

UNIVERSAL

THE FALL OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC



WILLIAM V
After a mezzotint by Hodges

THE FALL OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

BY HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS



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TO THE MEMORY

OF

MY MOTHER

"The best History is but like the art of Rembrandt; it casts a vivid light on certain selected causes, on those which were best and greatest; it leaves all the rest in shadow and unseen."

BUSKEN HUET, in Het Land van Rembrandt.

TO THE READER

THE following conversation is not uncommon: The well-intentioned Patron of Arts and Letters asks the Author what he is doing.

"Writing a History."

"That is good. Very good. A History of what?"

"The Fall of the Dutch Republic."

"Splendid! That is what Motley has done, too, and we need some new light on the subject. Look at it from a modern, up-to-date point of view—show us how the People . . . Hold on, now. I am wrong. You said, 'The Fall of the Dutch Republic'? Motley wrote the Rise. Why, I did not know that the thing had ever fallen."

And then, most welcome Reader, it appeared that out of a hundred interested inquirers, ninety-nine had none but the very vaguest conceptions of the adventures of the Dutch Republic from the moment it had ceased to be chronicled by the Great American Historian. Some few, who had taken English history in college, had dim recollections of a certain William of Orange who as the husband of Queen Mary had played some sort of a rôle in the works of the late Lord Macaulay.

But the untimely death of that famous English

author made it uncertain, how, when, and where said William had departed from this world.

As to most students, their stream of knowledge about Dutch history starts fresh and bright among the heroic deeds of the sixteenth century, follows a less impetuous course during the seventeenth, and runs itself to death among the dry sands of the eighteenth. They are aware of the undeniable fact that at the present moment there exists a Kingdom of the Netherlands. But what lies between the days of William III (of Macaulay fame) and the foundation of the modern kingdom, is a subject of quite as much speculation as the mediæval history of Greece or China. It has been my intention to supply the missing link for the benefit of American readers.

My fellow countrymen are fully informed about this subject. At least, they ought to be. Next to the excellent general history of the eighteenth century in Professor Blok's *History of the Dutch People*, they have in the special studies of Dr. Colenbrander a work which, measured by our deficient human standards, is well-nigh perfect.

For the writing of a book of such scope, the present writer possesses neither the energy nor the patience nor the ability. He can only aspire to write a short story of the main events which brought about the ruin of the old Dutch Republic, in the hope that some day a more able pen will write the history of this débâcle as it deserves to be written.

This book, therefore, does not pretend to give a finished picture. It is merely a preliminary sketch. The Author has faithfully tried to make it as short as possible. He has endeavored to omit as much as could possibly be discarded without spoiling a certain impression which he wanted to leave upon his Reader.

Dates and names, which on the whole do not tell most readers anything, have been referred to only when necessary. A full set of notes will tell the more inquisitive Brethren where they can find the grounds upon which the Author has based his opinions.

There remains the question of literary style and even correct English.

For the better part of his life the Author has not been familiar with the intricacies and peculiarities of that curious institution known as the English language. A kind friend has hunted through the pages of the manuscript and has eradicated the more evident solecisms.

For the remaining semi and entire absurdities, the Author begs the Reader's kind indulgence and his pardon.

But before he ends this peroration, allow him one more remark. The present work, with all its imperfections, would never have been written if it had not been for the friendly encouragement and support of a host of kind people, on whom the Author had no claim whatsoever. Since printing is expensive in this country, he will not try to enumerate them in a complete list. But when next in contemporary literature and public print you have it clearly demonstrated that your good country is going to constitutional dissolution and economic ruin, take courage.

For the Lord must have his own most special plans for a country which treats the stranger within its gates as well as it has treated the Reader's most humble servant,

HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON.

THE CAMP HOUSE Dublin, N. H., 31 October, 1912.

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THE FALL OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In December of the year of our Lord 1794, the revolutionary French armies crossed the frozen rivers of Brabant to attack the Dutch Republic. During the first days of January, 1795, they crossed the Maas and the Waal and entered Dutch territory.¹

Wherever they came, towns and villages fell into their hands, and the few fortifications they met were surrendered without the firing of a single gun. On January 16, the strong town of Utrecht opened its gates to the invaders. On the evening of the next day, the States General assembled in the Hague decided that under the circumstances further opposition was impracticable and that surrender was the only possibility. At midnight of the next day, the 18th, William V, the last hereditary Stadholder of the Republic of the United Netherlands, left the country and fled to England. A few weeks more and the Republic had ceased to exist. Her place was taken by the "Batavian Republic," a political dependency of victorious France. So, in a few days,

a work was destroyed which it had taken centuries to build up.

To the contemporary the end came in no way as a surprise. If there was occasion for surprise it was in the fact that the Republic had managed to exist as long as it had. For many years it had been on the road towards political and economical bankruptcy. But the respect which the Republic as a rich and well-managed community had enjoyed for many centuries had enabled it to survive long after its affairs had ceased to be sound. Like many another business (and as matter of fact it was little more than a large business house with a small admixture of politics), it had been living on its old reputation, contented to vegetate in peace, striving with all its might to put off the day when the true state of its affairs should be discovered.

But now a new power had sprung up in Europe, a power which respected neither hereditary rights nor old traditions, and which, having put its own house in order after its own fashion, had started out to bring its own particular salvation to its immediate neighbors and the world in general, whether they wanted it or not.

And behold, a very little shock and the old established Republic fell to pieces! The board of directors with their president at their head fled for their lives, and the stockholders permitted themselves to be reorganized upon an entirely new basis. So disgusted had the general mass of the public

become with their former leaders and their methods that they hailed the reorganization with joy and loudly welcomed the new era of liberty, equality and fraternity, which their new masters had promised.

In the following pages we shall try to describe how all this was possible; how the mighty Republic which had once held in its hands the destiny of Europe became a smug-living society of "rentiers"; how all attempts to instill new blood, new energy, and vigor into the decaying body failed through the stupidity of those who were called to be the leaders of the people; and how it came to pass that dependency upon France seemed to most citizens preferable to independence under the old national system of government.

The Republic of the United Seven Netherlands had been unique among the states of Europe. Other republics had existed before, from the very times of Athens and Sparta to the days of Venice and the Federation of the Swiss Cantons. Never before. however, had there been a republic which had been created and was maintained exclusively by the third estate — by the middle classes. This origin gave the Republic a character which stuck to it until the end of its days. It is true, the government soon developed into an oligarchy, and even in its best days it had nothing in common with a true democracy. But the essential fact remains that the Republic until its very end was true to its original character, and that the oligarchy which ruled it never suc-

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ceeded in changing itself into an established aristocracy.

During the early and the late Middle Ages, the different provinces, which later constituted the commonwealth, were not in any respects different from the rest of Europe. They had this marked advantage, that they were situated upon the confines of the great German Empire and were therefore spared much of the annoyance of the mediæval struggle between German Emperor and Roman Pope. But like the whole of Europe of that day, the Low Countries were gradually divided into a number of duchies, counties, and bishopries, and witnessed the foundation of a number of cities which as seats of the local potentates came to some small power and influence, though they did not play much of a rôle. Their isolated position and the many large rivers and inland seas which divided them from the mainland gave them a certain amount of safety, and made them familiar with life on the water. At the same time, the total absence of raw products of any sort forced their surplus population to look for a different occupation from that of farming, with which during the Middle Ages the majority of mankind was engaged. This occupation they found in trade, in carrying goods in their small ships from the Continent to England and along the coast of the Baltic. When in the thirteenth century the herring left the Baltic and came to the North Sea, they also established fisheries. During the Middle Ages, the southern part was by far the more prosperous. As early as the twelfth century the town of Bruges played a rôle similar to that of London or New York in our own day. The northern part, which in size and shape corresponds to the present Kingdom of Holland, was fairly comfortable, but certainly no more. It had a few industries, but these worked exclusively for home consumption.

In the Holy Roman Empire, to which they belonged officially, these different little states took no interest after the eleventh century. In the twelfth century they began to separate themselves from their large neighbor in the matter of language. This separation made a common sovereign impossible, and allowed each of the little feudal lords to work out his own salvation. Fortunately for the country the lord's own salvation and that of his subjects did not run in as diametrically opposite directions as they usually did during the days of feudalism. The country was not favorable for the development of petty tyrants. Liberty has always followed the shores of the ocean. Peasants in the Tyrol or central Germany, when maltreated by their masters, had nowhere else to go except to the next county, where they might find a worse employer than the one they had left at home. In a country, open on all sides and surrounded by water, the disgruntled subject could sail away and begin a new life within the walls of some near-by city. These little cities, the result of the moderate amount

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of prosperity caused by trade and commerce, were strongholds against which more than one small potentate broke his neck. Wherefore it behooved the small potentate to leave them in peace and treat his devoted subjects with some circumspection.

The absence of agricultural life, as known in the rest of the world, made an early introduction of the economic system possible and brought its benefits to the country as a whole. For the feudal master could subsist only so long as there was a feudal system to support him. The moment the economic system of life prevailed over the feudal, his feudal lordship commenced to starve. The only way to keep from starvation was by obtaining actual money, not butter and beeswax and cattle and the like. This actual money was not to be found among the peasants, many of whom never saw a coin during their entire lives. It was to be found only within the walls of the cities, and there were two ways in which to get it. One was to take the city and steal its contents. The other was to offer to the city for money what you might have to give it some day for nothing. This latter method was the more advan-Gradually the feudal lords, for certain considerations of cash-down, sold as many rights and privileges as the cities cared to buy. The cities put those rights and privileges, duly signed and sealed, in a strong-box, and placed the strong-box in the tower of the town hall. In the few cases where

the town hall has not been burned down, we may still see these documents, and from them understand how a certain amount of the old Germanic spirit of freedom never died out.

A detailed history of the Northern Lowlands during the Middle Ages may be of interest to the specialist; to humanity in general it means little more than the mediæval history of Denmark or Corea. There was no essentially Dutch civilization, no Dutch school of architecture or music. As for painting, there was very little, except in the south, where the Flemish School attracted all the young talent of the north — attracted it by better pay and by a more congenial civilization.

Up to the middle of the fifteenth century, the south had it all its own way. The north was the backwoods, the country districts, where people took an interest in religious matters and started all manner of queer puritanical brotherhoods, long after that sort of thing was out of fashion in the civilized world.

During the fifteenth century, the north simply went the way of the rest of the thousands of little states that formed the political map of Europe. A powerful house of French origin, with the ambition of reviving what once had been the inheritance of Lothar, the grandson of Charlemagne, started to buy, steal, or marry the different little principalities between the Meuse and the North Sea; and in little more than a century it acquired the majority of

the little states, and began upon a course of gradual amalgamation. To each little duchy or county, or whatever it was, was left its own shape and form and local government; but the Dukes of Burgundy became their common head, and replaced the former duke or count or lord, and ruled over them through their appointed representatives — their governors or stadholders.

At the end of the sixteenth century, the great plans of the House of Burgundy collapsed because the family had died out. Its inheritance went to the House of Hapsburg, which, from a small Swiss family of second-rate nobles, had by this time worked itself up to a position of great importance in Europe. A Hapsburg was Emperor in Germany, King of Spain, and King of Hungary, Supreme Ruler of all the little states in the Netherlands and of many in Italy.

If we translate its position into modern terms, we might say that the House of Hapsburg of the sixteenth century held a controlling interest in the shipping trust, the food trust, and the railroad trust. Most of the world paid it tribute in some way or other. Nowadays, the same house holds a controlling interest in Austria and in Spain only.

During the first half of the sixteenth century, the head of the house was of exceptional capacities. Under normal conditions he would no doubt have succeeded in getting his Dutch possessions into such shape that a large and united Dutch kingdom might

have grown out of it; a combination of present-day Belgium and Holland. But the same conditions, which in Germany retarded the process of centralization until within the last fifty years, also prevented the small Dutch states from continuing in their normal development.

The chief cause of this retardation was the Reformation.

The inhabitants of the Low Countries had always been good Catholics. More than that, they had been intensely and almost puritanically interested in religious matters. The Catholic Church, in its struggle with the German Empire for supremacy in political as well as in religious matters, had more and more become a worldly institution and had gradually lost its old character. To the average Latin mind of the sixteenth century the Church was a sort of general club to which you belonged as a matter of course, which baptized you and which buried you and kept a record of your marriage, but which otherwise was not expected to interfere with the agreeable pursuits of your daily life. You took a sort of polite interest in its established doctrines and went through certain formulas at certain times. More was not necessary. But here in the north, in the depressing and serious atmosphere of a country lower than sea-level, religion had always been taken with a terrible amount of seriousness. The easy-going and superficial mind of the Latin races was a horror to the heavy and

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plodding mind of the Hollander. He took his religion seriously because he took everything in life seriously.

In these countries nothing was (nor is now for that matter) passed over lightly—neither the affairs of the soul nor those of the body. The people could not help it. They were made that way. No longer was each little state obliged to be forever on guard against the attacks of its nearest neighbors. Murder and pillaging between rival counties had been seriously discouraged. There was no longer any demand for interstate warfare, since all the states belonged to one master. The cities developed rapidly, and the prosperity of their inhabitants increased out of all proportion to what it had been before. Greater prosperity meant greater leisure and more time to devote to study. Since the printing-press had brought books within the reach of the well-to-do, reading had become very general. It was reading of a solid sort, too, most of the books being theological works. Good Latin and Greek schools were within reach of anybody who showed exceptional ability.

The inherent desire to get at the real internal value of things, rather than to be contented with accepting their superficial meaning, made these people take a most serious and intense interest in the great theological discussion of their day. The great spiritual revolution which occurred during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries meant to the

mind of man what the revolution of our own century, in economic matters, may yet mean to our material lives. People felt that the life of their souls could not go on the way it was then going on, just as we, in our day, feel that there is something wrong with a system of economics which starves the majority without really making the minority happier or better.

During the fifteenth century repeated attempts had been made to reform the Church. These attempts had all failed utterly. During the early part of the sixteenth century they were renewed with great ardor by the Germans. Gradually and much against their own will and their general desires, the new reformers were forced to leave the fold of their own Church and to establish themselves independently.

We are very apt to think of the Reformation as a sudden great upheaval, a sort of a Chinese revolution, to-day this, to-morrow that. In Germany it took more than a century before a final and definite break occurred. It took quite as long in the Lowlands, before it became clear what was going to be the definite outcome of the original vague movement. For half a century, at least, a compromise seemed quite possible. But it so happened that the Low Countries had as their common ruler King Philip II of Spain, who had inherited them from his father Charles V, 'who had inherited them from his grandmother, Maria of Burgundy. Mr. Motley

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having done full justice to the character of King Philip, it would be sufficient to state that, under anybody else, less stupidly narrow-minded and less bigoted, there would have been a great chance of preventing the religious reformation from also becoming a political movement and from preventing the political movement from becoming an actual rebellion. Revolutions are seldom caused by a majority of all the people. The majority of the people everywhere and at all times is extremely conservative. When outward conditions are such that the majority for the moment is forced to give up its indifference and is willing to give silent support to the minority, a revolution usually succeeds. So it was in this revolution; so it was in England during Cromwell's time, in America during the years 1775-83, in France during the days of the great Revolution.

The people of the Netherlands were driven into open revolt through a combination of circumstances, some of a religious and some of a political nature. An attempt was made to force upon them a political system which was tolerated in Spain, but which no more fitted their Dutch nature than the Manchu system would have fitted America. The nature of the people was of an old Germanic, individualistic sort, and instinctively rejected all attempts at trying to press it into the collectivistic system of an absolute monarchy.

The old nobility of the land, discontented with

the political innovations which deprived them of some of their ancient rights and of their former privileges, were the first leaders of this vague movement against the religious and civic reforms being introduced by the Spanish king. Soon, however, the nobility saw that its chief support in acting against the sovereign came from the side of the middle classes — from the inhabitants of the cities. We cannot expect any class of people to commit suicide for the benefit of others. The nobility had nothing to expect from the middle classes. It had everything to expect from the king. Therefore the nobles soon came to an understanding with their legitimate sovereign and returned to their old allegiance. The cities were left to their own fate.

In the north, with the exception of Amsterdam, they were now all devoted to the new religion, to the doctrines of Martin Luther or to those of Calvin. After many years of rebellion, the cities were willing to compromise upon political matters, to recognize their ruler's right to institute such political innovations as he thought necessary. But, one and all of them, they positively refused to promise to give up their new religious convictions. Some of the cities of the south which had suffered terribly at the hands of the extreme Calvinistic demagogues were willing to make a compromise. They returned officially to their old faith, were pardoned, and in the future were treated with circumspection. But the cities in the seven provinces of the northern part

could not do this. They stuck to their demands for free worship. When these were flatly refused, they were forced to continue the struggle. Either they must go forward, whatever the consequences, or they must perish.

Of all the great leaders who played a part during these first two decades of the struggle for religious independence, only one of great prominence had remained faithful to the cause of these seven provinces. This was a German prince of eminent rank, once a very rich man, but now a pauper. His name was William. His rank that of a Count of Nassau Dillenburg. He is better known by his higher title of a Prince of Orange. Posterity, without any foundation for the by-name, has called him William the Silent. Officially he was the representative of the King of Spain in the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht,—the Stadholder.

In character he was everything which Philip was not. His eminent abilities as a statesman and an organizer, together with his tact and his patience in adversity, made him the man around whom the whole revolution developed. He was not, like Cromwell or Washington, a great military leader. As a general his abilities were indeed very mediocre. Neither was he at any time the recognized official head of the combined opposition. With many of the provinces which continued the hopeless struggle, he was not even officially connected. He was merely the executive head of three provinces, and the work

which he did he accomplished through the sheer strength of his personality. He was the man who, quite naturally and without great effort on his part, gradually became the personification of those ideas which caused the common opposition to the Spanish king. Nobody recognized this better than did King Philip himself when, in 1579, he offered an enormous sum in money and several additional rewards in honor to whosoever would murder William.

The difficulties of William's life during the years from 1575 to 1584 were enormous. Broken in health, covered with debts, and suffering under the loss of his oldest son, who was kept a prisoner in Spain, he actually did not have enough to provide for the wants of his large family. He passed his days in trying to keep the different rebellious provinces from flying at one another's throats; for all the time during which they were fighting the common enemy they never forgot their petty jealousies of each other, and small misunderstandings occurred continually.

Fortunately for their final cause, their condition gradually became so precarious that in 1579 they were obliged to forget all their different rivalries for the time being and were forced into a defensive alliance. This alliance, concluded in January of 1579, has since become known as the Union of Utrecht; and it has laid the foundation for the development of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands,

and later for the Kingdom of Holland. From that moment on the seven rebellious provinces, while retaining their complete provincial autonomy, for the purpose of all foreign matters, became as one province.²

After this step had been taken, it was comparatively an easy matter to reach the logical conclusion of this initial action, and in the year 1581 the representatives of the seven provinces solemnly abjured their common sovereign, King Philip, as he had broken his part of the contract existing between ruler and subject, and had actually persecuted his subjects, where he ought to have taken care of them with fatherly love and foresight.³

It was this principle of a contract between king and people which was followed up a century later by the English when they cut off their sovereign's head, and which served, still another hundred years afterward, as an example to France and to America, when the enraged inhabitants of these two countries, in France decapitated Louis XVI, and in America rebelled successfully against King George III.

Having in this way disposed of one sovereign, the new republic was now obliged to find another; for nobody as yet thought of establishing an absolutely independent democratic state, such as in our own day is established once in a while in Portugal, Panama, or China. Holland and Zeeland wanted to revive the old feudal dignity of count, and wanted to

make William a sort of constitutional count of their provinces. The step would not have been a difficult one. The executive powers of the former feudal lords of Holland had continued in the Burgundian princes and were assumed by the Spanish kings, who exercised them through their representative, the Stadholder. But the other provinces were afraid of Holland's large money-bags and the influence which they gave this province in the Union. They foresaw that Holland's ruler would also become the ruler of the Union. This their particularism would not allow, and in order to prevent it they tried all sorts of experiments with foreign potentates.

King Philip made the whole question more complicated by his standing reward of forty thousand guilders for William's murder. On the 10th of July, 1584, this reward was at last won. William was murdered in Delft in his own home, and the chances of the House of Orange becoming the constitutional head of the republic came to naught. For William's oldest son, Maurice, who succeeded him as the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Republic, lacked all of his father's superior qualities as a statesman. It was impossible that this rough-and-ready cavalry leader should assume a position which required an amount of tact, patience, and circumspection almost beyond human endurance.

Maurice was, therefore, kept at the front, clearing the Republic's territory of the Spaniards, while

the experiments with foreign princes were continued. These experiments, however, failed, and failed completely. Gradually and much against their own desires, the seven different provinces were forced to recognize the fact that none of their neighbors was willing to become their ruler on the terms which they were willing to offer. The only alternative was that they take the management of their own affairs into their own hands.

The Union of Utrecht, as the only tie which bound the different provinces together, now became a sort of common constitution, something for which it had never been intended and for which it was not in the least adapted. The estates of the seven provinces, as the principal surviving form of the old order of things, were obliged to assume the direct sovereignty of their states and to take the actual government into their own hands. In our days the sovereignty would have gone to the people, but in the sixteenth century the people as such had not yet been invented. They were a vast and intangible mass. The estates were their only tangible representatives. As such they assumed the command of the provinces and of the Union.

These estates had been in existence for almost two centuries.⁵ Originally they had been a sort of advisory board which was consulted by the feudal lord whenever he needed funds. At first they had only consisted of representatives from among the clergy and the nobility. Gradually, with the in-

crease of their economic importance, the cities had been asked to send delegates. The influence of the civic members had quickly increased during the fifteenth century. During the Reformation the clergy had of course disappeared, and their share in the estates had been taken over by the cities. This meant that the nobility lost most of its power, for it was now opposed by two thirds of the total membership of the different estates. In many other countries, especially in Germany, the share of the clergy fell into the hands of the nobility, and meant a corresponding loss to the cause of the citizens.

After the seven provinces had abjured their king, the estates remained on the whole very much what they had been before. They still were chiefly a consulting body, composed of a certain number of representatives from different cities appointed directly by the town council and not in any way by the people. In no two provinces were the estates formed in the same way. The whole system was so complicated, and so typical of the Republic and its strong particularism, that we shall do well to describe it in short terms.

In Holland there were in all nineteen votes in the provincial estates. Eighteen of those votes belonged to the eighteen principal cities. One belonged to the seven members of the old nobility, who were obliged to vote collectively. The cities, therefore, had everything their own way. Each one could send as many delegates as it liked, but each city

had but one vote. As for the small towns and the country districts, they were not represented at all. The nobility was vaguely expected to look after their needs.

In Zeeland there were seven members of the provincial estates and there were seven votes. Six of those belonged to the six largest cities, one to the nobility. But there was no nobility. Either the noble houses had died out or they had remained faithful to the Spanish rule and had been disfranchised. The one vote of the old local nobility now belonged to the Princes of Orange, who had bought the Marquisate of Vlissingen and Veere.

In Utrecht things were very complicated. This was owing to the fact that Utrecht had formerly been a bishopric, in which of course the clergy had played an unusually large part. The clergy as such had disappeared, but as it was found to be impossible to get out of the intricacies which were left by their departure from their ancient possessions in cloisters and farms covering a large part of the province, the vote of the late clergy was continued. It now belonged to a number of delegates specially appointed by the nobility and the smaller cities. The nobility also possessed one vote. The four large cities had one vote together. Here we find, therefore, that the cities played a much less important rôle than they did in Holland and Zeeland.

The same was true in Gelderland, where the system was even more complicated. This province, a

former duchy, was divided into three so-called "quarters." Each of these quarters had small estates of its own, in each of which there were two votes, belonging to the combined cities and to the combined nobility. Furthermore, in most of the cities there was a body of thirty or forty specially selected men who might be consulted by these estates upon special occasions. Three times a year the three quarters met jointly. However, they never deliberated in common. The subjects for discussion were brought up in the meeting of the whole, but were debated separately, to be voted upon again in a joint meeting in which each quarter had one vote.

Overysel had somewhat the same complicated form of government.

Friesland was even worse, having four different quarters. One of these quarters consisted of the eleven large cities. The other three were again subdivided into eleven, ten, and nine sub-quarters. A joint meeting of the estates brought together more than eighty delegates who, however, had only four votes at their disposal, one for each quarter. In case of a tie, the Stadholder of the province was asked to decide.

Groningen was divided into two parts, each with a vote; one for the city of Groningen and one for the surrounding country, which again was divided into three quarters, each with its own direct subestates.

Except in the Province of Holland where the estates met practically the whole year round and where they gradually developed into a sort of parliament, the estates of the other provinces were a most clumsy and unmanageable political instrument. For while the combined cities or the combined nobility, except in Zeeland, had but one vote at their disposal, they could send as many delegates as they could afford to send, who before a vote was taken were to meet together and then decide upon their vote. But it will be easily understood that, for example, in Utrecht, where the town of Utrecht used to send twenty delegates and the other three cities two each, said town of Utrecht had everything its own way. In Overysel things were established in such a way that a majority of votes could be brought about if three cities voted with one noble or forty-seven nobles with one city. In Friesland practically everybody who was a farmer of some independence had a direct influence upon the government and had a right to be heard in the meetings of the sub-quarters. In Groningen the whole town council of the town of Groningen were ex-officio members of the delegation to the estates. In Zeeland some small cities which gradually developed into "rotten boroughs" had more individual power than Amsterdam, with one eighth of the total population of the Republic, had in the Estates of Holland.

To be short, there was no general system of any

sort. Each province stuck as closely as possible to its ancient clumsy political arrangement and strongly opposed any attempts at uniformity. Of course, the system was bad, but it had the power that comes with centuries of existence. It had developed very slowly and it now worked through sheer force of habit, just as the absurd system of measures and weights works in Anglo-Saxon countries because everybody has become accustomed to it. The chief disadvantage of the system lay in the fact that it made the estates merely a meetingplace of the representatives of several independent cities who were not expected to pull together; who never for a moment forgot their own petty interests, and whose great joy at all times was to block the plans of their neighbors and rivals.

Unfortunately the government of the Union as a whole was not a whit better. The highest body of the central government was the Estates General. This body, which met permanently, had been intended to be both the House of Representatives and the Senate in one, with the addition of a few of the powers of the Executive.

Each of the provinces had but one vote, although here, too, each could send as many delegates as it wished, and could appoint them after its own fashion. These delegates met like so many Ambassadors Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary from a number of independent sovereign powers, who deigned to come together to discuss some

matter of common importance, but who intended strictly to maintain their own country's full and absolute autonomy. The Estates General were expected to discuss matters of war and peace, of treaties, of army and navy, of religion, and of taxation. They were also to indicate what foreign policy the Union should follow.

Sometimes, indeed, when all these ambassadors happened to agree about some matter of common interest, the Estates General might be said to resemble a modern parliament. But only upon such rare occasions. Usually there was a difference of opinion upon all questions, and unless there was a strong man in the Republic who could force his will upon the whole community, the majority never felt itself bound to obey the decisions of the majority. For the high contracting parties of the Union of Utrecht, even in that moment of extreme danger, had been careful to avoid the institution of a central power which could have turned their old and beloved anarchy into a centralized government. The spirit of the Middle Ages had been too strong upon them. Everything was left to the good will of the different provinces, and of this article they had very little.

But there was still a third power in the Republic which, with an ill-defined right and prerogative, was apt to make things more complicated. This third power was the Stadholder.⁶ Originally the representative of the sovereign, the Stadholder,

had been the executive of each province. But when the sovereign was abjured, it was impossible for the provincial estates to make themselves the executive of the whole province. They, were too unwieldy a body to do the executive work for which they never had been trained. The office of the Stadholder was therefore continued in all of the provinces. But what were its direct powers? It is very difficult to say, because, as time went on and the estates grew in independence, they continually tried to encroach upon the old rights of the Stadholder, while the Stadholder in turn tried to encroach upon the rights of the estates.

Nominally the Stadholder, after the sovereign had been abjured, was the paid executive and the hired servant of the estates. But in many ways his power was much more direct and far-reaching than that of his nominal masters. When the Stadholder happened to be a strong man, he was apt to eclipse his masters entirely. He soon became a very undesirable institution in the eyes of the estates, and whenever they could do so the provinces tried to manage their affairs without appointing a stadholder; in which case they drew upon themselves the executive powers. In this way we often find part of the provinces with a stadholder and part of them without one, or a number of provinces sharing one stadholder.

Add to this fact that each province except Zeeland had a separate synod to look after the affairs

of the Church: had a number of deputy estates t look after such affairs as demanded immediate attention; had separate high courts of justice;7 that there were five different and separate admiralties, each working independently of the others, and that each province looked after its own finances in its own special way; and we ask ourselves how it was possible that this heterogeneous form of government could subsist as long as it actually did, and could even make itself one of the leading powers of Europe. The answer to our question, however, is simple. In reality the whole thing straightened itself out as such things usually do. Legally there was no one central head to guide the Republic, no one great power which could force its will upon the others. But without strong guidance no nation can exist: therefore what could not be done legally, was done illegally and with great success.

In the last instance it came down to a very vulgar matter of dollars and cents. Holland paid fifty-eight per cent of the common funds, and Holland ran the Republic. Should any of the other provinces refuse to obey its dictates, then Holland, by refusing to pay its share of the common expenses, could threaten a bankruptcy. In turn, the man or the party managing to become supreme in Holland was also supreme in the whole of the Republic. It may be well to keep this fact in mind during the discussion which we shall bring up in later chapters of this book.

The greatest individual office in the Republic was, after all, that of the executive, of the Stadholder. But during the years of warfare against Spain, when the Stadholder was usually away from the seat of government and out in the field protecting the Republic's territory from invasion and clearing it of the Spaniards, another official, a provincial one, managed to acquire for his office vast and important powers. That this could happen was in the first place owing to the brilliancy of the men who were appointed to this office during the first half-century of the Republic's existence. This office was that of Raadpensionaris of Holland.⁸

Again it is difficult to say what a raadpensionaris was. He held so many offices which we now divide among a number of men that we cannot translate his powers into direct modern equivalents. He attended the meetings of both the Estates of Holland and the Estates General. In the Estates of Holland he was not only the chairman, but also brought out the vote of the nobility. During the first years of independence, when Holland on its own initiative had organized a diplomatic service, the Raadpensionaris became the man who directed this service. Later on he continued this work, and became practically the minister of foreign affairs of the entire Republic. The Raadpensionaris was the man who was in actual daily contact with all the most important bodies of the government, and of course he was the man who knew best what was going on everywhere. Perhaps we shall come nearest to the truth if we call him President of the House of Representatives, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister in one. This great power enabled a strong man to become the practical ruler of the Union.

But in the course of time this office became still another thing. The Raadpensionaris of Holland became the leader of the separatist party, for such we can call one of the two large parties in the Republic. There were no parties in our sense of the word, with conventions and caucuses and bosses and all the rest of it. But there were two general modes of thought prevalent, and the Raadpensionaris became the unofficial leader of those who wanted a strong decentralized form of government, while the Stadholder became the leader of those who saw their only salvation in a strong central government, in which the Stadholder should be a constitutional monarch.

I have mentioned the fact that the majority of the people had nothing to do with the government either one way or the other. Then, who were those men who made up the different estates and the whole large body of town councils, deputy estates, admiralty colleges, etc., etc.? Without exception they were members of certain influential families. The rule of patrician families was nothing new or original to the Republic. It dated back to the Middle Ages, when it was imperative that a few strong families should have the government in their hands.

Wherever this had not been the case, as it was not in the large cities of Belgium, continual chaos had been the result. During the war with Spain, a few families had been tories and had been obliged to leave the country after the defeat of their cause. Their place was taken by others of conspicuous zeal for the new cause. But the system remained the same.

In each city there were a number of families, prominent through fortune and relationship, which, without belonging to the old nobility, were regarded as predestined to perpetuate the town government. From among these the Stadholder, as chief executive, appointed the burgomasters, the town councils, and the sheriffs. From among themselves they appointed the members to the provincial and general estates. From among themselves they appointed the directors of the admiralty colleges and the directors in every large financial undertaking. They formed a close corporation, perpetuating itself, the members marrying only among themselves and rigorously keeping out any and all outsiders. After generations of probation, a new family might be adopted, but even then only with very great difficulty. As a class they were called the Regents.9

As all-powerful rulers of their respective big or small cities, they ran these cities, provinces, and the Republic very much as if they were their own private concerns. They were most terribly jealous of one another's powers, and each small corporation wanted to be consulted quite as much as its larger neighbors. Wherefore it happened that a matter which was brought up for discussion in the Estates General was referred back to the provincial estates, who referred it back to the town councils of the different cities, who thereupon gave their opinion and sent their opinion back to the provincial estates. who thereupon forwarded this opinion to the Estates General, who thereupon might try to come to some general conclusions. This method meant that all affairs had first to be discussed by some two thousand different persons, representing some fifty different cities, and that these matters for discussion were usually half a year under way before they returned to the place whence they had started. It also meant that nothing could possibly be kept a secret, and that the only successful rulers of the Republic were those who, against all laws and usages, established a secret body of half a dozen persons. who, quite illegally and over the heads of all the other officials, acted on such important affairs as must remain secret for the time being.

This sort of government, however, strengthening itself as time went on, and becoming more and more rigid in all its forms, was never popular with the masses. The people did not so much mind being under the direct rule of a stadholder who was also a prince of royal blood. His title was as good as any in Europe. He kept a real court and a real lifeguard. He was the commander-in-chief of the arm-

ies of the Union, and if he were a famous general, too, as Maurice and his brother happened to be, his court became the centre to which young noblemen from all over the world flocked to learn their trade. He wore a beautiful uniform, and pranced around on a horse, surrounded by his suite. His wife was a daughter of a royal house. That was something tangible. He was the real prince of the people's imagination.

But what sort of respect could the men in the street have for the members of the estates? A lot of black-coated, white-jaboted citizens whose grandfathers had been green-grocers or brewers! Their wives had no greater claim to honor. Money and family influence and general circumstances might have helped the grandfather out of his class, but his neighbors were not going to forget his origin.

And now, behold, since these folk had come to such large power they treated the masses as if they did not exist. The mob, the common man, the lower people, were the terms used to designate ninety-five per cent of the population. The ninety-five per cent did not like it, but they were too busy with their material affairs and they were too dependent in an economic way upon the rich classes to be able to show their objections. There was nothing which resembled our highly modern "class warfare." Until fifty years or so ago, most people were quite willing to recognize the fact that there must be classes, and that all can be happy without

envying one another. The average man of the sixteenth century was quite willing to leave the government to their lordships and not be bothered with it himself. But when he had to choose between the two candidates for the government — between the very human and grand seigneury Stadholder, with all the paraphernalia of royalty around him, and his technical masters, the Estates, with all their heavy pomp of rich merchants, then he was sure to call "hurray" for the Stadholder and to dismiss their High and Mightinesses of the Estates with a profound but icy bow. Only when the regents produced a man of more than exceptional ability, a man who under the solid black coat and the white ruffles hid the heart of a soldier and showed himself a true leader, could they actually run the country. When there was no such man, the people turned instinctively toward the Stadholder, in whom they saw the embodiment of what they considered a sovereign ought to be.

A very short review of the history of the Republic will show what we mean.

Maurice, the oldest son of William, succeeded his father when the latter was murdered; and for a period of forty years he was practically the dictator of the Republic. As a general he made a wonderful record. He was the victor in three great pitched battles and took thirty-eight walled cities and forty-five fortifications, thereby driving the Spaniards defiantly from the Republic's territory. As

commander-in-chief of the common army and as Stadholder of six of the seven provinces, he was by far the most influential and the most powerful man in the Republic.

Hence he soon got into trouble with the Estates of Holland, who feared that his power would develop along monarchical lines. The leader of the opposition was the old Raadpensionaris of Holland, Johan van Oldenbarneveldt. The result of the struggle which ensued is well known. Maurice remained victorious and Oldenbarneveldt, after having been condemned by a packed tribunal, was put to death. In 1625, Maurice died. His brother Frederic Henry succeeded him as commander-in-chief and also as Stadholder in all of the provinces except Friesland. Frederic Henry continued the war with Spain quite as successfully as his brother had done. But he, also, was too much occupied with military affairs to be able to pay much attention to internal politics. He did nothing to establish his assumed powers upon a legal basis. He ruled the Republic because he happened to be the strongest man in the whole commonwealth and because there was no well-organized opposition. In fact, he was the uncrowned king of the Dutch Republic, but in theory he was still only the "hired man" of the Estates.

In 1647, Frederic Henry was succeeded by his young son William II. William, educated like a crown prince and married to the daughter of James II of England, related to all the most power-

ful reigning houses of Europe, got into immediate trouble with the Estates and more particularly with the rich commercial cities headed by Amsterdam. He might (but this is mere speculation) have succeeded in what his father and uncle had failed to do, and might have made himself hereditary ruler of the Republic, but he died most unexpectedly and without leaving a successor. His son William III was born eleven days after his death.

The Republic was without a stadholder. The estates of the provinces immediately used this most favorable occasion to draw unto themselves all the power formerly invested in the Stadholder. They now became representative and executive in one. The cities rushed to as complete an independence as was possible from provincial supervision. The right of appointment to the town council, until then invested in the Stadholder, was taken up by the town council itself, which thereby became an autonomous and self-continuing body, practically independent of the provincial estates and ruling its city as if it were an independent commonwealth.

For thirty years the Estates, the Regent families, ruled the country absolutely. Jan de Witt became their leader. He now became the Republic's dictator as much as the Princes of Orange had been before him. He also continued their foreign policy and with great success. A statesman of exceptional ability, a politician of great cunning, he gradually but firmly increased the power of the Regents until

it seemed that the House of Orange was doomed to be excluded from power and influence in the Republic forever. When it appeared that the weak posthumous child of William II was going to live after all and had a very sound mind in a very unsound body, de Witt managed to have several laws passed which not only made it impossible for the Princes of Orange to occupy the position of Stadholder, but which altogether and for all time abolished this high office.

During the middle of the seventeenth century, it looked as if the Republic was going to follow the example of Venice, and was going to develop into a republic governed by a legally instituted aristocracy. Only one thing prevented the Regents from establishing themselves as such: there was no standing army. For although Article 8 of the Union of Utrecht declared that a general census should be taken of all people between the ages of eighteen and sixty, in order that a regular militia might be established from among them for the defense of the whole country, no such militia had ever been organized. Except in one single province the census had never been taken. It was found to be infinitely cheaper and more expedient to hire troops to do the fighting than to drill a busy and commercial population for a work for which they had neither aptitude nor liking. The army of foreign mercenary troops, commanded, however, by Dutch officers, many of whom belonged to the nobility of

the country provinces, who still preferred a military career to business life, was under direct command of the Stadholder. He it was who appointed the officers, and who as an active officer came into daily contact with the men. Naturally he was more popular than the members of the Estates, who paid for the expenses of the army, but who did so grudgingly, and who were forever trying to reduce the cost of maintenance as well as the size of the army. When there were no stadholders the Estates General became the direct commanders of the army. But then the relation between the two became even worse, for no military man ever likes to be controlled by or to be interfered with by a civilian. Therefore, whatever there was left of the Republic's armies was openly and avowedly on the side of the Princes of Orange and quite as openly and avowedly against the Regents. The army was spread over the many small towns along the frontier, and there it spent its days in cursing its luck and wishing for better times.

Besides the regular army in the service of the Estates General, there was yet another armed force in the Republic. This consisted of the volunteer militia of the different towns. It was something between Boston's Ancient and Honorable Artillery and a regular police corps. In case of fire and riot, it was called upon to maintain order. It also did a nominal guard duty on the city walls. Chiefly, however, this militia was a pleasant social organization,

known to posterity by the famous pictures which contemporary painters have made of its members attending their excellent dinners or their pleasant outings.

The officers of these militia companies were appointed by the town council, and therefore apt to belong to the Regent class. The rank and file, however, belonged to the large class of tradespeople and small shopkeepers. They were no uniform. Whenever the fire-alarm was rung, the men put on a colored sash, took a halberd or a gun, and made for the site of danger to keep their fellow citizens from plundering or from bothering the firemen. Also in case of riot they might be called upon to reëstablish order. Except in the year 1672, when the Republic seemed completely lost, the civic militia was never called upon to do any actual fighting, and on that occasion they proved themselves as useless as untrained volunteers always are. Being economically dependent upon the good will of their rich neighbors, these soldiers could not very well show their dislike of the Regents openly. But it was quite evident that, in case of a quarrel between Regents and people, the citizen-soldiers would not allow themselves to become an instrument in the hands of the oligarchy.

In this connection we are led to think of Napoleon's comparison of himself and the Bourbons, when he stated that he, as a usurper, needed constant new victories to maintain himself, while they,

the Bourbons, as the legitimate House of France, were as secure upon their throne in defeat as they were in victory. For, taking it all in all, the government of de Witt had not been bad. It is true he had neglected the army, in which he felt little interest. On the other hand, he had given a great impetus to the building of a strong navy, and had successfully maintained the glory of the Republic's fleets against England and France and Sweden. During the twenty years of his reign the Republic reached a height of prosperity and a prominence in art and science which was never again attained. Through his personal example, de Witt introduced a degree of honesty and integrity in public affairs which up to that time had been sadly lacking, and which after his death was as sadly lacking as before his rule began.

It was this very prosperity which allowed de Witt to do what he actually did. Everybody was so busy looking after his own personal affairs that nobody had time to bother about those of the country. A strong fleet protected the merchant and his ships wherever they went. New industries were developed and were encouraged by the Government. There was work for everybody and nobody needed to be either idle or hungry. In short, all those conditions of material prosperity prevailed which in our own day prevail in America, and which so fully occupy the minds of the majority of American people that they have neither time nor inclination

to bother about the way in which they are being governed.

Therefore, whatever they did the Regents were forced to keep within certain bounds. Should their methods cause great and general discontent, they knew that they were powerless against the mass of the people. And here it was that in the year 1672 they made their mistake. De Witt, whose contempt for the masses was supreme, went just a little too far. The hatred which he caused by his overbearing behavior was intense and was not in the least confined to the mere rabble.

When in 1672, through a most unfortunate combination of circumstances, and not in the least through the perfidy of King Charles II of England. the Republic had to face a war with France, England, and several German princes, the whole political fabric of de Witt fell to pieces. A sudden thaw did more to save the Republic than all its military forces had been able to do. A panic spread throughout the land. Everywhere the people clamored for the appointment of the young Prince of Orange as stadholder. Their only salvation, so they claimed, lay in this appointment, and they demanded it peremptorily and quickly. De Witt was forced to give in. William was appointed commander-inchief and was made stadholder, not only of Holland but also of four other provinces. Even then the fury of the people knew no bounds. Only after de Witt and his brother had been dragged from prison and

lynched by a mob, which acted with the full approval and the assistance of the better classes, did peace and quiet return.

William III, who is well known in history as King of England, had less power in the land over which he ruled as a monarch than over the country where he was only the Stadholder. 10 As a matter of fact his powers in the Republic were practically unlimited. If there ever was a man who could have changed the government of the Republic, it was William III. He had the whole of the nation behind him. Their attitude was: "We have established you where you can be of permanent benefit to our state. Go ahead and we will back you up in anything you do." But the truth of the matter is that William had not the slightest interest in such reforms. History repeated itself. There was a change of men but not of methods. On the whole the government of de Witt had been less selfish than the government of William proved to be. William used the Republic as he used England, and as he used everybody he could get in his power, for his own special purpose — for the purpose of resisting the aggressive policy of France and of preventing the great revival of the Catholic power.

In order to be successful in this self-imposed task, William was willing to adopt any corrupt system of politics, either at home or abroad. Whenever he was unable to enforce his will by legal methods, he unscrupulously did so by illegal ones. Without any

delicacy and with great brutality he forced all the different elements into line to support him in his international policies. That he made the Republic exert herself far beyond her real strength was a matter of no concern to him. The Republic might have gone into bankruptcy, for all he cared. The debts of the provinces were increased tremendously, the admiralties were compelled to build more ships than they ever could hope to pay for, the industries of the country were allowed to go to ruin. It mattered not to the Stadholder as long as the Union could be made to pay in one way or the other for his wars against France. The general tone of politics became worse than it had been under de Witt. Power and influence were within reach of those only who could gain the ear of the Stadholder or of one of his camarilla. When William died in 1702, his task was done. France had been held within bounds and the famous balance of European power had been reëstablished.

But all this had been accomplished at the expense of the Republic's financial supremacy. William III left no direct successor. The popular attempt to improve conditions by the appointment of a stadholder with unlimited power had completely failed. Without a murmur the people returned to the government by the Regents.

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

On the 12th of April of the year of our Lord 1713, the market-place of the town of Utrecht witnessed an unusual commotion. Early in the day two small cannon had been posted in front of the town hall. At exactly ten o'clock in the morning they were fired. This meant that the delegates of France, Spain, England, Sweden, and the Republic had concluded peace — a peace which ended the War of the Spanish Succession and which at the same time ended the political rôle of the great Republic.

After having been one of the leading powers of Europe for more than a century, the Republic voluntarily retired from active life among the great nations. Her armies were disbanded. Her fleet was allowed to rot away in the harbors. Her generals and admirals were pensioned off and sent home to tend their vegetable gardens. Their places were taken by diplomats, long-wigged and well provided with money. This money was to serve to buy peace. Peace at any cost, even at the cost of dishonor, was to be the new creed of the Republic. It is true the old prosperity remained, and for many decades to come commerce and industry were to be quite profitable. But it seems that the

"men" had died out. During a whole century we look in vain for a single man of more than ordinary ability.

The House of Orange, after having produced in a straight line five princes of great prominence, either as generals or as statesmen, died out in the direct line. Its titles and its dignities were inherited by the collateral line of the stadholders of Friesland. But neither of the princes who were called to play a rôle during the eighteenth century rose above the most mediocre abilities. Both William IV and William V were second-rate men; men of good intentions but absolutely lacking in physical strength, in courage and initiative.

The long list of great statesmen seems to stop abruptly. Their former places are now taken by politicians — some clever and unscrupulous, others merely unscrupulous; and none of them rising above the narrow point of view of their little home towns. The Regents are again the rulers of the country. But they are no longer the men of the days of de Witt. They are a caricature of their ancestors. They are no longer men of energy working for some definite, albeit selfish, ends. They are fast petrifying into a class of imitation aristocrats, and they retire from active business and allow their capital to work for them.

But the nation as a whole, the men and women, who a century before had gone through famine, siege, and pestilence rather than submit to a for-

eign will and a foreign church; what has become of them? They, too, have degenerated; they have settled into a large mass of well-to-do and selfcontented rentiers. Their energy and their enterprise are gone. Their money has been invested. Their dividends are expected to keep them in comfort. The seventeenth century was the century of the accumulation of wealth; the eighteenth century was the century of the enjoyment thereof.

Several hundred millions of guilders were still tied up in trade and foreign commerce.11 But in addition there was an enormous surplus, which was used for investments. The Republic during the eighteenth century became the great moneylender of the whole world. The Exchange of Amsterdam became the centre of the international stock-market. More than 340,000,000 guilders were invested in foreign securities, in Europe, in the East Indies, in America. A very large part of the English national debt was in Dutch hands. More than 25,000,000 guilders a year went from England to the Republic in the form of dividends alone. France had taken 25,000,000; Spain, Russia, Sweden, and some smaller German countries had taken 30,000,000 guilders. The general banking business and exchange, of which Amsterdam had become the centre, had taken about 50,000,000. More than 140,000,000 were tied up in colonial enterprises in the East Indies and in South America. Millions were invested in city loans and loans to provinces and counties. It was estimated that the sum of 50,000,000 guilders represented the value of the gold and silver and precious stones in the possession of the Republic's citizens. This large accumulation of wealth in such a short time could only have been possible in an age when the capture of a single Spanish treasure fleet produced net results of some 12,000,000 guilders.

The standard of interest in the eighteenth century was much higher than that of our own time. Twelve per cent was no exception. It will be understood what a steady stream of dividends flowed into this small space of territory, and what a large part of its population was allowed a life of "otium cum dignitate," with the cutting of coupons as its only serious occupation, and allowed to spend its days in the contemplation of that famous ode of Horace which begins "Beatus ille qui procul negotiis."

Yet there was another side to this delightful picture. To the national character this heavenly rest meant little good. As the Republic had loaned money to everybody, it meant that she had to stay good friends with everybody. War with England or war with France would have meant the immediate suspension of a large part of the dividends from these countries, and would therefore have been most harmful to the general prosperity. What was worse, it meant that, no matter with whom the Republic got into a fight, she was going to be fought

with her own capital. For this reason war with another nation had to be avoided at all cost.

In the second place, all this money invested abroad meant a direct loss to the industries at home. The cost of living was — and for that matter still is - much higher in the prosperous Netherlands than in the surrounding countries. The workman here had better wages than elsewhere, and as the guilds were less strongly developed he had greater liberty to look after his own private interests. Moreover, the industries were obliged to compete with the merchant marine. The merchant marine paid good wages, and the industries had to pay more to get the men at all. All of this meant an increase in the cost of production, which in turn meant a smaller standard of interest on the invested capital. Unfortunately the Hollander of the eighteenth century was not patriotic enough to invest at home with a prospect of four and a half or five percent, when he could get six or seven per cent abroad, in quite as safe undertakings. This meant that during the course of the century, when competition from abroad began to be serious and to affect the Dutch markets, the Dutch manufacturers could not increase their business as they should have done to meet this new competition.

But greater even than these material considerations was the moral influence which this new mode of things had upon the public in general. Trade and industry were beginning to be looked upon as not quite "fashionable." The Regents gradually retired from business altogether, and lost all touch with the rest of the people. Very many of the people who came directly after the Regents in social order were just as well-to-do, although they did not belong to the governing class. These speedily imitated their betters and also left business alone. Their sons were sent to the universities and were made to study jurisprudence as an introduction to some polite occupation. The rest of the people began to consider this mild fashion of loafing as the beau ideal of life. This wholesale retirement from business meant that the existing capital was not being increased. Yet with the continual increase in the cost of living and the gradual introduction of new luxuries, larger incomes were more needed than ever before in order to keep up with the times.

There remained but one way in which to increase capital except by straightforward labor. This was by speculation. Now, we should not like to give the impression that the inhabitants of the United Netherlands had ever been averse to speculating. When Tacitus visited their ancestors, he had remarked, as one of their chief characteristics, that they were willing to gamble at any time and for any thing they possessed, up to their wives and children and their own personal freedom. This gambling spirit had never been absent, and it had broken loose from time to time in such exaggerated forms as the great tulip craze of 1637, or later in a giant

exploitation of the Mississippi Bubble. The great commercial bodies, such as the India companies, had also been built more on solid water than on solid stock and had offered wonderful chances for some clever speculating.

Speculating was now, however, becoming restricted to gambling on the values of the stockmarket. Next to the Ten Commandments the reports of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange became the guiding spirit of a good many families, who were constantly living beyond their incomes and who were trying to make both ends meet by some careful manipulations on 'Change. Then, as now, a few clever men, who knew the inside working of the thing, made money and made a lot of it. Then, as now, the outsider was made to pay for the other fellow's luck and lost whatever he had.

We had occasion to mention the Mississippi Bubble. When John Law extended his operations to the Republic, almost every city and every village became involved in the speculation that followed (except the careful Regents of Amsterdam). The wave of prosperity that followed lasted just long enough to make people fond of the luxuries which their temporarily increased means allowed them. The terrible failure which followed immediately after made it all the harder for them to go without those luxuries. But the score of families that were ruined for all time were soon forgotten for the few lucky people who had pulled a fortune out of this gamble.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century large financial crises came with a horrible regularity. First of all in '63. Then in '73. This second one was followed by the worst of all, that of '81. Each crisis, started by some outward cause, was made possible by the unsound condition of affairs. Its direct result every time was the failure of a number of banks. These bank failures, in a community of investors, meant ruin to a number of private families who by this time had lost all taste or aptitude for actual business. If they were possessed of a certain amount of political influence, they could usually manage to get employment somewhere in the Indies in the service of the East India Company. This was the last resort for failures among the best families, and it usually allowed them to recover from their past losses by a careful exploitation of the natives. The small fry, however, the little investors, were left high and dry and had to begin all over again on the economic and social ladder.

Wall Street — in this case the Stock Exchange of Amsterdam — became the highest ruler of the land. The stock exchange is no doubt a very valuable servant of a prosperous country. As a master, however, it has never yet been a success.

The greatest source of income to the Republic had always been its commerce. Its very existence depended upon it. When the English war of 1781 destroyed this commerce, the Republic was doomed and collapsed within a few years.

As we have seen before, the inhabitants of the Low Countries had been forced first of all into this carrying trade, because the absence of raw materials made the development of large industries an impossibility, while the central position between many large nations allowed special facilities for international commerce. But during the sixteenth century another great factor had encouraged the development of this trade in a measure out of all proportion to the size of the country and the number of its inhabitants. We mean the fact that after the Spanish yoke had been once thrown off, the Republic was spared further internal troubles, while the surrounding countries were kept in a state of constant ferment for another century.

Germany had suffered from the Thirty Years' War, which reduced her population from eighteen million to four million, and which destroyed her prosperity for at least three centuries. England went through a series of civil wars, which seriously hampered her normal economic development. In France, the first part of the sixteenth century was a period of continuous religious wars and of several severe internal disturbances. Spain had been ruined by a system of political economy which had drained it of its entire gold supply. Portugal, an old colonial rival of the Republic, was exhausted after the many years of Spanish domination.

The Republic, on the other hand, when in the year 1602 it concluded the twelve years' truce with

Spain, had its hands comparatively free. Holland and Zeeland, the two principal commercial provinces, had not suffered directly from the enemy for almost twenty years and had been able to develop their resources in perfect peace. Except for the riot of 1672, which lasted only a few weeks, there had been no actual bloodshed in a civil war. There had been political and religious struggles, but never had the business life of the country been suspended while two warring factions were actually fighting for the control of the government.

It is true, that the Republic, during the seventeenth century, had fought several severe wars with England, but these wars were fought for economic purposes and not for religious or dynastic principles. Since 1600 the Republic had on the whole been able to give its entire force towards the development of its trade, commerce, and industries. When in 1621 the war with Spain was renewed, the Republic suffered no loss but that of the actual sums of money with which it paid others to do the fighting. On the contrary, the renewed hostilities allowed the different trading companies to attack the Spanish and Portuguese colonies wherever they could, and enabled them to acquire a large share of new territory.

In the matter of religion, the Republic did not yet avow any modern ideas of tolerance, and certainly she did not openly recognize the existence of perfect liberty in all those things which pertain to

the soul. But neither did she aggressively persecute all those who in a humble and inconspicuous way tried to find salvation by methods different from those of the established Reformed Church. Provided the dissenter's methods were not dangerous to the safety of the State, and provided the dissenter did not try to proselytize, he was left absolutely alone. This made the Republic a haven of rest for those poor creatures who elsewhere had to suffer on account of their religious convictions. From all parts of Europe large numbers of people fled to Holland. These new citizens soon proved to be of great value. Not only did they bring energy and resourcefulness in business matters to their new home, but often they also brought their capital and their credit and put both into the service of the Republic's commerce.

In a previous chapter we have shown how the Low Countries had always been a studious sort of place, where people took things seriously and felt an interest in book-learning. This interest in reading and studying was also of great value to the development of commerce, especially of shipping. Foreign languages, even such remote ones as those spoken in the Levantine countries, were studied carefully. A scientific system of book-keeping did away with the older and clumsier methods. The whole technique of trade and commerce became better and more profitable than the old hit-or-miss methods. The art of navigation was studied out to

a fine point and was aided by the production of an excellent set of atlases and charts. An aptitude for navigation, acquired during many centuries of seafaring life, allowed the Hollanders to man their ships with half as many sailors as other nations did, thereby greatly reducing the cost of equipment. At the same time a system of shipbuilding had been developed which turned out vessels outlasting all foreign products by many years. In all these things the Republic was so far ahead of its contemporaries that people in any way connected with trade or business in general used to go to Holland to study its methods, just as in our own days an expert in engineering would go to Germany or America. All of this, however, is no longer true in the eighteenth century. England, towards the end of the sixteenth century, had at last come to peace and had started upon that career of commercial and colonial expansion which has lasted into our own days. In France, since the days of Colbert, a large system of manufacturing had been developed, while great attention was being paid to both the fleet and the colonies. Spain was making desperate attempts to reform its internal affairs. In Germany, in certain principalities and in some of the old Hanse towns, a new and more vigorous life began to show signs of the coming of another day. Sweden had been at last forced to discontinue a foreign policy which had done it little good and much harm, and was beginning to revive from the disastrous wars of Charles XII. Of

course, all these things did not happen when the clock struck twelve at midnight of December 31, 1699. In some countries, the awakening came within the first twenty years of the century, in others much later.

We wish to give only a general impression of that time and show how, during the course of the eight-eenth century, one nation after another, which had been handicapped in the economic struggle by internal disorders, was now beginning to pick up and to fight for such a share of the world's business as it was entitled to by right of its geographical position, its natural resources, and the number of its citizens. Also one after the other of these nations discovered that during the century which had gone before, when for some reason or other it had been incapacitated, the Dutch merchants had quietly but not the less effectively monopolized its entire trade.

On every side there was found to exist a complete dependence upon the Dutch trader and manufacturer. Now these foreign nations quite naturally did not like this condition of affairs, and they tried in every way to free themselves from this economic dependence. By every possible means of defense, such as a high protective tariff and large premiums to native enterprises, foreign nations started to combat this Dutch monopoly and tried to regain the ground lost by previous generations of their citizens.

When we read the hundreds of pamphlets which during the middle of the eighteenth century drew the attention of the Estates to the pitiful condition of "business," we are inclined to believe that there had actually been a sudden and serious decline in all the many and varied forms of commercial activity during the twenty years that had just passed. The Dutch merchants had been so accustomed to their natural monopoly in the carrying trade and in a number of industries that any infringement thereon by a foreign nation, however justifiable, was regarded by them as an outrage. They forgot that not only had the population of the Republic increased and the profits been therefore divided among more persons than before, but also that only a most exceptional combination of circumstances had allowed them to acquire and maintain the position which they were now gradually losing.

It is not our purpose to write down a long string of facts regarding the history of the Republic. We are endeavoring to make the history of a very dull period readable and we shall not annoy our readers with many ciphers. But a few figures are necessary to show how this gradual change took place. For the purpose of a history of business, we can divide the eighteenth century roughly into several periods.

The period from 1700 to 1730 was prosperous—a reaction after the bad years of the war with France and the war of the Spanish Succession. Home indus-

tries flourished and exports filled the ships when they were not needed for the carrying business between foreign countries. But about 1730, under the pressure of foreign competition, the Dutch industries began to languish. From 1730 to 1750 was a bad time. Then new sources of income having been opened, and the war between England and France and England and America offering splendid opportunities for profitable smuggling, there was a new period, which in the whole was favorable.

But there was no longer a sound basis for this prosperity, and when the war with England broke out in 1780 it destroyed the last vestiges of Dutch commerce so suddenly and so completely that it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that a revival was possible. The most valuable statistics which we possess for the trade of Holland are the registers of the toll in the Sont. The Sont, which gave entrance to the Baltic Sea, had always been a profitable source of income to Denmark, which had imposed a toll upon all ships passing through these straits. Now the earliest and the most profitable business of the Republic had been to carry grain from the Baltic provinces to other parts of Europe. Dantzig and Litbeck and, later on, Riga, were the chief ports from which the grain was shipped.

The number of Dutch ships that passed through the Sont in 1497 was 567; in 1597, 3908 ships; in 1697, more than 4000 ships. But from then on, the number goes down. In the middle of the eighteenth century only 3000 passed through; in 1774 (year after a crisis), 2447 ships. Six years later there were 2080 ships. Then comes the war with England. In 1781 the number is eleven ships. In 1782 the carrying trade picked up a bit, but it never regained even half of its former size.¹² In this trade the largest amount of capital had been invested. As the decline was the same all along the line, we can imagine what it must have been in the other branches of commerce.

The trade with England (partly goods in transit. but mostly exports of homemade manufactures) showed a steady decline on the part of the Republic with a corresponding increase in the quantity of goods imported from Great Britain. During the eighteenth century, France was a much better customer than England. France had developed a large manufacturing system and wanted to send its products to its colonies, but it did not possess the necessary commercial marine. It was therefore obliged to use Dutch ships. Now that the Dutch Republic had rivals for the monopoly of the carrying trade in Danish and Swedish and English ships, this unwelcome competition forced her to be much more circumspect in her treatment of her old customers than she liked to be. In order to keep the profitable French business, we see how, during the eighteenth century, the Republic is gradually driven away from its old friendship with England

and is obliged to become the ally of France. All during this century we see how political disobedience on the part of the Republic is immediately punished by France by a threat of economic reprisals—the increasing of certain duties or the interdict of certain imports. And without fail, the Republic has to apologize and to submit to France's demands. It could no longer afford to lose any customers. Finally, the Republic was even driven by France into the American adventure, which led directly to the war with England and the destruction of the Republic's commerce.

As for Spain, the Republic never regained its former importance there after the war of the Spanish Succession.¹⁸ The slave trade with the Spanish colonies became an English monopoly in 1713, and the Republic gradually lost all its business with the Spanish colonies in South America.

The Russian and the Levantine trade show us the same state of affairs. There is not a sudden decline, not even a decline within a few years, but other nations, especially England, are constantly closely pushing the Dutch merchants, and every customer whom the Hollander loses is gain for his British rivals. During the first years of the eighteenth century, we find almost two hundred ships going from Holland to St. Petersburg. Fifty years later, their number had decreased by two thirds. In 1795, there is only one ship. But in the same year there are more than five hundred English ships in that harbor,

where a century before the trade had been practically a monopoly of the Hollanders. The Levantine trade, the trade on the Turkish and Italian coast, sometimes shows a temporary small increase, but it is invariably followed by many bad years. In Turkey the English gradually replaced the Dutch merchants until none were left of the latter.

The same can be said of another form of enterprise which was even older than the carrying trade and out of which the carrying trade had actually grown. We mean the fisheries. Since during the late Middle Ages the herring had left the Baltic Sea and had come to live in the Atlantic Ocean and in the North Sea, herring fishing had become a most important and profitable factor in the life of the people along the coast. When in 1380 a Zeeland fisherman had invented a way of curing the herring, this fish became a great article of export to be consumed by the Catholic world on all its fast days. The small cities in Zeeland and along the border of the Zuyderzee had greatly profited by these fisheries, and by means of them they had laid the foundations of those fortunes which during a later period allowed them to participate in the trade on the Baltic and later on to take their share in the East and West India Companies. Early in the sixteenth century whaling had been added to the herring fishing. The fisheries so much impressed foreign visitors that they have left us the most exaggerated stories about the thousands of ships, with their ten

thousands of men and their hundreds of thousands of profit.¹⁴

Now, while the Republic had a natural monopoly of many things abroad it did not indulge in trading monopolies at home. Except for the East India Company, there is not a single monopoly in the Republic which managed to maintain itself as such for any length of time. "Free trade" and "freedom of action in trade" were the two principles which caused the Republic's supremacy. The herring fisheries, too, were no monopoly, for every city and every village sent as many ships as it could—subject only to such general rules and regulations as the Estates General provided in order to keep the fisheries as much as possible in Dutch hands.

But again, no sooner were the first twenty years of the eighteenth century by than we see a slow but steady decline in these fisheries. The whalers had a very hard time maintaining themselves against English and Danish competitors. Germany, Denmark, England, and Sweden, all of them living much nearer to the regions where the herring was to be found, drove out the Dutch fishermen, who had to cross the North Sea before they could reach fishing waters.

In some countries, most particularly in France, special laws were formulated which prevented the importation of herring which was caught by Dutch ships. The government of the Republic tried all sorts of remedies. The duties which all the pro-

vinces had been in the habit of levying upon the fisheries in their time of prosperity were abolished. This did not prove of any special help. Then an attempt was made to subsidize the fisheries. A large sum was appropriated each year for these subsidies. A premium as high as five hundred guilders was finally promised to each ship that should go out for fishing purposes. Even this did not stay the decline. In 1736 there were 219 fishing ships. Ten years later the number was only 144. It never went up again. The English war put a complete end to it for several years.

But the greatest net profit of all had been derived from the colonies, and we must consider their adventures more particularly. They are highly illustrative of the general methods employed by the Republic. Of all the different trading companies, of which there were many during the fifteenth century, only two large ones, formed from combination of a number of smaller ones, survived. These were the East and West India Companies, and of these two, the former played by far the greater rôle. It was a monopoly, and a monopoly which in our own day would hardly be tolerated for any length of time. 16 It was formed in 1602 with the great Raadpensionaris of Holland, van Oldenbarneveldt, as its organizer and chief leader. It started out with a capital of only 6,500,000 guilders, over half of which was subscribed for and paid in by the merchants of Amsterdam. From the very beginning it prospered. Its stock stood high five years after its formation. In fifty years the stock had gone up to 380. During the eighteenth century it went up to 570 and even higher than 600. Five years after it was founded, the company paid seventy-five per cent dividends. But that was only during the first years, and was possible only because of a most irresponsible method of robbery of the new colonies. The average during the hundred and eighty years of the company's existence was twenty-one per cent.

We can judge of the sums which this enterprise brought into the pockets of the Dutch merchants when we consider the fact that upon one share of 3000 guilders, during a period of eighty years, no less than 107,665 guilders were paid in dividends. The possession of a few of these shares of 3000 guilders, which were regularly sold at 18,000 guilders, would keep an entire family in comfort.

Now, how was this accomplished? Chiefly through a most rigorous maintenance of the company's monopoly in spices. This spice trade was of such importance that we may again intrude with a few figures. In 1632, seven ships returned from India loaded with spices. They had cost the company about 2,000,000 guilders. They were sold for 10,000,000. Deduct a million for ships, equipment, etc., and we still have a gain greatly surpassing the original capital of the company. In the year 1661, the fleet returned from India with goods which cost

2,000,000 guilders and which sold for 4,000,000 more. Even in 1672, the worst year of the seventeenth century, the East India Company brought more than 40,000,000 guilders worth of merchandise to the Republic. The company used to buy her spices in India for thirty cents a pound. She sold them at home for four guilders a pound — a gain of twelve hundred per cent.

An average yearly product of these spices was as follows: nutmeg, 300,000 pounds; mace, 100,000 pounds; and cloves, 300,000 pounds. At the rate as given above, we can well understand the profits of this trade. And the chief beauty of it all (from the point of view of the company) was the fact that it could regulate the spice-supply in such a way as to keep the prices to the desired height. The company was supreme in those islands which alone grew spices, and could encourage their production just as it could destroy all over-production. When we read how whole spice islands were burned out in order that the price of nutmeg or mace might be increased, we feel almost friendly towards our modern trusts.

As to the management of this company, it was such that a modern board of directors following its example would be in the state's prison in a very short while. The Dutch people in commercial as well as in political life loved "committees." Nothing was ever done by a single man that could be done by a committee of men. We have seen how the

whole political fabric of the Union and the province consisted of an innumerable number of committees and sub-committees. It was the same in all commercial enterprises, and the East India Company was not an exception. There was no single head, no director-general, as there is in a modern concern of that sort. The company was divided into four "chambers." These chambers represented each a certain number of stockholders. The largest one was that of Amsterdam, which had invested 3,700,000 guilders. Then came Zeeland with 1,300,000, Hoorn and Enkhuizen with 550,000 and 250,000 guilders, and Delft and Rotterdam with 450,000 and 175,000 guilders respectively.

None of the other cities is mentioned. Therefore, although the grant of the East India Company's monopoly had been given by the Estates General and the company flew the flag of the Union, the whole affair remained essentially in the hands of Holland and Zeeland. The inhabitants of other provinces could own stock individually, but they could not exercise any direct influence upon the management of the company's affairs.

The members of each of the four chambers looked only after the India business of their own particular town, and supervised and equipped the ships which each town was allowed to send out, a number which was in proportion to the share in the general capital. For here as elsewhere the intense particularism held sway: a ship which was sent out by Delft or by

Hoorn had to return to Delft or to Hoorn. But as the company was not only a trading company but also a sovereign political body, which in the name of the Estates General kept armies and a fleet and made war and concluded treaties and acquired territory, it was necessary that some central body supervise the general policy of the company.

There was a general board of directors in which Amsterdam was represented by twenty members, Zeeland by twelve, the other two cities by seven each. But this number of men was too large for practical purposes, and the immediate power became centred in a board of governors, composed of seventeen members, the "Messrs. XVII," as they were called. In this board Amsterdam was represented by eight members; Zeeland had four; the other two chambers, each two. The seventeenth member was appointed alternately by one of the chambers, excluding Amsterdam. The old story repeated itself. Both in this board and in the general board of directors, Amsterdam through its large capital was supreme and ruled the company as it ruled practically everything else in the Republic.

The Messrs. XVII appointed the governorgeneral of the Indies; they also appointed all the other employees, civil, military, and judicial; but these were subject to the approval of the Estates General. The Estates General, however, let well enough alone. Except in the choice of the governorgeneral, they never controlled any of the Indian

appointments. As a matter of fact, although they were at liberty to do so, they never interfered with the affairs of the company at all. As long as the company's stock was quoted at 500, and higher, no questions were asked.

But where in this broad scheme of business did the stockholders come in? We do not mean the directors and the high officials, who were all appointed from among the Regents, but the small investors, the men who owned two to five shares and who had no connection with the governing classes. They did not come in anywhere. They were allowed to take their dividends and to thank their mighty lordships for their excellent management which provided them with such high returns. As for exercising any influence, however small, in the management of the affairs in which they were interested, that was entirely out of the question. Stockholders' meetings were unknown. Neither did the company at any time of its existence publish an account of its business. By the terms of its original grant, the company was obliged to report to the Estates General once every ten years and show its balance-sheets. The company omitted to do this, the Estates General did not insist, and the stockholders were entirely powerless to enforce this stipulation.

During the first fifty years of the company's existence the stockholders made some semblance of a fight to get their side represented in the board of directors, but to no avail. Their protests were laid

upon the table, and as a matter of fact dividends were kept so high that most shareholders were quite willing not to inquire into the company's methods, but merely to content themselves with the results of these methods. The secrecy which prevailed about the book-keeping and the accounting of the company was maintained so rigorously that not even minutes of the meetings of the Messrs. XVII were kept. To this day we do not know in detail how the company was managed. An authentic account of their doings would, however, make very interesting reading. These directors indulged in the most wonderful financial juggling to make both ends meet. During the seventeenth century the colonies produced enough of everything to keep the dividends high. But during the eighteenth century there were years when it would have been impossible to keep the shares up to their ordinary height without borrowing money. In order to keep the fact of a less favorable year from the knowledge of the people at home, the company used to borrow money in India or elsewhere at three times the rate of interest of Holland, rather than let the fact that money was needed be known at home.

In India, in its relations with the natives, the company was a severe master. This was a matter of necessity. Without prompt and stern retribution, no people on earth could have founded such a large colonial empire. We are not trying to defend the company's methods. In the light of our own

day they were hardly permissible. In the light of their time, however, they compared favorably with the colonial methods of the Latin races in that the conquered people were not interfered with on account of their religion. The company was a trading concern and expected to pay dividends as high as possible.

As long as the native allowed these dividends to be continued, the company was willing to let the native work out his own salvation in his own way. It was a very plain business agreement, such as we find in our modern industrial undertakings. Only the results counted. There was no sentiment wasted on anything not directly pertaining to results. In order to get money, the company forced the native to work. But in order to avert rebellion and war on the part of the native, the company was obliged to keep within certain bounds. In this way a working system was hit upon which did fairly well for both parties.

Now, the men who during the seventeenth century acted as governors-general, and who acted in high military and civic capacities in the Indies, were without exception strong men with all the virtues and the failings of such. During the eighteenth century, however, the management fell more and more into the hands of people who, without merit, got their position on account of their family connections. As we have said before, the Indies became the place whither went those who were not

wanted at home, either on account of some financial business or on account of some undesirable civil notoriety. One and all their only idea in crossing the Atlantic and Indian Oceans was to improve their financial condition. The difference between high and low official was chiefly in the larger or smaller amount of money which they appropriated for themselves. It will be easily understood that with such officers the affairs of the company went from bad to worse. After 1770 its credit was maintained with great difficulty. After 1780 it was practically bankrupt. When in 1795 the old Republic fell to pieces, the East India Company was one of the first bodies to collapse. Up to the last years, however, it was to its stockholders a source of a splendid income. The deluge came when the people who were to play a rôle in our history were well past middle age.

The same thing cannot be said of the West India Company. It was founded in 1621, after the plans of the East India Company, save that stockholders had a more direct influence upon the company's management. Like the East India Company it was meant to be a strict monopoly. But in this it failed. As we have said before, of all the monopolies which at one time or another were started in the Republic none proved successful except the East India Company. All the others, whether trading or fishing or manufacturing was the ultimate purpose, failed sooner or later, and

their place was taken up by enterprises founded by private initiative, which curiously enough succeeded where the monopoly had failed. The West India Company had been started with more capital than her East Indian rival. Fully seven millions had been subscribed. Amsterdam came first with four ninths of the total amount, Zeeland paid in two ninths, Rotterdam and Hoorn each one ninth, while one ninth went to the provinces of Groningen and Friesland. The country provinces were therefore represented in contrast with the East India Company, which was entirely in the hands of Holland and Zeeland. What made the West India Company still more an affair of the whole country was the fact that the Estates General took 500,000 guilders worth of stock and the Stadholder, 50,000. There were seventy-four directors appointed by the Estates from among the stockholders who possessed two or more securities of 6000 guilders. A committee of nineteen looked after the direct management. Eight of the members of this committee were appointed by Amsterdam, ten by the other four chambers, one by the Estates General.

The company received a monopoly of the trade on the west coast of Africa, the east coast of America, and all of the islands between and to the south of those two coasts. This means that the West India Company was to consider the Atlantic Ocean as her own private possession in the same way that the East India Company was to have full sway in the Indian Ocean. The salt trade was also made a monopoly of this company, and a very profitable one it proved to be.

From the very first, however, the West India Company was unsuccessful. The East India Company had everything its own way. It found that the first rough pioneering work in the Indies had already been done by the Spaniards and the Portuguese. After it had once driven them out of their strongholds, it found a native population with a fair amount of civilization, quite accustomed to do work in the fields and on the plantations.

The possessions of the West India Company also lay under the equator, and as far as their geographical situation was concerned they might have produced all tropical plants. Here, however, there was no civilized native population available to do the necessary work. The native had first to be caught and then had to be trained to do regular work, and the plantations had to be laid out and some twenty years would have to go by before there would be any practical results. But the Dutch trading companies of that day worked for immediate results and not for the possible benefit of future generations. The idea of starting colonies which were to enrich their grandchildren was not in the least agreeable to the Dutch stockholders. They did not colonize to get a hinterland for the products of the mother country. They colonized to get div-

idends out of the products of their newly conquered territory.

Even if they had wanted to colonize in the modern sense of the word, there would not have been people enough to populate such colonies. The few million people in the entire Republic were hardly sufficient to look after all the work that needed to be done at home. There was no inducement for any of them to go into a far-away and uncivilized country to make a living when home provided a decent living at little cost. This explains the impossibility of getting the colony of New Amsterdam under way. There were not emigrants enough to make the thing successful. It was not that the Hollanders of the seventeenth century did not see a future in the settlement along the Hudson. But the country had undertaken to do a great deal more than it was able to do, and hence it failed in those places where the immediate returns were smallest. The East Indies proved to be the most productive part of the world in which Dutch capital was interested. Hence the East India colonies were exploited with care and patience. The West Indies were merely second choice, and as such were left to get along as best they could without active support. The West India Company had some good days. But they were caused by what, for lack of another word, we will call legitimate piracy.

Spanish treasure fleets and Portuguese colonies, whenever taken by the company's armed forces,

caused sudden and spasmodic intervals of superabundant dividends. But there was no steady and enduring profit, and these abnormal windfalls could not prevent the company from becoming a bankrupt as early as 1674. Now it was not the policy of the Regents to let anything in which they were officially interested (in this case quite officially through the share which the Estates General had in the undertaking) go to the bankruptcy court. Before it was quite so bad as all that, the company was reorganized and was continued under a new grant.

But this new grant meant practically the end of her existence as a monopoly. It recognized the fact that monopoly, in that part of the world, at least, was a failure. It is true the company was still allowed the exclusive trading privilege on the west coast of Africa, the West Indian Islands, and Surinam, Essequibo, Berbice, and Curação, but it was not able to maintain its exclusive rights. Several of these colonies in South America had been settled before the West India Company was founded, and when, by right of its original grant, the company claimed all of these settlements, the old owners had objected so strenuously that the company was obliged to compromise. To make things more complicated, these colonies were captured by the French and the English, and were recaptured by the Dutch several times.

The final settlement of the difficulty was typical

of the methods of the Republic with her eternal committees and sub-committees and her general patchwork. The colony of Surinam, after years of quarreling between the company and the Estates of Zeeland, which claimed that they were the original possessors thereof and had previous rights, was sold by the Estates of Zeeland to the West India Company. The amount to be paid was 260,000 guilders. The company, however, could not obtain such a large amount of cash, and sold one third of its new purchase to Amsterdam and one third to an Amsterdam merchant, Cornelis Aerssen.

Aerssen sailed across the ocean and settled down in his new domains, but after five years' residence, in the year of our Lord 1688, he was murdered by his own soldiers. His possessions were inherited by his family, who sold out to Amsterdam for 700,000 guilders (original cost 70,000), and, therefore, during the last half of the eighteenth century, Amsterdam owned and immediately controlled two thirds of this valuable colony. It contained some four hundred plantations, on which more than thirty thousand slaves were kept busy, and it exported millions of guilders worth of cocoa, coffee, sugar, and cotton, and remained a steady source of income to the carrying trade.

Essequibo had very much the same sort of history. Here, too, the Estates of Zeeland claimed previous right. Finally the Estates of Zeeland officially recognized the supreme authority of the company,

but the company allowed the colony to remain under the direct control of the Estates of Zeeland.

Berbice had been directly settled by a single firm of Flushing merchants. They remained in control of their possession, but finally they agreed to pay the company five hundred and seventy-five guilders on each ship which was used in the trade.

The smaller islands in the Caribbean Sea, through lack of water and of soil, produced nothing, but they were extremely valuable as storehouses and bases of operations for Dutch smugglers. As such they were used by all Dutch merchants, and the monopoly of the company could not be maintained here either, for the company as an official body could not very well indulge in an illicit trade of this sort. Whenever complaints reached the Estates General, they preferred to be able to answer that the trade on these islands, being practically free and open to all comers, it was extremely difficult for them to stop the smuggling.

Only one real monopoly remained in the possession of the company during the eighteenth century. This was that of the slave trade, and it enabled the directors to pay from three to four per cent dividend on the invested capital. Otherwise during the eighteenth century the company had an uneventful existence, while private initiative opened up her territory and made large profits.

Right here it may be well to point out the loss which several parts of the country suffered through

the slow but gradual decline in all these branches of commerce, fisheries, and the carrying trade. Some parts of Holland, especially the region along the Zaan, a short waterway connecting Amsterdam with the centre of the province of North Holland, depended for their very existence upon shipbuilding. In these parts the ships were built and the articles necessary for their equipment were manufactured. And it was here that the imported goods were prepared for exportation to foreign parts.

Since in 1596 the first planing-mill had been built, the power of the wind, always present in this low and flat part of the country, was used for all sorts of industrial enterprises. Wood from Scandinavia and the Black Forest was here sawed and planed and changed into small but fast ships. Ropewalks, tar-sheds, sail-yards, net-factories, carpenter-shops turned out the many different articles necessary for the merchantmen and the fishing-boats. And after the different ships returned to the Fatherland, the herring had to be salted, and the blubber had to be boiled, and the rice had to be peeled, and all this was done right here where an abundance of canals made transportation cheap and easy.

But when the fisheries began to lose their importance, and the trading companies began to use fewer ships and rarely built new ones, all these smaller industries connected with shipbuilding began to suffer, and the once prosperous region grew quiet. Not that it ever suffered actual poverty. But those who saw that the profits steadily diminished preferred to go out of a losing business; they reinvested their savings, and on the place where once their busy factory had stood, they now built a comfortable house and spent their days in agreeable quiet rather than in active work.

It took Gibbon thousands of pages to describe approximately the decline of the Roman Empire. The Dutch Republic was much smaller, but its decline was such a complicated matter that we cannot hope to do it justice within these few pages. We can only hope to make clear to our readers that there was a very gradual and very slow diminishing of prosperity, caused partly by changing economic circumstances, but most of all by a change in the character of the people. We must keep in mind that this sort of thing never happens suddenly. It was a very slow process which during many decades can be hardly noticed at all. Only in one particular case can we see a sudden and abrupt change. Unfortunately this abrupt decline occurred where it did most harm, and where it caused the greatest damage to the Republic's prestige as one of the leading nations of Europe. We mean the utter neglect of the fleet after the year 1715.18

During the last years of the seventeenth century the Republic had maintained a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships, ninety of which were ships of the line. Fifty years later, there were less than fifty

ships and only a dozen of those were of any value. In 1696, the Republic had eight ships of the then Dreadnought class of more than ninety guns. In 1741, it possessed only one of this type; this was forty-two years old and perfectly useless. Thirty vears later, when the size of the ships had again greatly increased, and when England and France had each two, and Spain one ship of more than one hundred guns and more than nine hundred men equipage, and had several ships of more than eighty guns, the Republic possessed four ships of seventy cannon, some of which were nearly a century old and had no fighting value at all. Without adequate means of defending herself on the ocean, the Republic was entirely at the mercy of all of her commercial rivals, and was bound to lose ground even if her merchants had been of superlative ability.

What had caused this sudden change in policy? There were several reasons. Again it was a question not only of money but also of men. Both de Witt and William III had been immensely interested in maintaining a strong fleet. De Witt by the powers which he had usurped, William by the powers with which he had been duly invested, had forced the admiralties to build ships and had forced the provinces to pay for the building. The country provinces paid their share under protest, but they did pay. But no sooner was William dead than internal political anarchy returned, and the provinces quietly refused to produce the funds necessary for

the maintenance and increase of the fleet. As we have tried to show before, the Estates General were no parliament where the desirability of a strong fleet could be debated and where the majority could enforce its opinion upon the whole country. As long as there was no man in Holland strong enough to bully the other provinces into obedience, each province stuck closely to its own particular interests and refused to contribute a penny to matters of general interest.

It was the same with the admiralties. The five admiralties of the Republic were operated independently of each other. When there was a stadholder he was their common chairman. As such, he could lay down a general policy and enforce a certain amount of coöperation between the different parts. The moment this general chairman disappeared, each admiralty refused to act beyond its own limits. The old disorder returned and the fleet suffered accordingly.

The long wars during the last years of the seventeenth century had caused vast expenditures. Before the war was definitely over, William had died and the supply of funds from the provinces had stopped abruptly. As a result the admiralties faced immediate bankruptcy.¹⁹ A certain amount of the duties on imports and exports which was put aside for their maintenance did not suffice to keep them solvent. When between 1706 and 1711 the country provinces did not pay a single penny for the fleet,

the whole burden of maintaining it fell upon Holland and Zeeland. These two provinces, however, could not alone continue to produce the necessary funds. As the war was still going on and as the ships had to be kept on the high seas, the admiralties were allowed to borrow money, which some patriots were willing to let them have for the consideration of nine per cent. But even after large sums had been borrowed, the three admiralties of Holland alone, at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, were in debt to the amount of ten million guilders. No sooner was the war over than even Holland and Zeeland lost their interest in the fleet. The officers and men were dismissed and went into civil life or emigrated to other countries and took service in some solvent foreign navy. All sorts of scandals occurred when officers, unable to pay their debts, were put in prison.

Holland, and especially the town of Amsterdam, managed to keep their admiralties out of actual bankruptcy, but that was all they could do. From 1713 to 1770, for a period of fifty-seven years, the other six provinces did not pay a cent towards maintaining the fleet.

Here are a few examples of what happened during the eighteenth century. In 1721, the admiralty of North Holland possessed just three ships, two of which were twenty and thirty years old respectively. Between 1713 and 1746, the admiralty of Friesland built one small ship. The admiralty of Rotterdam,

between 1713 and 1725, built nothing at all and neglected her old ships. Zeeland during forty-six years, between 1700 and 1746, built four small ships without any fighting value. Amsterdam alone, supported by the Estates of Holland, maintained half a dozen ships which could be used to protect her merchantmen from African pirates, but which would not have counted in time of war. Whatever ships remained from former days were allowed to lie in the harbor and gradually rot away. The naval career, once sought after eagerly, fell into contempt. There was no chance of promotion. There was not even a certainty of regular pay.

Finally the condition of the fleet grew so bad that the Republic, once the principal seafaring nation, had to open its naval service to foreigners in order to get enough officers. Time and again the weakness of the Dutch fleet was brought home in a most humiliating manner. The Dutch merchantmen in the Atlantic and the Dutch fishing-boats in the North Sea were exposed to search and capture by anybody that would take the trouble to stop them. England, which had always maintained her right to search ships for contraband of war, held up Dutch ships continually, whether there was a war or whether there was peace. The pirates of the Algerian coast had to be bribed to leave the Dutch ships alone. In the West Indies pirates took away millions of guilders' worth of Dutch goods.

The merchants and the traders complained, com-

plained often and complained loudly. Sometimes they sent petitions to the Estates General and later, when there was again a stadholder, they sent petitions to the Stadholder. Invariably the answer was that the matter would be taken under consideration. The time necessary for such "consideration" often lasted as long as five whole years, and even then the answer was evasive. At no time during the entire century was a serious attempt made to reform the fleet and make it efficient. Unwilling to assert her good right by the strength of her army and her fleet, the Republic had no just cause to complain that rival nations had destroyed her prosperity. As a matter of fact she committed suicide.

This picture, however, which, with the help of statistics and year-books, we are now able to draw, was in no way so clear to our ancestors themselves. Indeed, to those who enjoyed the leisurely life of the well-to-do rentier, and who felt that he lived in a country enjoying superlative benefits (the rewards which Heaven bestowed upon so much civic virtue), it seemed as if the golden age had at last arrived and that no improvement could be made. What did it matter that a few discontented merchants were getting up petitions about this and about that, and were asking for a protective system (a protective system in the very stronghold of free trade!), and that rather strenuous and very doubtful methods had to be used to keep the East India Company going? Merchants had always been complaining even during good times, and the East India Company had never been a model of commercial honesty.

At least, during the first seventy years of the century the people at large worried no more about those increasing signs of decline, than people in America worry because there are twelve thousand failures a year and because part of the country is declaring most solemnly that without further protection it is doomed to immediate and utter failure. The Hollander of the eighteenth century took whatever was offered him with a grateful heart, and worried not about the day after to-morrow when the day itself provided him with so much comfort.²⁰

For let it be known that the Republic was essentially a "comfortable" place to live in. Since 1672 no foreign enemy had threatened its territory or had occupied any part thereof. The country at large was safe. There was no danger of robbers or brigands anywhere. The picturesque highwaymen of the good old days in England found no equivalents in the Low Countries. The country was densely populated, and the road to the gallows, under the strict rule of the Regents, was a very short one. The class of beggars and the dilapidated stragglers left over from the war with Spain, which had once served as models to Rembrandt and to many of his fellow painters of the seventeenth century, had entirely disappeared. The habit of carrying arms was given up as useless and

a little ridiculous. This general safety allowed an excellent system of communication between the different parts of the country. The foreigner who made his "voyage de Hollande" never omitted to wonder at the ease and comfort of traveling in the Republic. The country roads in the eastern provinces, except the chief ones leading to Hamburg, Cologne, and Brussels, were little better than those elsewhere in Europe. In Holland and Zeeland and Friesland, however, with their intricate system of canals and their dozens of commercial cities which demanded rapid ways of communication, there had developed a system of canal boats which never failed to elicit the admiration of the distinguished foreigner who honored the country with his presence. Indeed, the comfortable and regularly running canal boat never failed to inspire him with that enthusiasm which we now feel at our first glimpse of the American Limited Express. Perhaps it was the regularity which struck them as most admirable. Except in the case of ice the canal boat ran as regularly as a train. It did not depend upon the weather or upon the wind or the condition of the roads. In storms or rain a patient horse pulled the boat as steadily as in the most beautiful weather. Those who wish for particulars I would refer to the guide-books of the day, which give time-tables and prices of tickets, and compare the advantages of the different companies.

Just as an example of how well the service was

arranged, we may mention that, whereas in our own day there are twenty-four trains daily between Delft and Rotterdam, there were then sixteen boats. Of course, the train now does the distance in twenty minutes and the boats took five hours. But this was of no great importance in a period which knew not of our hurry, when men cared more for a comfortable pipe in the cabin of the canal boat and a leisurely talk about the affairs of the world than about a street-car strap and the latest headlines.

The customary medieval annoyances of travel, which often forced people to take a most circuitous route because, in the year of our Lord so-and-somuch, some little city had managed to obtain such-and-such a little privilege, had been quite as apparent in the Republic as elsewhere. But before the pressure of the needs of business these annovances had gradually disappeared and the twelfth century was no longer allowed to hold up the eighteenth. By the end of the eighteenth century, taking the Hague, the seat of government, as the centre, we find the following schedules: to Amsterdam, ten hours: Haarlem, eight hours: Leiden, two and a half; Delft, one; and Rotterdam, six — which goes to show that the eternal delay in the transaction of all political matters in the Republic was certainly not due to the long distances. Indeed, whatever happened in the capital of the country could be known the very same day in the most prominent cities, and within three days it could be known even in the remote parts of the country; for there was an excellent communication between Holland and the northern provinces through a regular service of boats plying between Amsterdam and Lemmer, a village in Friesland. The distance was covered in ten hours, and the boats connected directly with the canal boats for Leeuwarden and the north.

As for the eastern provinces, Germany, and the east of Europe, they were reached by way of Utrecht. This city, eight hours' distance from Amsterdam, was then, as now, the centre of the road system of the country. It was a sort of clearing-house for all the news which went from the east of Europe to Holland, and as such it was the Republic's best-posted city on all domestic and foreign news. The states to the south, in particular Belgium and France, were reached by way of Antwerp, with which city Rotterdam maintained direct connections—first by water as far as the Moerdyk and then by diligence through the province of Brabant.

The connection with England was made by way of Hellevoetsluis, a port on the island of Voorne in the southern part of Holland. From Rotterdam this city was reached by water in eight hours. The packets for England sailed three times a week, and reached England within a day.

The connections with India depended upon the merchants that happened to be sent out. During the

last part of the eighteenth century a number of small but fast ships were built which were intended to make the trip between Holland and Batavia in ten months, but before the service could be well regulated, the East India Company failed.

As to America, the West India Company's ships took whatever passengers there were for the South American colonies. Those who had business with North America, and they were very few, had to travel by way of England. Plans of a regular service between Amsterdam and Boston were considered, but never went further than the preliminaries.

All in all, while from our point of view there was room for improvement, the system of transportation, especially when compared with that in other countries, was far ahead of its time, and allowed a quick and safe intercourse between the different parts of the country and those parts of the world with which one was likely to do business.

In connection with the system of transportation the postal system of the Republic had been able to develop early. It is unnecessary to say that this postal system was not under direct control of the Estates General.²¹ Usually it was maintained by the cities themselves, which gave the privilege of carrying their mail to some person or some company. Each company worked as much for its own interest as an American private telephone or express company. But while the final end was a self-ish one, and every postal company was only trying

to make as much profit out of the system as it possibly could, the indirect result was a great benefit to the people in general. Private initiative and competitive companies may not be ideal institutions; still they often perform a service which but for them would not be performed at all.

The system, like everything else, had reached its greatest development in Holland and Zeeland, where the commercial cities had instituted a messenger service as early as the fifteenth century. The great difficulty in establishing such a system was the opposition which came from small cities and villages, situated on the route between the large towns, each of which tried to get some "rake-off" by holding up the large postal company that wanted to cross its territory.

During the seventeenth century, however, this disorganized system, in which each party looked after its own interests and tried to ruin its neighbor, was found to be detrimental to good service and gradually the public began to demand reforms. But reforms were slow to come. The city governments usually drew too much profit out of the system, such as it was, to favor a change. Above all, the city governments discouraged the introduction of a governmental postal system. It was only after the uprising of 1748 that the new Stadholder was made Postmaster-General, and that it was decided that the revenue from the postal system should go into the provincial treasury and not into

the pockets of the Regents, who until then had given away the privilege to their political friends.

It is impossible here to give a list of the hundreds of different postal routes, or the combinations of routes, which came into usage during the eighteenth century. We merely wish to draw attention to the fact that each person who was not directly poor could avail himself of a system which would bring his letters to any place within the Republic in less than five days and between the large cities in less than a single day, at the cost of approximately fourpence, and which would deliver his mail in Hamburg, Paris, or London within a week and for only twelvepence.

In Alfen, a little village in the heart of Holland, where five of the principal postal routes came together, a sort of clearing-house was established, and here the letters from abroad and from the home cities were collected and sorted. Amsterdam, with its great interest in the northern trade, had had regular communication with Hamburg and the Swedish and Baltic cities as early as 1606. The English mail, during the eighteenth century, went twice a week by way of Briel and Hellevoetsluis, and was constantly being improved upon, the demand for speed causing many new shorter routes to be taken.

The French mail was a matter of constant difficulty because it had to cross Belgium, which as part of Austria was then reserved for the Imperial Mail-Carriers, the Princes of Taxis. Their High-

nesses were forever in trouble with the Republic about the amount which they thought they were entitled to for allowing the Dutch mail to be carried over their exclusive territory,—a quarrel which was never definitely settled, but was allowed to drag on while temporary compromises were being made. The mail service for France and Spain and Italy, however, did not suffer under these disputes, but was so regularly maintained that during the eighteenth century a great many Dutch merchants kept their ships continually in the Mediterranean, where they did carrying service between the different southern ports and sent their instructions to their captains entirely by mail.

Having said so much about commercial affairs, it may be well to point out that the Republic had a monetary and banking system, which, however defective from our point of view, greatly facilitated business. It was not a uniform system for the entire Republic, nor was it under the immediate control of the Estates General. Provincial feeling was much too strong to allow of such a thing. But it was an improvement on the mediæval system which in many countries has survived almost to our own days, and which causes continual annoyance and loss to all those who have to deal with it, except the money-changers. Out of the different local systems of coinage, there developed, during the seventeenth century, a common standard coin, the guilder. As this was too small an amount for larger

transactions, the business world used to count in ryksdaalders, which had the value of two and a half guilders and which were equal to our present-day dollar.²²

During the time when there was no stadholder. and each province was steadily trying to free itself from the control of the Estates General, the monetary system again became disorganized to such an extent that between 1681 and 1694 thorough reforms were found to be necessary. Holland, which had the greatest interest in this matter, was the leader, and proposed as a new standard coin the three-guilder piece, which was to be maintained at a certain nominal value and was to be divided into two and a half, two, one, and half guilder pieces, and several smaller coins for circulation currency. Two gold coins to the value of fourteen and seven guilders were also established. Though some of the old coins remained in circulation, and the provincial mints, as usual, tried to make an extra profit out of small irregularities with the lesser grades of currency, the value of the standard coins and of the gold coins was rigorously maintained, and trading between the different provinces became easier and offered practically no risk.

As to the banking system, the credit for the first initiative in this direction goes to Amsterdam, which established a city bank as early as 1609.²³ This bank did a general banking business and, most important of all, it paid only in good coin. The

town government itself guaranteed the deposits in her bank, and these, as long as they remained within the bank, could not be attached for any purpose. The bank's reserve in currency of the different countries was so large that there never was any danger of suspension of payment. This made it an institution of the greatest value during the many crises which occurred in the eighteenth century. This bank not only became an important factor in the business world of the Republic but of all Europe. The credit which it was willing to give, as well as its bills of exchange, which were honored everywhere, greatly facilitated foreign commerce.

When, in 1616, Dordrecht and Middelburg, and, in 1635, Rotterdam established similar institutions, Holland became the centre of the European exchange business, a position which it maintained until the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the banks of Hamburg and of England, established along the same lines, seriously began to compete with those of the Republic.

Having in the previous pages tried to describe the material background of our history, we now must consider the people who lived under those conditions and who profited by the many commercial advantages which they owed to their fathers, and which filled their purses without any great exertions on their own part.

During the eighteenth century there were about

1,700,000 inhabitants within the confines of the Republic. While theoretically they were all born free and equal before the law, and while there existed no recognized privileged class, the people were nominally divided into three parts. At the top we have the class of the Regents, at the bottom that of the common people. Between these two ill-defined classes was a large class of well-to-do, well-educated families, who enjoyed all the privileges of wealth, but who were excluded from participation in the government on account of not being of a Regent family.

The Regents were all of the same stock. Some of them were richer than others, but that did not mean a difference in social standing. Just as in our own days the poorest little German princeling is the equal of his very rich neighbor, so the Mayor of Amsterdam was in no way superior to his poor colleague in some small provincial nest. The other two classes, however, were again divided and subdivided into numberless layers, each of which was felt to exist as clearly as if it had been instituted by Divine Providence itself, and the inhabitants of which were kept in their proper places by their neighbors above and their neighbors below.

Brilliancy in science or art was not recognized. The Regents had as much use for a painter as they had for a shoemaker. One made shoes and the other made pictures. As for the people from among whom all these many painters, scientists, and in-

ventors sprang, men who are now the pride of their country, they too seem to have believed that exceptional ability in such matters was all very well in its own way, but that it did not entitle the owner thereof to step out of the class in which it had pleased Almighty Heaven to place him and to consider himself superior to his humble fellow citizens. The result was that anybody with a particular gift for anything not pertaining to the making of money was forced to live a sort of bohemian existence apart from his fellow citizens or to suffer under their daily neglect. The bankruptcy of a number of painters, the poor circumstances of a number of literary men, and the complete neglect of a number of scientific men of international repute will bear this statement out.

The Republic, in its daily life and its mode of thinking and feeling, was essentially a commercial commonwealth, where the almighty ryksdaalder was the standard of success, and where "good" meant an ability to pay one's debts and "bad" meant an inability to do so. That such a wonderful school of art could develop even under these discouraging circumstances, and that the Republic during the two centuries of its existence could in such vast measure contribute to the general sum of human knowledge, only goes to show how intensely the men who devoted their lives to these unprofitable branches of art and learning were interested in their subject.

These good people with a scientific or an artistic bent were always in the vast minority, and their suffering did not disturb the community at large any more than the forlorn position of many of their scholars and scientists agitates the American public. The large majority of men, worshiping things as they found them, practical men not given over to sentimentalizing, lived contentedly enough, and pitied these neighboring communities where a man was considered a fine gentleman merely because he could smear paint on a piece of linen better than anybody else or because he invented an instrument which had no other use than to magnify drops of water.

In the matter of religion the Regents had, of course, to be very conservative. They all belonged to the official Dutch Reformed Church. The two other classes, however, were divided by many and varied religious creeds. Though the victory of the Republic over Spain had been one of Protestantism over Catholicism, there had always been a large number of people who had remained faithful to the old creed. On the whole, they were left in peace. They belonged to the poorer classes, and as long as they showed that they had no intention of carrying their religion into politics, and that they were perfectly harmless people, they were allowed to worship in peace. In order not to anger their orthodox Protestant brethren with their worship of images and their swinging of incense, they were obliged to meet in back rooms or in small chapels, situated away from the public streets. But then, if they were willing to pay a little something to those police officials whose duty it was to see that the true religion was maintained, they could count upon being left undisturbed in the exercise of their devotions.

Socially the Catholics and the Protestants were not on very intimate terms. The Protestant never got over a certain feeling of uneasiness in his dealing with Catholics: visions of inquisitorial doings and Jesuitic machinations made him suspicious of his Catholic neighbor with his crucifixes and all his incomprehensible forms of worship. On the other hand, the Catholic was carefully taught by his spiritual adviser that the new Republic was after all rather a monstrous invention which had robbed the Holy Church of all its goods and chattels, and which was now trying to entice her children away from their old blessed faith. It is true that the Catholics never showed any disloyalty to their common Fatherland and that the Protestants never tried to steal their children. But prejudices of that sort are long-lived and exist even in our day.

From olden times, when Lutheranism had been common in the Republic, there remained a few Lutherans. But most of these had later gone over to Calvinism. In some parts of the country, however, there were a large number of Baptists.

Especially along the Zaan, that highly busy and enterprising part of North Holland, the Baptists formed a majority of the inhabitants. Being excluded from all interest in the government, they had directed all their attention towards their daily affairs, and being very frugal and industrious they had in many cases accumulated great riches. Their wealth made them desirable taxpayers, and as such they were left in peace by the government, were allowed to build their churches wherever they wanted to, and to maintain their own religious seminaries.

Being essentially an introspective people, the Hollanders indulged in many and often quite remarkable forms of religious beliefs. During the eighteenth century, however, the governing classes had grown sufficiently unorthodox and indifferent in all such matters not to bother other folk merely because they had singular notions about the best ways and means through which salvation could be reached. Provided a man behaved himself, he was welcome, even if he openly disavowed Christ and went to the synagogue to worship an older divinity.

Looking back at the conglomerate mass of people in this small country, people of old Dutch stock, of French and German and English immigrant descent, of Semitic birth or Javanese blood (for the line between the different races was never closely drawn in the colonies), one is rather astonished that the thing went as well as it actually did. Most

of all, perhaps, it will strike us, that for at least a century and a half there was no serious opposition to the rule of the Regents. As we have said before, the Regents were a self-imposed oligarchy, and their government was not supported by an armed force. Why, then, did the people upon so few occasions rebel and throw off this yoke? Simply because they did not feel it as such. In dealing with matters of the past, we must not forget to make allowance for a complete change in the point of view. The average man of the eighteenth century accepted the government, in which he had no share, quite as naturally as the average Christian accepts the rulings of Providence, in which he has no share.

Providence was there, to look after the sun and the moon and the earth and the rain and the stars; and their lordships, the Regents, were there, to see to it that the towns were well governed and that hospitals and almshouses and pawnshops and orphan asylums were built, and to provide a thousand little jobs for those who needed them.

A certain amount of good common sense prevented the Regents from ever becoming too bureaucratic or pedantic in their methods. In dealing with the people they usually assumed a certain dignified affability, which never failed to impress the humble subject so addressed. Although taxes were high and had to be paid with exacting promptness, the people always felt that they received fair value for

their money, and not, as in so many countries, that the taxes served only to keep a few courtiers in luxuries. To the average citizen, the town of his birth was his world from the day that the official city drynurse put him into his first swaddling clothes to the day that the official town undertaker buried him in the local church.

Business or purposes of study might temporarily take him away from his little cosmos, but there he belonged and there he hoped to return, and there he knew everybody and everybody knew him. How these people loved their cities we understand when we see the numerous pictures and prints they ordered made of the town pump and the official fishmarket and of every bit of scenery connected with the blessed spot of their birth.

And if we visit one of these cities and think away the modern improvements with their addition of bad taste, we can understand how our ancestors of a hundred-odd years ago could come to have such affection for their home city. Architecture, even in the worst periods of baroque and rococo, never became wholly bad. The general picture which the town offered, with its handsome houses and its canals lined with stately trees, its public buildings expressing the civic pride of the citizens, was one which could never fail to please him who looked at it with an affection born of the conviction that all this was more or less directly his own, and that he had had a share in its construction and main-

tenance. The streets in the Dutch cities had been paved at an early date. It was all very well in other countries for fine ladies and gentlemen to allow themselves to be carried through the mud in their own most particular chaises, but in a Dutch city the first and foremost consideration was to haul goods from ships to warehouses, and for this purpose a pavement was highly necessary.

At night the streets were lighted. The light of a tallow candle or an oil lamp was not a very brilliant one, but it was sufficient to prevent citizens from falling into the canal, and it greatly discouraged the industry of the sneak thief and the hold-up man. By increasing the public safety it allowed people to make neighborly calls, and in this way increased the general sociability. Whether by natural inclination or by the fear which the Church had planted in their hearts, in case they should fail to be generous, the Hollander had from the earliest times been a founder of hospitals and of asylums for the weak and the young. His practical mind had never taken much interest in the building of churches, but innumerable institutions of a public character had been endowed since Christianity had made its triumphant entry between the ninth and the tenth century.

This generosity continued after the Catholic Church lost its power. Whether all the money given for these charitable purposes was strictly untainted, and whether sometimes a small amount of vanity



THE PALACE OF THE STADHOLDERS A¹ THE HAGUE DURING THE ANNUAL FAIR
After an eagraing by D. Marot

and the pleasure of seeing one's name engraved in marble had nothing to do with the large sums that were forthcoming, is of no special consideration. The chief fact remained that those who were too young or too sick or too old to work could find a place where they were taken care of without having to go to the workhouse. The supervision of these institutions was in the hands of a board of directors composed of philanthropic old ladies or gentlemen who volunteered their services. In the case of the orphan asylums, they saw to it that the inmates learned a good trade and became useful members of society.

The well-to-do middle classes, who would never become beneficiaries for poor-relief, were able to secure their family's future by a system of life insurance, which in this country, full of commercial insurance companies, had developed as early as the seventeenth century.

The movement from the country to the city was quite strong during the eighteenth century. The young girls from the country districts went to the city to look for places as domestic servants. Young men went there to try to find a career which offered more entertainment than that offered by a rustic community.

To keep pace with the increase in prosperity a great change occurred in the mode of living. The merchant no longer lived at his place of business. The living quarters had gradually been removed

from the workshop or the office. First of all, the living quarters had moved upstairs, but the entrance to them had been through the workshop downstairs. Then the living quarters received a separate entrance. The tradespeople and the artisans adhere to this mode of living up to our own day, but the merchant moved his actual residence to a more desirable part of the town and maintained his old residence merely as his office.

This new way of living, by which a man needed two different homes, took a great deal more space than the old one, and, as there was no possibility of a war, the towns soon grew far beyond their walls. In the houses themselves, too, the eighteenth century saw a very great change. We notice the first vestiges of what we know under the name of "comfort." Hygiene as a science was still quite as unknown as sociology. The canals served as sewers and at the same time provided drinking water. People lived quite as happily and often quite as many years under those circumstances as they do in our own day. As they knew no better, they asked for no better. But they did begin to get acquainted with comfort. Stone chimneys had been part of the Dutch house long before they had been used abroad. They were a great improvement upon the old chimnevless house of the Middle Ages. Still people had continued to freeze more or less until, in the eighteenth century, the tile-stove was introduced. The stone floors were being replaced by wooden ones,

and rugs and carpets covered the floors of the rich just as mats covered those of the poor. Sleeping and living quarters became separated.

Also the country was discovered. The mediæval man had rarely known what the country or nature meant. He knew that they both could be found outside his city gate, where it was not safe to go. But the security from foreign enemies or homemade tramps allowed the richer classes to build country homes, whither they repaired during the summer months when the city grew hot and unhealthy. Around each large city there was a region thickly covered with summer residences. They were usually situated on a canal, so as to allow the business man to "commute" by means of the canal boat.

The greater warmth and the corresponding dryness of the houses produced a change in the people's clothing. No longer was it necessary to dress in furs all the year round. The warmer houses allowed the wearing of light silks and linens in contrast to the old, heavy woolens. The old, heavy hat, which had been worn both in the house and out of it, was gradually discarded, and merely became an object of adornment carried politely under one's arm.

The furniture in the house was also altered, and shows us the change in the people's way of thinking. In olden days the Hollander furnished his house as though neither he nor his children nor his grandchildren ever intended to move. A cupboard placed in a certain spot was put there not

only for the present occupant, but also for the benefit of future generations. Tables and chairs and everything connected with the house were built on lines which took count of the coming centuries. The eighteenth century, however, took a different view of things. Grandmother's cupboards were hoisted to the attic, where, being absolutely mothproof, they did good service as chests for the pretty modern clothes. The houses were now refurnished with new, more up-to-date and more fashionable articles, which, alas, were nothing but a cheap imitation of whatever happened to be fashionable in Paris at that moment. There was no longer the smallest vestige of originality. But nobody asked for originality. To do and to be and to think the "fashionable thing" was of a great deal more importance than to be original. The leading families went so far in this imitation of foreign manners and customs that they considered their own language as a sort of rustic patois and preferred to speak and write in French or in English.

It was comparatively easy to imitate the French nation in its clothes and in its furniture. To imitate the grace with which the French ladies and gentlemen wore those clothes and moved among their gilded chairs and tables was another matter and a far more difficult one. Heavily built by nature, eating and drinking vast amounts and taking no exercise whatsoever (for it was considered decidedly vulgar for ladies to indulge in walks or to be seen

on the street more than once or twice a week), the Hollander, in all his eighteenth-century frills and ribbons, was unfortunately a subject of ridicule to the very people he tried to honor by his constant imitation.

Not only was the home in which the eighteenthcentury people dwelt different from that of their fathers and grandfathers, but they also lived much better. Not that the worthy ancestors of a century earlier ever went hungry. Far from that. But the people had become more refined in what they ate and drank. The quality began to replace the quantity. The lower classes, which in so many countries were condemned to a dullness in the matter of eating and drinking and a sameness which seems to us almost unbearable, now enjoyed a great many advantages. Tobacco, which is neither food nor drink, but quite as necessary to many people, was in such common use that the foreigner never thought of a Hollander without having visions of large clouds of smoke and long clay pipes. Salt and sugar were never taxed in such a way that they were out of the reach of even the poorer classes. Coffee and tea were commodities which in almost all the households were available from early morning to late night.

As the people on the farms could no longer work for the export trade they were bound to carry their products to the nearest local market, and butter and cheese and eggs were to be had for prices which

we fear to mention in a book meant for American readers. With water on all sides and fish for the catching, and with a system of free trade which laid the country wide open to all colonial and foreign imports, the material side of our history is a happy one.

In the line of amusements the eighteenth century remained as unsatisfactory as the seventeenth. But we should not forget that in those days there had not yet been formed that large mass of people who, not sufficiently educated to amuse themselves with their own thoughts, are constantly clamoring for a circus to keep them entertained.

The theatre, under the constant criticism and opposition of the ultra-orthodox clergy, had not prospered. An occasional visit to the tavern and later, when they were introduced as a foreign novelty, to the coffee-house, was about all the social distraction most people ever had. There was a good deal of visiting from house to house and a good deal of social eating and drinking and smoking. Entertainments outside of the home circle were not encouraged and not considered very nice.

Once a year there was occasion for a general celebration. That was the annual fair, which every self-respecting town and village held at a regular time of the calendar. Then, everybody, from the Stadholder and their lordships, the Estates, down to the poorest costermonger, forgot for the moment the dignity which he owed to his particular station

in life and enjoyed himself thoroughly. The entertainment, it is true, was tame enough from our point of view. It consisted of looking at the booths exhibiting wonderful wares from all over the civilized and uncivilized world, of indulging in a ride on a primitive merry-go-round, or of squandering some good pennies on the grandmother of the Siamese twins or the original wild man from Borneo; not to forget the noble game of "monte," which then, as now, proved most disastrous to the pocket book of the unsuspecting rustic.

We have just now mentioned the opposition of the clergy to the theatre. The clergy still had a great deal to do with the daily life of the people. It is true religion no longer played such a vital part as it had done during the previous century. Among the higher classes the interest taken in the affairs of the Church was more and more on the wane. But the old Calvinistic system was such an excellent means by which to keep the people in their proper places that the Regents respected the Church, and in case of disputes usually supported the clergy as against their congregations.

As to the vast masses of the people, some of them were faithful church-goers out of conviction, others out of habit. A creed which for many generations has meant more to people than life itself is not lost in a few years. There always remained a strong minority of aggressively orthodox preachers and followers who fought with all means fair and unfair

for the supremacy of those extreme ideas in which most people had lost their interest.

The clergy of the established Church had always occupied a rather particular position in the community. For the greater part they were recruited from among the lower middle classes. A bright boy with exceptionally good brains, but with little money, could always count on help in the form of scholarships, which would allow him to study for the ministry. Once a minister, he was by birth and early training a member of the lower classes, but in virtue of his calling an ex-officio member of the very highest classes.

What made this position more complicated was the fact that the clergy, almost without exception, were strong supporters of the House of Orange, just as the majority of the class from which they sprang were ardent partisans of these princes. Now, as the influence of the clergy upon the people remained strong, and as the clergy could influence their congregations against whomever they wanted, the Regents had to conciliate the preachers even when these—as happened quite frequently—followed a course which was far from pleasant to the ruling classes.

In general, the clergy remained faithful to the people who were entrusted to their care, and never catered too much to the oligarchy nor forgot the vaguely democratic principles which they found among the masses. Often through ignorance or an excess of zeal, they stood in the way of justice or of progress, but, taking it all in all, they remained until the very end an influence for good among their surroundings and a class to which as a whole the people might well look with respect and devotion.

In one way, however, they were losing much of their old importance. They were no longer the intellectual leaders of their community. The general prosperity and the change in the way of living, which sent people to the university rather than to the office, did away with the old privilege of the clergyman of being the *vir doctissimus* of his congregation.

This general trend towards the universities finally changed the entire character of the people and of the universities themselves. Originally the universities had been intended as training schools for the clergy. The Theological Faculty was the oldest and for many centuries the most important. Latin and Greek philology, followed by Hebrew, Chaldean, and Arabic, were after all but secondary branches of learning and intended to supplement the study of the Scriptures. In the course of time philosophy was added, and jurisprudence, and much later, medicine and the natural sciences. The addition of all these studies introduced an element of freedom of thought in the university community which was not in the least to the liking of many pious Protestants. In some of the country pro-

vinces, the good people even founded universities of their own, in order that they might keep their young men at home and out of the way of the temptation of Liberalism.

As the universities were not under direct control of anybody but the estates of their particular province, which allowed them to be practically autonomous, they could develop in any direction that was agreeable to their faculty. Gradually they lost some of the character of the purely professional school and began to fulfill the rôle of the American college, i.e., they became places where a young man went to get a general education and to make pleasant friends. Everybody who could afford to do so went to the university and enrolled as a student of law. That meant that he could spend three or four years in reading whatever he pleased and in making friends with those young men who seemed most likable to him. At the end of the term the student let himself be coached in the necessary subjects for his examinations, spent a few busy months on a Latin dissertation, and then got his degree. This degree did not mean that he knew a lot of law, but was considered a guarantee that the owner thereof had spent a few years at a reputable seat of learning and might be considered a gentleman.

Now, while this change in the university education meant that much superficial work was being done, it also meant that a good many more people than ever before got a liberal education. We do not intend to give the impression that all interest in serious work had suddenly disappeared. While these gay young men of fashion regarded their university merely as a club, a good deal of faithful work was still being done in all of the departments. Philology, classical and Semitic, still came in for considerable attention. The presence of printingshops which could print in all languages favored the development of books in these tongues.

The natural sciences and medicine, not hampered by laws against dissection, maintained the high standard of investigation set by the previous century, which has continued to modern times. History was a favorite subject of study. During the seventeenth century the people were still so full of the great and glorious deeds of the war with Spain that most of their histories were written on this one subject. The eighteenth century, through quite a natural reaction, did not take the virtues of the forefathers quite as seriously and rather neglected the history of the war of eighty years.

Like a great many people who prefer contemplation to active work, the people of 1750 or thereabouts used to indulge in genealogical and antiquarian studies. It was a time when old documents, old chronicles of towns and provinces, old statutes, old privileges, were collected and edited with profuse and very learned notes. Not very exciting work, we must grant, but very useful for later investigators. It also made the people acquainted

with the Middle Ages and the changes which had taken place in the local government since the days of the popular guilds and their influence upon local government.

The study of philosophy had rather a curious history. While there was no objection to the study of the philosophy of the ancients, the orthodox clergy always strongly opposed all attempts at introducing a modern system of philosophy. Spinoza, the mildest of men, whose philosophical treatises were understood by one person in every five thousand, found himself opposed by the full strength of the Church, which saw in him no less than the Anti-Christ.

During the eighteenth century this opposition of the clergy grew less as the indifference to religious matters grew larger. A general tolerance born of indifference, and not of superior convictions, decided that people could study philosophy if they were so inclined, and refused to listen to the violent arguments of such pious brethren as saw in such liberty a menace to the welfare of their fellow citizens' souls.

Original work was as much absent in the study of philosophy as it was in everything else. But that which France and England produced was neatly reprinted, and was studied with great care and with a serious desire to get at the truth. The English philosophers, such as Locke and Hume, who appealed to common sense more than to abstract reasoning, were the most popular and were translated repeatedly, and soon penetrated from the universities to the masses at large. The interest in all these things was not as profound as it was before, but it was certainly much more widespread. During the latter half of the eighteenth century interest in learned subjects became "fashionable."

Anybody who wished to be considered as somebody showed his interest in the Higher Life by collecting valuable books or china or coins or South American butterflies, or anything that was rare and expensive. If he were a man of great wealth he would hire some hungry Doctor of Laws or Divinity to catalogue and describe his collection, and had the catalogue printed most beautifully, with handcolored illustrations and a binding which would withstand all time and change.

In order not to grow stale and to keep his mind young and fresh, the citizen, blessed with worldly goods and an interest in immaterial things, used to be very fond of joining some literary or scientific society. During the latter half of the century a score of such societies were founded. They served many purposes. Some of them made a special study of literature, others of mathematics and the natural sciences; others were interested in local history or provincial genealogy. All of them published yearly or half-yearly reports of their meetings and sent those reports broadcast. In this way, too, a good deal of information which formerly had not

been available found its way among large classes of people. The good postal system allowed even those who lived far away from the centre of things to keep informed of what was going on in the big world.

Another source of information for the masses was found in the newspapers. Owing to the good postal system, the newspapers had been able to develop rapidly, and they kept the whole country informed of what was going on in the rest of the world. These Dutch newspapers played a curious international rôle. During the eighteenth century they were the most up-to-date papers, and maintained such a good foreign service that the papers of other countries worshiped them most assiduously with their scissors. The "Gazette de Leyde," published in French, held the place which during the nineteenth century was enjoyed by the London "Times." Nobody was well informed who had not yet seen what the "Gazette de Leyde" had to say upon certain subjects. Editorials in our sense of the word were unknown, but the news items were often accompanied by a few private remarks of the editor.

Not only did these papers print foreign and domestic political news and stock quotations, but they also kept au courant of the inventions and discoveries made at home and elsewhere. They were so upto-date, that even the patent medicine advertisement, with "forty years' practice and a thousand testimonials," was not wanting. Now, while the influence of these papers may not have been that of

the standard papers of to-day, still they brought to everybody who would take the trouble to read them a miscellaneous amount of information which could not fail to broaden his views.

Here ends our short review of the social and economic conditions in the Republic just before the French Revolution. All we could attempt to do was to make a rough sketch of the eighteenth century, which would throw a light upon the principal changes from the previous century. Our work is more intended to provide some scenery for the stage on which our actors will perform in the following chapters than to give a detailed map on which the reader would be able to follow the precise movements of each individual actor.

CHAPTER III

WILLIAM IV

As we have stated before, the death of William III introduced a new period, during which the government of the country was exercised by the Regents and during which all of the provinces except Friesland were without stadholders. Friesland, with its strong feeling of independence, had always held aloof from the other provinces as much as was practicable, and had as early as 1584 elected as its own stadholder, Willem Lodewyk, a son of Johan of Nassau, the oldest brother of William the Silent. It was this same collateral branch of the House of Nassau which later, during the eighteenth century, furnished stadholders for the entire Republic, and which in 1815 was elevated to the throne of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

We have also seen that the first act of the Regents after William died was to endeavor to draw the Republic out of all foreign complications and to start upon a new career of "peace at all costs." Of course international complications continued to take place, and it was not always found possible for the Republic to remain absolutely neutral while her nearest friends and enemies were fighting each other. Furthermore the Republic, from its former days of greatness, was still bound to many nations by dif-

ferent treaties and alliances, and not infrequently she was requested to send such assistance as those treaties stipulated. Whenever this occurred, the request for help was listened to with great patience and was then brought up for discussion in the meeting of the Estates General. But, of course, the foreign ambassadors who made the request would understand that in this free Republic nothing could be done without first informing all the interested parties. The matter, therefore, went from the Estates General to the provincial estates. The provincial estates referred the matter to the delegates from the different cities. The delegates from the different cities had to ask the opinion of their burgomaster and aldermen. Then, after endless debates, the matter under discussion began to creep back to where it came from. By the time it reached the Estates General, the foreign war was apt to be over, through exhaustion of both belligerents; or it had become manifest which of the two warring countries was going to be victorious and measures could be taken to keep on the safe side. This proceeding was hardly dignified, but it saved the Republic much money, and hence was greatly encouraged.

When in the year 1718, England, France, and Austria concluded their triple alliance against Spain, it was expected that the Republic would join them at once. As a matter of fact the Republic did join, but not until the year 1719, when the pre-

liminary fighting indicated a victory for the allies. A year later, the different leading powers of Europe held a sort of peace conference in Cambrai to discuss political matters of international interest. The Estates General, however, preferred not to incur the heavy expenses of sending their delegates to this conference and the Republic was not represented. This voluntary absence was accepted by the other nations as an indication of the Republic's desire to be left undisturbed in foreign matters. Henceforth the Republic was considered a negligible quantity. which had to be respected only on account of its prominent position on the money market. At the same time, when no money could be found to send a few representatives to this important conference. the whole country went crazy about John Law's financial schemes and spent millions in the most futile speculation. We mention the episode because it indicates the change that had come over the Republic.

After this congress of Cambrai there followed a dozen years of European peace. The Republic, free from care about the condition of European politics, allowed what remained of her army to go to ruin, and kept only half a dozen ships afloat with which to defend her enormous foreign commerce.

In 1733, the war of the Polish Succession broke out. But this took place far away from Holland, and, as England also maintained her neutrality, the Republic on this occasion was not disturbed in her slumbers. Then followed seven years of general peace. Except for a few troops in the wholly neglected fortifications along the French frontier, the so-called Barrière, there were no troops left. The fleet was equally as weak.

Almost an entire generation had now gone by since the Regents had resumed the government of the country. Only a few old folks remembered the days of 1672 and the terrible defeat the Regents' party had suffered in that year. The scaffold of de Witt and the remembrance of his mutilated body being dragged through the streets had become ancient history. One had to be a nonagenarian to have a clear recollection of that terrible occurrence. The younger generation of the Regents no longer shared their fathers' fear of a possible repetition of such a violent outbreak. Accordingly, they were less careful. They had been born and bred under very different conditions of life from those their fathers remembered, and they had no personal knowledge of the people's wrath, which was so real and terrible to their grandfathers. They took their share of the government and of the profits of office with much less conscious feeling of responsibility than their ancestors had known. The country was at peace. It was no longer burdened with a useless army and a costly navy. There was general abundance. Surely there was no reason why everybody should not be as happy as kings or why anybody should grudge the Republic its revenues.

But, alas, this pleasant idyll was cruelly disturbed in the year 1740. The war of the Austrian Succession broke out. The Republic unfortunately was one of the signers of the famous Pragmatic Sanction, by which Charles VI of Austria had assured his daughter, Maria Theresa, of the succession in his domains. Neither the Republic nor England, which was also one of the signers, had done so out of love for the young Princess or out of respect for her aged father. In return for their signatures Charles had promised to discontinue his attempts to start an Austro-Indian Company in Ostend, an undertaking which threatened to be a dangerous rival to the English and Dutch Indian Companies.

Now, when in 1740 Frederic the Great started on his first freebooting expedition against Austria and precipitated the war of the Austrian Succession, the Republic was most disagreeably reminded of her rash step in signing this Pragmatic Sanction. For by this agreement the Republic was bound to come to the support of Maria Theresa with arms and money. The Empress demanded help, and England at once came to the rescue and reminded Holland of her obligations to do likewise. But the Republic hesitated, for on the other side, lined up with Prussia, was France, and this country threatened all sorts of things should the Republic refuse to maintain a strict neutrality.

The problem, therefore, came down to the following eminently practical question: either the Repub-

lic would support the Empress as it was obliged to do by solemn treaty, — a policy which would cost money and produce no practical results, — or the Republic would stay neutral, save money, and be rewarded by commercial advantages from the French government.

As usual, a compromise was made. Instead of sending the Empress troops, as they were bound to do according to the stipulations of the treaty, the Estates General sent her some money. Instead of sending a fleet, very vague preliminary discussions were started about the building of a few new ships. Of course, neither side was contented with these halfway measures. Maria Theresa thought that the Republic had done too little. France thought that she had done too much.

In a short time the whole country got interested in discussing the purely academic question as to whether the Republic was actually bound to stick to its solemn promises or not. Soon this general debating society developed into two camps, divided along the old lines of party politics. Those who supported the Empress and England were guided by the old friendship which had always bound the Princes of Orange to the neighbors across the North Sea. On the other side were the Regents and their adherents, guided by practical instincts, who saw the country's sole salvation in a close friendship with France. After a few months' discussion, the original questions at issue were forgot-

ten in the general revival of the political quarrels between the pro- and anti-Stadholderites.

Meanwhile the head of the House of Orange was peacefully living in Leeuwarden, the capital of Friesland, and was ruling this province without exercising the slightest influence upon any of the rest of the Republic or upon her foreign policy.²⁴ The head of the house at that moment was Willem Karel Hendrik Friso, aged twenty-nine years. He was born in Leeuwarden on September 1, 1711. His father had been drowned two months before while crossing the Moerdyk, on his way from the army in Belgium to the Hague, whither he was bound to see about the settlement of the inheritance of William III. His mother was a German princess, Mary Louise of Hesse-Cassel. She, as well as her husband, was of a family of more than ordinary mental and physical gifts. The husband, Johan Willem Friso, might have done great things in the Republic if he had not met with such an untimely end.

But the child of this couple was a very commonplace little personage. Neither in appearance nor in mental make-up did he resemble his parents. As a small child he had been sickly, and had been educated, therefore, by his mother with great care and in the quietest of ways. He had spent his whole youth in Leeuwarden, a city remarkable for its slow dignity, conservatism, and general dowdiness. It was a little country town, situated far away from the large outside world, and not much in touch with

what happened abroad. Friesland was a little republic by itself, with a rich aristocracy and a rich peasant class. Between these two there was hardly a second class. The aristocracy lived either on its estates or in Leeuwarden. Very proud of its old names and its glorious family histories, it had petrified into a rather dull but extremely haughty and conservative class of imitation grands seigneurs. For the rich crowd of green-grocers and butchers, who were almighty in Holland and in most of the rest of the Republic, they had no use whatsoever. Indeed, whenever the occasion offered itself they treated them with great superiority and high-andmightiness, a feeling which was reciprocated most energetically by the merchants of the Province of Holland.

In this atmosphere, full of rather feudal sentiments, young Willem Karel Hendrik Friso, whom we shall know under the name of William IV, grew up under the rigid discipline of his mother. She was very pious and very strict, and young William's life was not full of exhilarating joy. He got, however, an excellent foundation in many serious branches of learning and great virtuosity in discussing theological questions. His mother, moreover, must have been a woman of rare tact, for, at the early age of twenty-three, when she was left a widow in a strange and not very hospitable land, she gradually managed to make herself so well-beloved that the homely nickname, "Maryken

Meu," or "Mother Mary," which her contemporaries gave her, is still remembered with pleasant affection in even our own day.

In the year 1726, at the age of fifteen, the young Prince was sent to the University of Francker. This was one of the small universities which local patriotism had erected in opposition to the more international one at Leiden. It enjoyed, however, an excellent name in the world of scholarship. Here William made for himself a reputation as a serious student and indulged in many and varied branches of study. Mathematics and physics attracted him more especially, although it is doubtful what use he ever intended to make of them in his work as a statesman.

After a residence of two years in Francker, he went to Utrecht, where at the well-known university he again followed only such lectures as interested him. With this smattering of learning he finally went back to Leeuwarden to assume the duties of the stadholdership, which his mother had exercised for him until he should be of age.

His prospects for playing a leading rôle in the Republic were not large. It is true that some of the minor country provinces in the east, Groningen, Drenthe, and Gelderland, had gradually preferred to appoint the young Prince their stadholder rather than continue under the old system of government by the Regents. But as long as Holland refused to throw off the yoke of their rule, the other provinces

counted for very little. And in Holland the Prince had at that moment practically no influence. He was befriended by a few leading families who had always been stanch supporters of the House of Orange and who now lived in forgotten obscurity. Of course among the people and among the clergy the majority were still faithful to the House of Orange, but the people were not organized and the Regents were. Hence it was impossible for the majority to assert themselves.

But now that the War of the Austrian Succession had broken out and the Republic was full of rumors that she would be drawn into the fight herself. the leading partisans of the Prince thought that the time had come to do something for the advancement of his cause. Their first thought was to ask the English government to give William a high military position in the army which was going to be sent to the support of the Austrian Empress. Then, when the Prince should return as a conquering hero. his chances would have increased enormously. But the unfortunate young man was chicken-breasted and suffered from chronic asthma; he lacked all the qualifications for a military hero, and the plan had to be given up. There was nothing for him to do but to continue his peaceful life in Leeuwarden.

All this time, through a number of inheritances, the Prince was getting to be a rich man. Several of the collateral branches of the family died out, and

the Prince acquired their possessions. So that by the year 1742 his power as a ruler over a number of small German states was quite as large as that which he exercised as Stadholder of Friesland and Groningen and Gelderland. It put him into rather a curious position, for he was absolute ruler over his patient Teutons and the subordinate executive of the estates of the aggressively "free-born" Frisians. To the Prince, however, more possessions meant more money, and more money meant more power. Gradually he was becoming the richest man of his country.

Meanwhile, also, the debate as to the advisability or inadvisability of sticking to one's given word was still going on, and fortunately with increasing success for those who supported the safe and sane policy of honesty. In 1744, the Estates General, after much pressure on the part of England, at last consented to come to the support of the Empress, and began to gather a few troops. They even went so far as to discuss the possibility of giving the Prince of Orange a post as lieutenant-general. But William, like a good many dull people, was of a most tenacious nature. His father had been commanderin-chief before him. Either he was going to be commander-in-chief, too, or he was going to be nothing at all. As far as he was concerned, there was not going to be any compromise. The offer was therefore declined. The troops were sent under another lieutenant-general, and the prince remained in Leeuwarden and waited in peace for the things that were to come.

The international political situation, however, was changing very fast. England had strictly followed out all the promises made to Charles VI. and had sent an auxiliary army to Maria Theresa. At Dettingen, this army had beaten the French. France, in order to get even with England, was equipping a fleet which was to bring the English Pretender Charles Edward into his rightful dominion. The French fleet, with the Pretender and a large army, actually sailed away from France to invade England, but owing to very bad weather it failed to land or to accomplish anything. But this unfortunate enterprise sufficed to draw the Republic definitely into the general mix-up. For the Republic and England were united by two defensive treaties, one of the year 1678 and one of the year 1716. These treaties stipulated that either country must help the other in case of a threatened invasion. Now England was being threatened with an invasion. Hence the Republic, according to the words of the treaty, must send her six thousand soldiers. The sending of six thousand men, however, meant certain war with France. The difficulty was great. England clamored for help. France clamored for neutrality. Again the Republic tried to please both parties. The six thousand men were actually brought together, but great difficulty was experienced in shipping them across the North Sea. It

was found to be impossible to collect even twenty ships. The best naval officer who could be found to command this fleet was a venerable gentleman of seventy-three years of age who had been pensioned during the last fifteen years. The second in command was sixty-nine years old.

Before the auxiliary troops were finally embarked, the French expedition had come to grief. England was no longer threatened with an invasion and the Dutch troops were no longer needed. But the episode had sufficed to show the Republic's bad faith and had estranged her from both France and Great Britain. The Republic had now sunk so low that, while she was collecting the necessary men for her English expedition, she at the same time sent a special mission to France to make clear in Paris that she supported England only under very great pressure and that such support was not intended as an act of hostility against her good French friends. Even after a French army had invaded Belgium (which was an Austrian province) and had taken all the Dutch fortifications of the Barrière, the Republic continued her policy of conciliation in Paris, and went to any degree of indignity and humiliation rather than openly take the side to which she was bound by solemn treaty. In this way, when the year 1745 came, she had lost the good will and the respect of every other nation in Europe, and, moreover, was finally dragged into the war and under the most unfavorable circumstances.

For France refused to be pacified by extraordinary missions. She declared war and immediately invaded Dutch territory. The Dutch fortifications, fallen into decay and manned by a few veteran pensioners, were surrendered without the firing of a single shot. Within a few weeks the French army conquered the greater part of the Dutch territory on the south shore of the Scheldt. Since the year 1672 the Republic had not seen a war so near her door. Stories of French vandalism were still alive and were revived by the behavior of the troops under Maurice of Saxony, who, although specially admonished by the French government to "go easy," entertained very liberal ideas about the right of the conqueror and the "exigencies of war."

When in the spring of 1747 the French troops made ready to penetrate farther into Dutch territory, a terrible panic spread. Whosoever could afford to do so fled across the Scheldt and escaped to the islands of Walcheren and Beveland. Most of the fugitives went to Middelburg on the island of Walcheren, the capital of Zeeland. Middelburg had been one of the first Dutch cities to throw off the Spanish yoke, and since the disappearance of the Spanish troops its inhabitants had not had opportunity to see what a foreign soldier looked like. They were now thrown into terrible distress by the harrowing stories of their brethren from across the Scheldt. The whole island, one of the richest parts

of the whole Republic, saw itself at the mercy of the invading enemy.

In Vlissingen and in Veere, the two cities over which the Prince of Orange, in his quality of Marquis of those cities, had always exercised great influence, and which had always been connected with the House of Orange by very affectionate ties, the people assembled in the market-place and caused considerable disorder. Vlissingen was still a prosperous city with a large colonial commerce. Veere was strongly on the decline, and was changing from an important mediæval town into a country village, where to-day the remains of an immense Gothic church, a wonderful town hall, and a few beautiful houses preach a silent lesson of past glory.

Curiously enough, it was in Veere, with its thousand and odd inhabitants, that the first outbreak occurred. During the evening of the 24th of April of the year 1747 the news of the fall of Aardenburg, the key to the whole of the Republic's part of Flanders, became known. The people flocked to the town hall. Speeches were made. Almost exactly the same thing happened as in the year 1672. There were loud and violent outcries of treachery. The Regents were blamed for everything. The only hope for salvation was seen in the immediate appointment of a stadholder and commander-general. In the middle of the night the Burgomaster of Veere was visited by an angry multitude. In order to save himself from violence, he was obliged

to promise that he would on the morrow advise the Estates of Zeeland to appoint Prince William as stadholder.

From Veere to Middleburg is only half an hour's walk. The next morning the disorder of Veere had spread to the Zeeland capital. The Regents, as always under similar circumstances, were helpless. They had no armed force at their disposal. Within three days the whole of the Province of Zeeland was clamoring for the appointment of William, and on the 28th of April the provincial estates decided to offer the Prince of Orange the dignity of Stadholder of their province.

The first news of this popular uprising reached Holland by way of Rotterdam, which heard of it through the sailors of the small boats which early each morning brought the fresh vegetables from the Zeeland Islands. No sooner were these small boats, adorned with Orange flags, seen on the Maas, than the crowd along the river broke forth into wild iov. Orange ribbons were produced from somewhere, and soon a procession of much-beribboned people began to move towards the town hall, the final goal of all similar processions. Inside the town hall a number of badly frightened Regents were holding a meeting. Much against their will for they were defenseless — the burgomasters were forced to receive a delegation from among the processionists. A baker and a cartwright were their spokesmen. In very determined words they de-

manded that the town council should lend its support towards the appointment of Prince William IV as Stadholder of Holland. The town council could do nothing but acquiesce. Within an hour the Orange flag was floating from the old tower of the Lawrence Church. The rest of the day was spent in celebrations. The taverns did a great business.

Exactly the same thing happened in Dordrecht and the Hague and Haarlem and Leyden. Processions formed everywhere; the town council was bullied into submission, and the old flag of the Prince was gloriously hoisted on the highest available church tower.

Three days this peaceful revolution lasted. No blood flowed. Only a few very unpopular Regents suffered material damage in the form of broken window-panes. That was all. But on the 3d of May the Estates of Holland offered the Stadholder of Friesland, Groningen, and Gelderland the dignity of Stadholder of their own province, and on the next day they appointed him commander-in-chief of the Republic's armies and of the navy. The young Prince saw himself reinstated in all the dignities which had formerly belonged to his great-uncles. His patience was rewarded. Without himself contributing to the final results in any way, he was called to his high office.

A deputation from among the Estates of Zeeland crossed the Zuyderzee and arrived in Leeuwarden on the 5th of May. They asked His Highness to

proceed at once to their province. On the 10th of May His Highness, with his young wife, Anna, daughter of George II of England, took a fond farewell of his mother and proceeded to Holland.

On Ascension Day the august family arrived in Amsterdam, where they were welcomed by the Burgomaster and deputations from all influential commercial and civic bodies of the town. As for the people, they had not shouted "Vivat Oranje" for so long, that they could do it now with a vengeance. The enthusiasm was immense, and wherever the Prince appeared he was greeted as a returning hero.

At last, after almost half a century, the people were again delivered from the oppressive yoke of the Regents. They felt that, as of old, the Prince of Orange would protect the country against the foreign enemy, and would put an end to all the many unbearable abuses which had gradually developed while the Regents were in supreme command of the country.

William IV was now Stadholder of all of the provinces of the entire Republic.²⁵ But that was not enough for those who supported him. He might die without leaving issue, and then the country would see a repetition of what happened after the death of William III. There was not yet a well-organized political party behind the Stadholder, but all of a sudden it was discovered that a large majority of the people felt the same way about certain things. In order to save the country from the

disastrous system caused by the rule of a few privileged families, it was felt in a general and vague way that certain fundamental changes had to be instituted. To be more concise, it was found that the majority of the people were in favor of a more centralized system on a constitutional-monarchial basis.

A great many contemporary historians of this period talk about the uprisings and the popular enthusiasm of the "mob," "the Plebs," "the profanum vulgus." No doubt, that element made itself the most conspicuous. But behind it all there was a very sound popular feeling that a change in the general construction of the Republic's political system was eminently necessary and that William IV, as the man who had been put into office as the candidate of the reform party, had to be given great power in order to be able to bring about the muchdesired reforms. Accordingly, on the 7th of October, 1747, William was made hereditary Stadholder of all the seven provinces with a power which made him practically the sovereign ruler of the Republic.

It was now William's turn to fulfill the obligations which he owed to those who, through their direct pressure, had given him his power. But here he failed most hopelessly. He had none of the gifts of a true reformer. He might have made a faithful and patient executive. But he lacked all initiative, and he soon gave up trying to perform a task which was utterly beyond his strength. In the parlance of modern American life, "He failed to make good."

As we have said before, during the last fifty years several evils had developed in political life which demanded immediate correction. First of all, the postal system was in a bad condition. We have seen how the postal companies were private enterprises. and how their revenues were not used for the public benefit, but went into the pockets of the local Regents who happened to make up the town government and control the political jobs. These revenues often amounted to large sums. In Amsterdam they were no less than two hundred thousand guilders yearly, in the Hague they were almost forty thousand guilders. Now there had long been a feeling that this was not as it should be: that the revenues of the postal companies ought not to serve to enrich a few private individuals. Therefore, the people demanded that the whole postal system should come directly under the control of the Stadholder, and that its revenues should go into the public treasury.

As most of the supporters of the Prince were found among the middle classes, we are not astonished to find them demanding that something be done for the guilds. From a political-economic standpoint this demand offered little hope of success. The days of the guilds were gone by. Individualism in commerce and trade, and liberty in handwork, were becoming the keynote of the industrial situation. The people, however, did not see these things as we do now; they only knew how,

under the Regents, the guilds were gradually losing all the influence and the control over the affairs of the town and the province which they had formerly enjoyed. Hence they hoped that interference by the new stadholder would be sufficient to revive what was economically destined to perish.

Another important demand was expressed in relation to the civic militia. Formerly this militia had elected its own officers. Gradually the vacancies in the corps of officers had been filled by the Regents with their own supporters. In this way, so the people feared, the militia would eventually become too much influenced by the ruling classes and might be used by them in case of political disturbances. Therefore the people demanded that the militia again be allowed to elect their officers without any interference on the part of the town hall.

Finally, there were many and loud complaints about the way in which the taxes were being collected. The taxes were high, as we have seen, but not exorbitant. They were not levied by the government directly, but were farmed out to tax-collectors. These gentlemen maintained that reputation for meanness and cruelty which they have enjoyed since the earliest days of human history. Would the Stadholder kindly see to it that a change for the good was made in this unsavory business? Yes, His Highness would see to everything; but would the people please give him a few weeks' time to get familiar with his new surroundings? The

people gave him a few weeks and the weeks changed into months and the months changed into years and nothing was ever done.


It is true a few changes were made in the postal system. The revenue derived therefrom now flowed into the provincial treasury. A few other reforms were begun, but never finished. Others were never begun at all. Several of the most objectionable Regents were removed from office. But their places were immediately taken by others from the same class. The men changed, but the system remained the same. After the many lean years the Regents who were partisans of Orange were now allowed to graze for a while on the fields of private privilege, and the Regents of the Anti-Orange party were politely requested to remove themselves temporarily from those blessed fields and to enjoy what the fat years had just brought them.

As to the popular demands, they were speedily forgotten. Of course, we could hardly have expected William IV to institute a modern democratic form of government. Such a change would have been an impossibility, and as a matter of fact was not wanted by anybody. There was only one country which had something resembling popular government, and that was England. But England was at that particular moment possessed of such corrupt politics that nobody cared to flatter it by an imitation of its system. What the Stadholder could have done, however, was to assure himself

of the cooperation of the large intelligent classes which still remained excluded from all influence in political matters. Neither they nor the common people were any better off than before.

Gradually the people discovered that their reform candidate, from whom they had expected such great things, was no better than the men whom he had supplanted. The people turned away from the Stadholder, and their disappointment changed their love into hatred. Was it for this that they had given themselves all this trouble of bringing about his election? they asked, when they saw how the Prince drew his chief advisers exclusively from among the Regents and how he surrounded himself with ultra-conservative members of the Frisian nobility.

The polite and hesitating way in which the Stadholder removed such members of the town government as had to be dismissed in order to appease the popular demand for revenge, did as much harm to his reputation as if he had never removed them at all. Furthermore, it seemed that the Prince would never get over apologizing to these victims of the popular wrath, explaining how really and truly it was not his fault that they had to retire, and that he had acted much against his own taste in the matter; and would they please not be cross with him? Whereupon he was apt to go and dine with them, to show them that there was no hard feeling on his part at all.



ILLUMINATION OF AMSTERDAM TOWN HALL FOR THE STATE VISIT OF WILLIAM V AND, HIS WIFE, MAY 3, 1768 After an engraving by S. Fokke

The young Prince ruled only a few years, but in those few years he showed decisively that he had no understanding whatsoever of his actual position or of the things that were reasonably expected of him. He did his very best according to his own lights and was surprised to discover himself a failure. Gradually he was driven into the small party of Orangist Regents, who, through his own appointment, had been returned to power. But this party had no longer the support of the large masses of Orangist citizens. These now went their own way. They did not at once form a regular party as we understand political parties, but they held aloof from the Stadholder and showed him in many direct and indirect ways that he no longer had their support.

Wherefore by the middle of the eighteenth century the Republic was divided into three political parties, defined very vaguely, but existing nevertheless as separate political bodies. First of all there were the supporters of the policy of decentralization, the party of the Estates, the Regents. Secondly, there was the Stadholder and a few leading Orangist families who wanted centralization, but primarily for the benefit of the Prince and of themselves. Thirdly, there was the large mass of the people who wanted a change towards centralization and an escape from the prevalent chaotic condition. These found themselves deserted by their chosen leader and now drifted about without any guidance.

In the year 1748 the War of the Austrian Succession ended. There was now no longer any danger of foreign invasion. The Prince, who for decency's sake had gone to the field of action, returned and went to his labors as general stadholder. It cannot be denied that he worked hard. He tried to introduce some necessary reforms in order to stay the rapid decline of commerce. He even got up a very valuable collection of suggestions which were presented to the Estates General for their consideration, but were promptly lost in that unprofitable desert of "future consideration."

But in all such matters the Prince was wont to lose himself in details, to err from the broad way that led to somewhere in order to investigate the bypaths that led to nowhere in particular. His health had never been very good. The attacks which he began to suffer from all sides bothered him a great deal. According to his own lights he did the very best he could. That this very best was not pleasing to his subjects was a matter of grief to him, and quite as inexplicable as it was painful to his self-respect.

In less than three years it seemed that he was exhausted and would not be able to go on with his task. In September of 1751, his physicians sent him to Aix-les-Bains for a cure. Somewhat improved in health he returned. But in October of the same year he fell sick again; this time of erysipelas. Usually this is not a deadly disease, but his weak

constitution could not stand the strain. On the 22d of October, 1751, William suddenly died. The man who four years before had been hailed as the Father of his Country was buried amidst general indifference. Even the faithful orthodox preachers, who were on the side of the House of Orange through all vicissitudes, did not know what to say in their funeral orations. When there was talk about a general mourning in respect to his memory, many voices were raised in protest. What was there to mourn about?

CHAPTER IV

THE PRINCESS ANNA

When William IV died he left a daughter and a son. The latter was just three years old. The actual government went, therefore, into the hands of his widow, the Princess Anna of Hannover, daughter of King George II of England. For eight years, until the time of her death in 1759, Anna was the Regent of the country, or, as she was commonly called, the "Governess."

These eight years were most unfortunate, not only for the country, but more especially for the Governess herself. The English Princess had never been very happy in the land of her adoption. Hospitality towards strangers was not a common virtue in a country of such pronounced provincial views. But the Princess suffered under other grievances. She was of roval blood and accustomed to be the first in the land of her birth. In the Republic the position of her husband had always been a doubtful one; for although he was the chief executive of the Republic, he was technically the servant of the estates of the provinces which had appointed him their stadholder. Hence there occurred continual unpleasantnesses. The wives of the members of the estates expected her to call on them first. The

Stadholder, so they maintained, was an employee of their husbands, and his wife should remember this fact. Only after a lengthy argument were they at last induced to present their cards at the House in the Woods before the Princess had honored them with her visit. The rich middle classes never omitted to show the Princess exactly what her position in this free Republic was. The fact that she was of royal blood was not going to make any difference. On the contrary, it only provoked hostility and distrust.

But much of her unhappiness the Princess owed to her own peculiar characteristics. The first thing for her to do would have been to found a party around herself and her small son. There were still many people anxious to support the Stadholder with great loyalty. But the Princess failed to see the necessity of rallying them around her. She did not like most people whom she met, and she rarely trusted them. Whenever a perfectly disinterested person offered to give her sound counsel, she was wont to distrust this person's motives and in consequence accepted his advice with ill grace. Many of the old nobility who had remained faithful to the House of Orange she estranged by her very proud and haughty behavior. She soon found herself deserted except by a few inferior persons who were willing to flatter her and who told her only what she liked to hear.

To make matters worse, the Princess was on

very bad terms with her mother-in-law. This old lady had remained in Leeuwarden, and from there she was continually intriguing against her British daughter-in-law. The two princesses had never been on good terms. In the first place, the old Princess, who had been wrapped up in the life and the career of her son, naturally disliked to see another woman take so much of the place in her son's life which formerly had belonged to herself. Furthermore, the characters of the two women were entirely different, and the old one had seen the young one's departure to the Hague with scarcely hidden pleasure.

No sooner had William IV died than the old mother in Leeuwarden began to worry about the way in which her grandchildren in the Hague were being educated. The German could not possibly approve of the British methods. The grandmother unfortunately allowed herself to be guided by her prejudices and started to intrigue openly against her daughter-in-law. In this she was actively supported by the old Frisian nobility. For almost half a century these people had formed the only court in the Republic. Now there was another and a much more brilliant court in the Hague, and they did not like it. They no longer played such an important rôle in the councils of the House of Orange as formerly, and they felt themselves reduced to the second rank. Of course they might easily have obtained positions at the court of the Hague, but,

being of an intensely provincial nature and having the ordinary feudal dislike of anything commercial, they preferred to stay in their own little city.

The first manifestations of this opposition from the north came when a proposal was made in the Estates General to appoint a board of tutors for the small Prince, in which all of the relatives should be represented. The formation of such a board would have given the grandmother as much influence over the education of her grandchildren as she had exercised over that of their father before them. But, as we have seen before, the people in Holland reciprocated the sentiments which the north felt towards them, and they had no desire to oblige their Frisian compatriots in any way or to give them a chance to educate the Prince; they intended to shape him after their own pattern. The board of tutors was never appointed, but the episode sufficed to show to everybody that there was no coöperation in the camp of the Stadholder, and in this way it did great damage to the cause of the little Prince.

Other mistakes were soon to follow. There had always been many people who felt that the Stadholder was responsible for too many things, that he could not well attend to all matters that were brought to his attention, and that he ought to have a corps of assistants, who should act as his secretaries and who should form what we might call a responsible ministry. In this way the Stadholder would be allowed the necessary time for attending

to matters of more importance than the accounting of some insignificant bills or the appointment of a burgomaster somewhere in a country district. William IV had never had time to listen to this proposition, being too busy with just the sort of detail which he ought to have left to the care of a subaltern.

Several of the wisest councillors of the party now made similar proposals to the Governess. The Count of Bentinck, a stanch supporter of the House of Orange, made a voluminous report upon this matter. The report, however, was respectfully put on the table. Bentinck, who was not the sort of man who liked to see his advice treated that way, retired to his estates and was seen no more in the councils of the Princess.

But, after all, as the Princess was not familiar enough with political conditions in the Republic to do everything herself, she was more and more obliged to leave the management of her affairs to little secretaries, obscure persons who served the interest of the stadholders and those of their own families with the greatest impartiality.

With men like Bentinck and his friends out of the way, the Regents now descended upon the helpless family. They cleverly managed to make themselves indispensable to the Princess, who was floating around without any guidance. Not that they had suddenly grown into supporters of the Stadholder. On the contrary, this exalted office was just as objec-

tionable an institution to them now as it ever had been before. But so long as there was going to be a stadholder anyway, it was most clearly in their own interest to have the greatest possible influence upon that dignitary.

After a few years there was but one person left within the entourage of the Princess who could be expected to serve her in a more or less impartial way. This was the Duke of Brunswick.26 His Serene Highness Louis Ernest Duke of Brunswick Wolfenbuettel plays a curious rôle in the history of the Republic. He started life as a German prince. Then for many years he was an Austrian fieldmarshal. After that he was commander-in-chief of the Dutch armies and practical dictator of the Republic. The last years of his life he spent again in Germany, where he died in the ancestral family castle. He was born September 25, 1718. He belonged to a large but poor family, and as such had to look for a career abroad. He entered the Austrian military service and served for three years under Seckendorff in the war against the Turks. In 1747, Maria Theresa made him a field-marshal as a reward for his services. He took an active part in the War of the Austrian Succession, and was wounded so badly that the surgeons despaired of his life. But he survived this experience and was sent to recuperate for a while in Aix.

While the Duke was in Aix, the French invaded Belgium, and as he was near the seat of war he was

sent at the head of an army to Dutch Flanders. There he met William IV, who had just been made stadholder, and who was now inspecting the means of defense along the frontier. He seems to have made such a deep impression upon the Stadholder that William tried at once to induce him to enter his own employment. It took quite a lot of persuasion to induce Maria Theresa to allow her general to change his allegiance, but at last this was accomplished and the Duke of Brunswick went to Holland in order to reorganize the Dutch armies.

We must confess that we do not know entirely what to make of the man. Few people who have played a rôle in Dutch history have been written about so much. A whole collection of pamphlets exists about this one individual. He has been caricatured and lampooned numberless times. About few people have such infamous things been said and printed as were said and printed openly about the "Fat Duke." During the last years of his life he hired a German professor to write his biography, and he tried to defend himself against much that had been said against him. The professor had a minute diary in six big volumes from which to draw his information.27 But this apologia pro vita did not help him in the least. For more than a century the Fat Duke remained the scapegoat for everything that had gone wrong in the Republic. It was he, so it was said, who had corrupted William V morally and physically and who had turned the Prince's

brilliant gifts into idiocy in order that he might retain his influence over the helpless creature, etc., etc.

During the last twenty years an attempt has been made to rehabilitate the Duke — to prove that his contemporaries treated him with great and undeserved ingratitude and tried to hide their own sins by pointing to those of the Prince's most trusted adviser. An attempt has also been made to prove that the Duke was the only man who, under given circumstances, might have saved the Republic from destruction. As is usually the case, the truth will be somewhere between the two extremes.

A man who, during twenty years, maintained himself at the head of such an ungovernable country as the Republic, may have been everything else, but he could not have been a fool. Furthermore, he must have had good mental qualities, for he could not impress those around him by his physical superiority. He was quite extraordinarily ugly, and in middle life he grew so fat that he could hardly mount a horse, and his figure became the standing joke of the army and of the people in general. From childhood he had stammered. As he grew older, his stammering grew worse, and the difficulty he experienced in expressing himself distinctly and clearly made it very hard for most people to understand what he was really talking about.

All his enemies, however, agree that he thoroughly understood human nature and that he had great ability as a political manager. Among the

many small politicians whom the Republic produced, this man, who came to them from the "big world," who, from his earliest age on, had been accustomed to the ways of the great Austrian court, and who had all his life been involved in some international intrigue or other, stood forth as the only person who clearly comprehended the small game that was being played all around him.

As to his military capacities, which his contemporaries derided with such delight, they must have been in evidence at some time or other. Of course it frequently occurred that princes of the blood were made field-marshals just on general principles. But such soldiers rarely ventured forth into a war on the heathen Turk or into the bloody War of the Austrian Succession. The fact that Maria Theresa let the Duke go to the Republic only after a long period of hesitation also seems to indicate that she believed his services to be valuable.

It is true that after he once got to Holland the Duke never had much chance to show what he was worth as a soldier. He clearly saw that the neglected Dutch army, under the existing circumstances, was past the stage of remedy, and he never even tried to introduce reforms. His principal duty he considered to consist in serving William IV, his widow, and later on his son, as a general political adviser. That he played this rôle entirely out of Platonic devotion to the House of Orange is as little true as the claim, made by some of his con-

temporaries, that he entered the service of the Republic in order to ruin the country and thereby oblige her foreign enemies. We think that the solution of the problem is a much simpler one. The Duke was an impecunious little German prince and he had to make a living. The Republic paid him at first twenty thousand and later on sixty thousand guilders a year for his services. That was a considerable compensation, and for this reason the Duke came and for this reason he stayed on.

On the whole, however, the former field-marshal did his duty well and served his masters faithfully. Without his particular services it is very doubtful whether the Princes of Orange could have maintained themselves as long as they actually did. Until the end of his life, William IV had the most complete faith in the devotion of the Duke. But no sooner had William died than the Duke found himself in a difficult position. The Governess did not care for him at all. The fact that first the Estates of Holland and then those of the other provinces had made provisions to have the Duke of Brunswick appointed as the guardian of William V. in case the Governess should die before her son came of age, was not conducive to a better understanding between her Royal Highness and her late husband's protégé.

Neither did the English Princess like to confess her inferiority in political sagacity by asking the advice of a little German Duke. But, as we have

seen, after a few years the Duke was the only person at the little court in the Hague who seemed to know what he wanted. Furthermore, he was the only one without sons and nephews and cousins for whom he had to provide, and thereby he was in pleasant contrast to the other courtiers, who were all working hard looking after the interests of their own families. Gradually the Princess was obliged to go to the Duke whenever she really needed anything done. The Duke never forced his advice upon her, and was clever enough to make her believe that whatever he proposed had emanated from her own brain. In this way after a short while he managed to remove all distrust on the part of the Princess, and the relations between the Governess and the Duke became mutually friendly and helpful and remained so until the death of the former.

But even with his support the Princess experienced difficult years. A good many industries which had been languishing for a long time now went out of existence altogether. Not a single month passed but one or two petitions were sent her asking that something be done for the country's commercial interests. The merchantmen, unprotected by a fleet, suffered continual detention by foreign nations and most especially by England. But where was the Governess going to find money to build ships, when the Province of Holland, the richest of all, was seventy millions in arrears?

The situation was difficult enough when in 1756

it was made even more precarious by the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. Soon all the powers of Europe were mixed up in this quarrel. France and England began a war on American soil for colonial supremacy in the northern part of the American continent. Again the Republic was asked to support England according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1678. The Governess, as had her husband before her, supported the demands of the English government. That was the moment for which the opposition had been waiting. The Regents again felt themselves strong enough to come out in the open against the young Stadholder and his mother, who was acting as his guardian and as Regent of the country. "Of course," so they said, "the Governess is supporting the demand of England. What else could we expect of an English Princess?"

Now in this there was no truth whatever. The Governess never became unfaithful to the interests of her adopted country. But she remembered how much ill-will the halting attitude of the Republic had caused during the War of the Austrian Succession, and quite rightly decided that a country, in order not to perish, must stick to its solemn promises.

But the opposition pretended not to believe in her honest intentions. The fact that the country was experiencing hard times gave the opposition the support of thousands of discontented merchants, who violently opposed the spending of money on

military preparations. The Princess's supporters were also reminded that on a previous occasion aid to England had meant war with France and that no true patriot could wish to repeat such an experiment. It was argued that this was a colonial war, and that no aid need be given to England as long as the fighting did not occur in Europe.

At this moment the opposition received a valuable ally in the French ambassador in the Hague. The old Régime in France may have been guilty of many sins, but it certainly produced very clever diplomats. The French representative in the Republic, the Count d'Affray, was one of these. He had been sent to the Republic with instructions to do as much damage as possible to the friendship which existed between the Republic and England, and to try to induce the former to conclude a treaty of friendship with France. Not that the Republic was considered so highly as a fighting power, but she still had lots of money, and France, already on the downward path and on the way to financial ruin, needed money more than it needed armies.

The French ambassador had from the very beginning turned towards the Regents and had stayed away as much as possible from the court of the Stadholder. He knew that material advantages more than sentimental considerations would count with his Dutch friends. He, therefore, held out very desirable visions of a preferential tariff which might be granted to the Republic as a reward for

good behavior. Good behavior in this case meant another refusal to comply with the stipulation of the English treaty. But the day drew near on which England expected the Dutch aid. As the Republic pretended not to possess the necessary ships with which to transport her six thousand auxiliary troops, England offered to send the ships herself.

In March, 1751, English ships actually appeared before the Dutch coast. But the Estates General asked for further delay and for more time in which to consider the matter. During three whole weeks the deliberations went on. Then the English commander grew tired of waiting any longer and departed.

England considered the Republic's act as a positive refusal, and henceforth treated Dutch ships like those of any other foreign nation and searched them and confiscated them without any regard for the feelings of her unfaithful ally. The Regents, however (and the French ambassador), considered that they had won a great victory against the Governess (and England), and they seem to have been wholly ignorant of the dangerous game they were playing, nor do they seem to have understood the relative strength of the two nations engaged in the war.

But when the war in America went on for many years, and the Dutch merchants continued to suffer from English privateers, the blame for all their losses was speedily put on the Governess. The

petitions for help increased, and from all over the country delegations came to sing a doleful dirge of the great losses that were being sustained by the Dutch business men. That they and they alone were to blame for this state of affairs seems not to have entered into their minds.

And while they were complaining in Holland about their terrible losses, they were doing a splendid smuggling business in the American colonies. Both sides needed powder and guns, and to both sides did the Dutch merchants sell their wares. So profitable was this trade that it was figured that if three ships were sent out and only one arrived at the port of destination, the enterprising merchant was still well rewarded for his troubles.

The poor Governess, abused from all sides and abused in a way which greatly transgressed all standards of decent political debate, began to show signs of ill-health. She had never been very robust. Like her husband she had worked hard but without system, and had lost her strength on perfectly futile questions. On the 12th of January, 1759, she died.

No sooner had the Princess disappeared from the scene than we notice a sudden cessation in the continual stream of complaints from the side of the established business interests. To all appearances the Regents were going to rule the country, at least until William V should be of age. They took good care not to continue their agitation for a fleet which

until then they had supported so vigorously. Now that they might have to carry the responsibility for the expenses thereof themselves, they intimated that, perhaps after all, a fleet was not absolutely necessary.

CHAPTER V

, THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK

WILLIAM V was eleven years old when his mother died. Seven more years had to elapse before he would be of age. In her testament the Princess Anna had appointed her father, King George II, and her mother-in-law, the Princess Mary Louise of Hesse, guardians of the little Prince. As we have seen before, the Estates of Holland were interested to keep their future stadholder under their direct care; the two august relatives were not allowed to exercise anything but a distant influence, though the Duke of Brunswick, who resided in the Hague, was to be William's direct tutor and guardian.

The Duke was also made provisional commanderin-chief of both the army and navy. It should be remembered that at that moment the Duke was still a favorite with the Regents, and used to receive extraordinary grants from the different estates in recognition of his valuable services to the country.

There was some difficulty about the right of making civil and military appointments. This right was invested in the Stadholder, and gave him his great power in the councils of the different cities. It could not well be exercised by a child nor could it be entrusted to a foreigner. The Estates therefore declared that for the sake of greater safety

this power should revert into their own hands until William should become of age. As there was now nobody who could successfully oppose the Estates, they saw their wishes fulfilled. For the next seven years the combined legislative and executive power was once more in the hands of the Regents.

In Friesland, however, the Princess Mary maintained an independent stadholdership and continued to exercise the right of appointment until the day that her grandchild became eighteen years of age.

Several years before, at the death of William IV, the old Princess had at once tried to replace her daughter-in-law by a board of guardians, in which she herself would have had great influence. Now when it appeared that, at least during seven years, the Duke and the Estates of Holland would control the fate of her small grandchild, the Princess Mary made another attempt to counteract their influence by proposing a regency which was to be exercised by William's older sister, the Princess Carolina. This young Princess was in her seventeenth year and reputed to be a good deal brighter than her small brother. She was engaged to be married to a German Prince of Nassau-Weilburg. (This Nassau was not a relative of the Dutch Nassaus.) Her appointment as regent during her brother's minority would of course have allowed her grandmother to play a leading rôle in the affairs of state. Her future marriage to a German prince

would have brought another foreigner into the affairs of the Republic. With all due respect to the Duke of Brunswick, no more foreigners were wanted, and the plan was opposed from all sides.

The last chance of success of this plan was finally destroyed by a most terrific scandal, which just at this time occurred in one of the leading Friesland families. Onno Zwier van Haren, leader of the Orangist party in Friesland, a great man in the local politics of his province and not without influence in those of the Republic, was accused by his son-in-law of a most atrocious crime. It was a most unsavory affair, of which to this day we do not know the exact truth. And unfortunately for the Stadholder and his adherents, the van Haren family insisted upon dragging the whole question into a publicity which one would have thought impossible before the day of the "yellow press." It was not long before every citizen of the Republic was convinced that there was something rotten in the most prominent family of those regarded as faithful advisers of the old Princess in Leeuwarden. Any future attempts of Mary Louise's adherents to obtain some influence over affairs which involved the interest of her grandchildren could be met with references to this unfortunate occurrence and hints that good government as well as charity began at home.

With the grandmother's power removed, the Duke of Brunswick had everything his own way.

Later, when the Duke was persona ingratissima, his enemies said that he had started the scandal and had given it its publicity in order to rid himself of all interference with his own educational methods. There is no good ground for the accusation. That he was not sorry to see van Haren disappear from the scene of political life is quite clear. The relations between the two had never been cordial, and according to all evidences this was not so much the fault of the Duke as that of van Haren himself, who was quite unbearable in his pride and arrogance.

As guardian of the Prince, the Duke saw that his first duty was to reorganize completely the finances of his ward. Accordingly he started out to bring some unity into the administration of the many estates to which William, through the death of a number of his relatives, had become the sole heir. These estates were spread all over Germany and were managed in a very unsatisfactory way. The Duke reorganized them so successfully that within a few years they produced an annual income of two million guilders. This sum made William one of the richest princes of his time and the richest man by far of his country.

As commander-in-chief, the Duke tried also to start a few reforms in the army. The new tactics used by Frederic the Great in his wars with Austria had caused an entire reversal of the old methods. But the Duke despaired of saving an army which was so evidently beyond hope of salvation. He did

not press his reforms, and the few soldiers who were still kept in the service of the Republic were disturbed no more.

Brunswick managed the internal politics of the country with a great deal of skill. The fact that the Regents were again invested with the right of appointment proved to be very beneficial to the cause of the Stadholder. The right of appointment gives the possessor thereof one friend as against ten enemies. The lucky man who gets the job sings his praises. The ten others who applied in vain swear dire revenge and hasten to join the opposition. As long as the Stadholder had exercised the right of appointment himself, he had come in for the personal hatred of the disappointed office-seekers. Large numbers of this species of implacable humanity had gone over to the Regents. Now that their fate depended upon the Regents, the disappointed ones were again driven back into the camp of the Stadholder. In this way William enjoyed during his youth a peace of mind and a popularity which he was never to know after he had celebrated his sixteenth birthday.

As for questions of foreign policy, they did not come up during the period from 1759 to 1766. The Estates General carefully kept the country out of all international complications. England continued to search Dutch ships and confiscate Dutch goods whenever these were considered to be contraband of war. The only remedy against this treat-

ment would have been the possession of a strong fleet. But nobody was willing to pay for such a fleet, and instead of defending themselves honorably, the Dutch merchants continued to make up their deficit by extending their smuggling operations.

On the 8th of March, 1766, William V came of age, and the Duke of Brunswick retired from his position as guardian of the Prince. It was considered that he had done his duty towards his ward and towards the country so well that the Estates General thanked him officially for his valuable services and presented him with six hundred thousand guilders, to which sum all the provinces contributed. The Estates General also instructed the Republic's representative in Vienna to try to induce Maria Theresa to allow her field-marshal to remain a few years more in the service of the United Netherlands. After some hesitation the Empress gave her consent, and though Brunswick was no longer guardian he continued to direct the affairs of the young Stadholder as if the Prince were still a minor.

Jorissen, in his excellent biography of William V, refutes the often repeated statement that Brunswick must have corrupted the child who was entrusted to his care and must have kept the boy backward so that he would be able to exercise greater influence over him. "It has never been proved," so Jorissen says, "that William, even under the most

efficient of pedagogues, could have been changed into anything else from what he finally turned out to be."

William V was exactly what we could have expected of the child of his parents. Neither his father nor his mother had been strong physically or of imposing appearance. His mother had always carried the signs of the smallpox, which had destroyed her good looks when she was a child. His father, who had suffered from epileptic fits when a child, had been an insignificant looking personage, without much vigor or physical endurance.

William V inherited the physical weaknesses of his parents. He was easily fatigued and became sleepy after the slightest exertion. He was clumsy in appearance, and apparently did not know what to do with his hands and feet. This clumsiness may have been the result of shyness. It was shyness which kept him smiling when he did not intend to smile at all. In conversation he was apt to bluster, and his perpetual grin made people think him a good deal less intelligent than he actually was.

It cannot be denied that the Prince possessed a certain sort of intelligence, but unfortunately it was a sort which did not do him the slightest good. Like most of his ancestors he was very fond of mathematical studies, and he had more than ordinary ability in this line of work. This mathematical turn of mind had been of great use to such generals as Maurice or Frederick Henry, but William V had

little chance to apply his knowledge to the solution of strategical problems. His great power of memory he merely used to fill his brain with all sorts of miscellaneous knowledge. But as he never had acquired the art of forgetting things, his brain soon resembled a storehouse, so full of all sorts of articles that whenever something was needed, it could not be found anywhere except after prolonged search.

The Prince had an innate love of detail. He wanted to attend to everything himself and to investigate the smallest items of the questions which came up for his decision. Great statesmen have usually been able to accomplish much because they knew how to choose their subordinates and were wise enough to leave all the non-essential things to these assistants. William, on the contrary, never left anything to the decision of his advisers except the large questions of state. As he had very little knowledge of human nature, and was unable to judge the character of those whom he called into his councils, the large questions were apt to be decided in a way most harmful to the prestige of the Stadholder. As one of his contemporaries said, "The Prince has but one system. It consists in doing everything unsystematically." The Stadholder spent most of his life in doing things which could have been done quite as efficiently by a young clerk for ten guilders a week.

William V was very proud. This was nothing

new. The House of Orange had always been proud. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries its members had much to make them feel that they belonged to quite an exceptional race of men. The first stadholders, however, had been men with a good deal of common sense. Their pride had rarely interfered with their interests. But in all such matters the Frisian branch of the Nassaus seems to have been just a little bit different from that branch which died out with William III. The members of this collateral branch were continually allowing their pride to interfere with their own interests and those of the country. In many ways they were a caricature of the virile descendants of the first great William. Maurice and Frederick Henry spent the better half of their lives in camp and on horseback; they lived hard, and loved and hated with no attempt to disguise their feelings. With all their faults they were positive and constructive characters. The members of the northern branch of the family seem on the whole to have lacked the vices of their granduncles, but they were deficient in their virtues. They were, with the exception of the later King William I, men of no force of character; not very bad and not very good, not very stupid and not very clever, without any fast friends or any bitter enemies; men of unobtrusive mediocrity.

William V was undoubtedly the worst type of the family. Most unfortunately he lived in a time of transition. During his lifetime the great change

which produced the modern world out of mediæval society took place. It is doubtful whether William ever understood the importance of all the many things that were happening around him. They annoyed him considerably. He felt unhappy that the world should be as it was. His own position in relation to the things that occurred about him never became quite clear to him.

Finally, we must mention one other unfortunate characteristic of the Prince. He could not forgive easily. He was not revengeful; his character was not positive enough for any such extreme. But when in the course of daily life some one opposed him in his political activities he would never forgive that man's actions. When in the turmoil of politics it happened, a few years later, that this same person was suddenly found to be on the side of the Stadholder, the latter could not forget the past and would refuse to have anything to do with his new supporter. Unfortunately this Prince, who never could forget the smallest slight to his dignity, constantly forgot those who sacrificed everything for his cause.

During the troublesome years that were to follow, a number of men and women showed great faithfulness to the Stadholder. They often suffered for their principles with exile and confiscation of their goods. In such cases the Stadholder never came to their rescue. He took all services rendered to him and to his house for granted, and did not

consider himself bound to reward his loyal subjects. It will be easily understood that a prince of such character and such personality, or rather lack of personality, was at great disadvantage during the latter half of the eighteenth century.

William's career as stadholder commenced with a serious blunder. It is little consolation that the direct responsibility therefor rests with the Duke of Brunswick. The fact remains that his first official act did great damage to his position. William was the only stadholder who was born as hereditary stadholder. Therefore when his father died, he succeeded him automatically, just as in a monarchy the dead monarch is succeeded by the crown prince. But instead of this, the Duke of Brunswick asked the estates of the different provinces to give William an official appointment. In this way it was once more clear that the Estates and not the Stadholder was the highest power in the Republic.

Why did the Duke do this? He must have known that there really was no need for such proceeding. The truth is that the Duke was trying to serve both the Stadholder and the Regents, and so to keep on good terms with both. By asking for an official appointment for William he rendered a service to the Regents which he hoped they would not forget in times to come.


After this bad beginning the Duke made himself guilty of another act which, though it remained a secret for a score of years, finally leaked out and did the greatest harm to the cause of the Stadholder. It has happened before in history that young princes when they were called to the throne were so overwhelmed by their duties that they put themselves into the hands of trusted councillors. But it probably has never occurred that a prince, almost before he has assumed his dignity, binds himself hand and foot to some one person of his court, and practically renounces all independence of action for his future life.

This is exactly what happened. On the 3d of May, 1766, the Prince signed a document which is unique.28 The document had been drawn up in official style by van Bleiswyk, the Pensionaris of Delft. In this the Prince expressed his sincere desire to keep the Duke of Brunswick with him always as his adviser in military and civil matters. In return the Duke of Brunswick promised under oath to give the Prince his advice upon all occasions when it was wanted and to support him in the maintenance of all his ancient rights and prerogatives. The fatal part of the agreement, however, came near the end. The Prince promised never to hold the Duke at any time responsible for any advice which the latter might give him according to the regulations of this contract. In other words, the Duke of Brunswick was appointed the confidential adviser of the Stadholder of Holland and at the same time he was promised immunity from the consequences of any advice which he might give. Without imputing any

bad motives to the Duke, and with full recognition of the fact that he had to do with a singularly incapable young man, it has to be granted that the document was a highly dangerous experiment.

The Duke recognized this fact himself, and asked that the transaction between him and his former pupil be kept secret. This was impossible. Van Bleiswyk, the man who had drawn up the document, knew about it. So did Stein, the Raadpensionaris of the Estates of Holland. So did the British Minister at the Hague and the Count Bentinck, one of the faithful partisans of the Prince. And as was inevitable in the Republic, with its complicated machinery of state, the existence of the document was soon known to the leaders of the Regents, though, as it was not in the least to their interest to have it known at that time, they kept their information to themselves. The large mass of the people certainly did not know anything about it until eighteen years later, when the existence of this agreement for purely political reasons was brought up for discussion in the meeting of the Estates of Zeeland. Having in this way secured for himself the position of "The Indispensable Man," the Duke now turned his attention towards providing William with a suitable wife.

Up to that time the Princes of Orange had usually married daughters of the Kings of England. The Duke, who was a German, encouraged a marriage with a German princess, and the mass of the



WILLIAM V AND THE PRINCESS WILHELMINA LEAVE AMSTERDAM AFTER THEIR FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT, JUNE 4, 1768

After an engraving by S. Fokke

people, with whom at that particular moment England was not in the least popular, supported him. The fame of Frederic the Great, who within a score of years had changed Prussia into a powerful nation, was then at its height. A wedding with a Prussian princess seemed to bring the Republic into closer relations with one of England's enemies, and as such was not unwelcome. On the 4th of October, 1767, William V married Frederica Sophia Wilhelmina, daughter of Prince August of Prussia, the brother of Frederic the Great.

The Princess was sixteen years old, pretty and vivacious. She had lived a quiet life far away from the court of her uncle. As a matter of fact, that famous uncle, who did not care greatly for women, and quite dreaded their opinion on political questions, had carefully kept his small niece ignorant of all affairs of state. Only now that she was to marry the rich Stadholder of the rich Republic, and in doing so was to become a part of international politics herself, did Frederic pay some attention to the young lady.

Frederic had very little respect for the Republic. He knew exactly the dilapidated condition of her armies and of her fleet. But the Republic was again possessed of the one thing which Prussia lacked, ready money, and so she was not to be despised. As to the internal political situation in the Republic, the Prussian King knew, what everybody else knew, that the country was hanging in the balance

between France and England, and that, though it had not yet officially broken with its old ally England, it might at any moment do so. He also knew that the traditional policy of the House of Orange had been to side with England, while the Regents were now openly favoring an *entente cordiale* with France.

It was of great importance to the King of Prussia that his niece should know what to do in her new surroundings, and therefore he gave her as companion a trusted old Prussian noblewoman, the Baroness von Danckelmann; she was to be dame d'honneur to the Princess and confidential adviser; at the same time she kept Frederic informed of what was going on in the Republic.

In November of the same year the happy couple left Berlin and moved to the Hague, accompanied by their dame d'honneur, who according to all reports had an abominable temper and added but little to the charm of the life of the court in the Hague.

The marriage of the Prince, however, was a happy one. The Princess was her husband's superior in everything, in character and in ability, in energy and in courage. But she stuck to him faithfully through all his vicissitudes, tended him when he fell sick at an early age, and followed him into exile. She survived him by many years, and lived to see her oldest son, to whom she had been a very good mother, installed upon the throne of the new King-

dom of the Netherlands. The first few years of her married life passed by quite uneventfully. There is a certain element of humor in the situation of the young couple. An old Austrian field-marshal and an old Prussian Baroness had the actual management of the family of the Dutch Stadholder. The humor, however, does not seem to have struck the husband and wife, who were busily engaged in watching the increasing population of their nursery. The country was at peace, dividends came in with most agreeable regularity, and everybody was happy. This lasted for eight years. Then came another of those terrible shocks which rudely awakened the country from its slumbers and threw it suddenly into the middle of serious international complications.

CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

In the English colonies in America there had been for a period of more than fifteen years an everincreasing misunderstanding between the colonies and the mother country, or such authorities as the mother country insisted upon sending out to govern her transatlantic possessions. As long as the French had been masters of Canada and had been a threatening neighbor to the thirteen English colonies along the coast of the Atlantic, the British government had been obliged to retain the good will of her subjects across the water and had been forced to consider seriously many of their demands. On the other hand, the colonists had depended a great deal upon the military assistance of the mother country, and had therefore been compelled to be more modest in their desires and less open in the expression of their many grievances than they would otherwise have been.

But after England had been victorious in Canada and had added the French colony to her empire, there was no longer need of coöperation between the English in America and the English in Britain, and both were at liberty to air their grievances. Unfortunately, just at this critical moment, King George III ascended the throne of England, and

his stubbornness and the dullness of the ministers with whom he surrounded himself kindled the small flame of discontent into an all-consuming fire.

We will now endeavor to make clear what a quarrel between colonists on the outskirts of the civilized world and the most powerful nation of that time had to do with the history of the Republic.

The quarrel in America was quite unique. Most revolutions take place as a result of long continued suffering. Their ultimate purpose is to free the oppressed masses from an unbearable wrong. The American Revolution was not preceded by any such period of national suffering. No other revolutionists have ever been quite so prosperous or so free from political restraint as were the men who started the movement which reached its logical conclusion in the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776.

One of the causes of the ill-feeling between colonists and mother country was, of course, a sentimental one. England at that time was essentially an aristocratic country. The colonies at that time, before their natural riches had made them a plutocracy, were essentially a democracy. Many characteristics of the one annoyed the other extremely. The overbearing donkeyesque type of man which composed the English garrisons was the only sort most colonists ever knew or saw of the people of the home country. On the other hand, the Englishman who stayed at home got information about his

brother across the sea from sources which depicted the aforementioned brother as a sort of sharp horse-dealer, who always came out on top in a bargain, who above all hated to pay for anything which did not bring him in an immediate return of a hundred per cent or more. As for the English ministers, they followed the time-honored British custom of knowing nothing about either their friends or their enemies in foreign parts, and treated their subjects on the American continent with that mixture of ignorance and insolence which brought England infinitely more trouble than a direct oppression would have done.

The difference which existed between colonists and mother country were not such as were irremediable. On the contrary, the majority of the people in the colonies were decidedly inclined to remain faithful to the mother country. But a policy which consisted of a prolonged series of dull blunders on the part of England gradually widened the breach, until at last separation was the only possible solution of the problem.

Now anything which had to do with England, or, more particularly, anything which seemed to indicate that it might do England harm, was followed in the Republic of the United Netherlands with the same enthusiasm with which in our own time England watches a general strike in Germany, or vice versa.

We only need to read the pamphlet literature of

that day to see how England was on the nerves of the people in the Republic, and how they welcomed the slightest sign of anything which indicated that the proud Briton was to get into fresh difficulties. The manifestations of discontent among the American colonists were followed with great interest by all those in the Dutch Republic who read the papers, which meant the vast majority of the population.

The somewhat bombastic, if sound, rhetoric of the leaders of the American colonists, with their continual allusions to Liberty and the Rights of Man and the People, were all the more appreciated in a Republic which several centuries before, with less talk but more action, had embodied similar sentiments in the abjuration of their lawful sovereign. The first manifest signs of an approaching storm in the American community became known in the Republic at just the moment when they could be hailed with the most joy and sympathy; for just about this time the second centenary of the relief of the town of Leyden from the Spaniards had been solemnly celebrated. A generation which itself performs no valorous deeds usually loves dearly to dwell upon the great virtues of its ancestors and to glorify its vigorous past. The relief of Leyden and the foundation of the university in that city as a reward for the citizens' heroic defense had been commemorated with great pomp and circumstance. The Stadholder and his family had been present. Much rhetoric of the particular kind in use on such

occasions had been indulged in by leading professors and statesmen. Liberty had been the keynote of the speeches; and after doing honor to the ancestors who had first established this liberty, there had been a good many compliments to the progeny who were now enjoying the fruits of their ancestors' labors in such a worthy way.

The next year, before the enthusiasm had quite died down, the first news (slightly exaggerated) of the battle of Lexington had reached the Republic. "The hirelings of a Tyrant beaten by the humble farmers of an indignant country!" What news could be more welcome, especially when the beaten "Tyrant" was the deadly rival across the North Sea.

As to the humble farmer who fired the "shot heard round the world," he was at that moment rather fashionable in Europe. The ocean is a broad piece of water which it then took from three to four weeks to cross. What happened upon the vast shores of the great American continent was but vaguely clear to most people in Europe. But it was a period when the highest classes of society dabbled in theories about "liberty" and "civic virtue," very much the same way that, in our own day, they dabble a bit in socialism. Rousseau and the French Encyclopedists were not writing in vain. Their theories were the property of everybody who pretended to be au courant of the intellectual interests of the day. The American farmer and politician

who managed the revolution against England were soon endowed with all those superlative virtues which it was felt could only survive in men who had always lived a natural life, far removed from the corruption of society and in the uplifting purity of the primeval forest.

For the Republic, however, besides these sentimental considerations, there were others of a more practical nature. Of course during the first few years, when it was not in the least clear whether the American rebellion would end with the defeat of the colonists or would degenerate into an endless guerrilla warfare, there was no hope of eventual gain.

When after a few years it seemed that the American colonies were actually going to start a new commonwealth, entirely independent of the mother country, large vistas of new commercial advantages opened themselves to the Dutch merchants.

Up to the beginning of the revolution the American colonists had been obliged to trade directly with England alone, and England had been careful that the colonists should not enter upon business which would compete with the business of her subjects at home. If they gained their independence, the colonists would then be able to deal with whomever they pleased, and the Republic hoped to get her share of the American trade. During the last thirty years so many old fields of enterprise had been gradually lost to her that a new opening would be extremely welcome.

This practical sentiment was reciprocated in America. Those excellent colonists were at all times infinitely more practical than the European sentimentalist could imagine them to be. They were practical politicians. The theory of their revolution never for a moment allowed them to forget the bread-and-butter side of it. Their hard common sense never allowed them to go off into any extremes which did not stand fundamentally upon a sound basis of "one dollar plus one dollar are two dollars." The French Revolution, with its sublime indifference to the material side of life and with its exaggerated sentiment about uplifting the whole of the human race to its own ideals, was conducted upon entirely different principles.

The American revolutionists knew what they wanted better than other rebels, either before or after, have known. They did one thing at a time, and did not waste their energies in senseless dreams of the far distant future. For the moment their most imperative need was guns, and materials of war generally. They had no regular fleet and few merchant ships. On the sea they were at the mercy of the English fleet. The Dutch smugglers were, therefore, of great benefit to them in supplying them with the necessities of war. From the small island of St. Eustatius in the Antilles — a possession of the West India Company — a regular smuggling trade was maintained with American ports. The island had a fine harbor and its storehouses were

filled with millions of dollars' worth of goods, ready for transportation to forbidden harbors—either Spanish or American.

This trade was quite as detrimental to the interests of England as the American export of mules for South Africa was detrimental to the interests of the late Transvaal Republic. In August of the year 1775, therefore, the British government instructed its representative in the Hague to address himself to the Estates General with the request that this smuggling from a Dutch harbor should forthwith be ended.

The Estates General expressed their regret at the matter and promised to attend to it at once. They promulgated an edict which forbade the export of guns and all materials of war from Dutch harbors for a period of six months. A fine of one thousand guilders was threatened to be levied upon those who should act contrary to this law. After the first six months this edict was prolonged for another half-year.

As for its practical results, they were nil. There was too much profit in the business to stop it with the mere threat of a fine. Furthermore, all the tricks of this particular trade were well known, and how could the Estates General surmise that barrels of butter directed to a French port in reality contained powder and were bound for an American harbor? They could have discovered this, of course, if they had really wished, but they hesitated to in-

terfere too seriously with a form of business activity, which, however objectionable, brought so much gain to many of their fellow citizens and to themselves.

When the British government noticed how ineffectual the Estates General had been in preventing a continuation of this detrimental smuggling business, it decided to take matters into its own hands and to defend its own interests as it thought best. The English fleet in the Caribbean Sea was strengthened with a number of new ships, and all Dutch vessels were searched, and if found to contain contraband of war were brought to English ports and there sold. This did not improve the feeling between the two countries. England resented the Republic's indifference. The Republic resented England's interference.

France, however, looked on with interest and rejoiced. Its minister in the Hague was busier than ever. If only the Republic would give up all her treaties with England, which for many years had existed only in name, how beneficial it would be, he argued, to the true interests of the Republic; and so on, and so on.

These old treaties were ere long to be the cause of another misunderstanding between London and the Hague, and this time of a very serious nature. It all came about in this way.

England needed troops for its war in America. The mother country could not provide all the men necessary for the many military enterprises in which England was engaged at that particular moment. Therefore, as is well known, it bought troops from German princes. Thousands of German soldiers were sent to America, where they died in order that the fountains of the Elector of Hesse might spout.

As is equally well known, these good Germans had no great interest either one way or the other in the conflict into which they had been dragged for so many marks a head. Being Germans, they did their duty, but no more; and when able to do so conveniently made their peace with their friend, the enemy, and retired from the field of battle. England, therefore, looked around for more satisfactory troops, and then remembered the existence of a Scottish brigade, which was stationed in the Republic.

This Scottish brigade had come to Holland in the year 1577 to help against the Spaniards and had ever since remained in the Dutch service. The soldiers no longer consisted exclusively of Scotchmen. The officers, however, were all native Scotchmen, and as a whole the brigade had maintained its foreign character. In time of war it was supposed to number three thousand men. But during the many years of peace, as a matter of economy, the number had been allowed to dwindle down to less than one thousand.

The British government now asked for the loan

of these troops. The acquiring of a thousand more soldiers was doubtless not their only motive, as in asking the Estates General for this loan they would have a chance to test the true feelings of their Dutch neighbors. In the matter of the smuggling trade of St. Eustatius, the Estates General had shown what the English considered bad faith. They would now have an opportunity to prove that their real attitude towards England was not a hostile one. In October of the year 1775, the English minister in the Hague informed the Stadholder that the King of England requested "as a favor" the loan of the Scottish brigade. In November the Stadholder informed the Estates General that the King of England, through the English minister in the Hague, had requested the loan of the Scottish brigade to be used in the war with the American colonists. At the same time he let their High-and-Mightinesses know that it had pleased the King of England to offer to the Republic a regiment of Hannoverian troops in exchange for the Scotchmen. After the war, the Scottish regiment, or whatever remained of it, would be promptly returned, the Hannoverians would march back to their German home, and everything would be as it had been before. In case the Estates General did not care for these particular Hannoverian troops, His Majesty was ready to furnish them the money necessary to equip a Dutch regiment. From the English point of view this was a very decent offer, and it was couched in such a form that a

refusal was practically impossible. Knowing the policy of the Republic to put off things interminably, the English minister asked for an immediate answer to this request. It indicates the dispatch with which things were usually done in the Republic when we hear that "the favor of an answer within one month" was considered extraordinary speed.

The complicated machinery of the Estates General was set to work in the well-known way. After a month the request of the English government reached the provinces for their special consideration. After two months, in December of 1775, four of the country provinces, Gelderland, Friesland, Groningen, and Overysel, sent in their answer. As they were not directly interested in the smuggling trade in America, they advised granting England's wishes. Though the majority of the Estates was in favor of this decision, in some provinces there was great opposition from a minority which, moved by ideal and not by material considerations, strongly opposed a policy that might be detrimental to the best interests of the rebellious Americans.

In Overysel, the opposition was of such nature that it drew the attention of the entire country. Its spokesman was the Baron Joan Derck van der Capellen van de Poll, a member of the nobility of Overysel, and as such possessed of a seat in the Estates whose part in this history is a considerable one. For the moment it will suffice to say that the Baron van der Capellen grew quite eloquent upon

the subject, and delivered himself of a speech which the interested reader may find in extenso in Wagenaar (Vervolg I, pp. 55-59). The essential arguments in this speech were as follows: To grant the wish of the British government and allow the English the loan of the Scottish brigade would mean a breach of neutrality at the expense of the Americans, and would mean that the Republic takes sides in a quarrel in which it should remain neutral. The Republic of the United Netherlands, which once upon a time had herself borne the proud name of "Rebel," would be drawn into a war against the courageous and virtuous defenders of such rights as they had received not from the British government but from Almighty God Himself. If the King of England wished mercenaries, it would be in better taste for him to hire Janizaries than to ask the troops of a free Commonwealth. If one could believe the newspapers, even the savages refused to be mixed up in the quarrel. Certainly it was the plain duty of the Republic to refuse the demands of England for once and for all.

The fact that van der Capellen used his impassioned speech for an attack upon local conditions in the province, and that he left the lofty heights of Almighty God and the Rights of Man to come down to a plain denunciation of state and national politics, did not strengthen his argument. He was outvoted and Overysel went on record as favoring the English demand.

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In the other provinces, however, hostility to the plan was general, though it was based not upon sentiment but upon plain material considerations. In Holland the opposition came from all sides. The opinion of the Stadholder was not asked, but his immediate adviser, the Duke of Brunswick, was against the plan. He feared that England would forget to replace the Scottish brigade after it had once left the Dutch shore, and in this way the miserable army of the Republic would be weakened still further.

The town of Amsterdam, though its motives differed somewhat from his, strongly supported the Duke. Amsterdam wanted to wait awhile before answering. It reasoned as follows: England is experiencing great difficulties with her colonies. Soon she may need soldiers even worse than she needs them now. We do not want this Scottish brigade, anyway, as it costs us so much per year and we have no need of soldiers. Let us wait, therefore, until England wants them very badly, and then let us sell the whole outfit at a good profit. Fortunately the other cities showed more decency than Amsterdam, and the Republic was at least spared this shameful transaction.

But even without these "practical" considerations, the Estates of Holland were strongly opposed to the whole plan. The influence of France had grown to such proportions that even in matters closely concerning the Republic's internal policies the French minister in the Hague could exercise great influence, and he now advised his friends to make a definite stand against this British demand.

On the other hand, however, the Estates feared to offend England too openly so long as the Republic was so completely at her mercy upon the seas. Therefore, after deliberating as long as could decently be done, they informed the British government that the sentiment of the seven provinces favored the granting of His Majesty's request and the Republic would be delighted to send her British ally the Scottish brigade. The Republic imposed only one condition: that the brigade should not be used for military purposes outside of Europe. Now, as everybody knew that England wanted the troops exclusively for use outside of Europe, the answer of the Republic contained not only a refusal, but a refusal with a gratuitous insult attached to it.

In the mean while four months had gone by since the original request had been made and England decided not to press her demands. The King of England officially thanked the Stadholder of Holland for the trouble taken in this matter and stated that His Majesty no longer needed the troops. In case His Majesty should renew his request, he would be careful to remember the conditions which had been imposed.

Nothing more was said or done at that time. The Scottish brigade remained in the Republic until 1795, and the King of England was obliged to

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hire his "Janizaries" elsewhere. But England did not forget the refusal, which she could only consider an insult. It was the third time that the Republic had neglected the duties imposed upon her by the different treaties which still bound her to Great Britain. It was the last time that she had a chance to renew the cordial relations between herself and England. From now on England only waited for the chance to retaliate.

Those who profited most by the whole transaction were the members of the rising young democratic party, the men who were sufficiently imbibed with the new notions of the Rights of Man and the Sanctity of Human Liberty to look upon the struggle in the American colonies with an enthusiastic approval which their more practical fellow citizens could hardly understand. Of these, spread all through the Republic, most of them unconscious of the fact that they were heralds of a new doctrine and a new era, none had covered himself with greater glory than the Baron van der Capellen, the upholder of Human Rights in the Estates of Overysel. Joan Derck van der Capellen, usually called Capellen van de Poll, to distinguish him from his cousin, Capellen van de Marsch, was a man of weight in his province. He was born in Tiel, November 2, 1741, a member of an old Overysel family. As we have seen before, the nobility in Overysel and Gelderland enjoyed a great deal more importance than those in any of the other provinces.

with the exception, perhaps, of a few families in Friesland.

During the eighty years' war against Spain, members of this nobility had faithfully served the Republic as generals or diplomats. When the war was over, and the military career offered no longer any advantages or honor, these families, rather than compete with the rich Holland merchants for supremacy in political matters, had preferred to retire to their estates, where they led the quiet life of country gentlemen. They either married among themselves or took wives from among the French or the German nobility. Many of them possessed some honorary position at the court of the Stadholder, which they exercised whenever the latter left the Hague and came to reside for a few weeks in their particular province. As members of the nobility they also had a seat in the meetings of the quarter in which they resided and in the general meeting of the different quarters which made up their provincial estates.

They cared a good deal for education, and either sent their sons to a Dutch university or let them study abroad. The University of Utrecht, as being situated outside of the unpopular Province of Holland, attracted most of their young men. Also Utrecht had the advantage of being less cosmopolitan and a little stiffer and more dignified than Leyden, which suffered under a reputation for liberalism. In the eyes of the good ultra-conservative

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and ultra-orthodox, Leyden was a direct anteroom to a far dryer and hotter region.

At the time that Capellen and his cousin went to Utrecht, however, this particular university had entered upon a short period in its career during which a fairly healthy atmosphere prevailed. Usually its young men were driven through an extremely dull, extremely pedantic, and totally useless course of Roman law, and were then considered to have received a liberal education. For a few years a course of lectures on the Jus Civile of the Republic had been given by a certain Professor Trotz. Trotz had started his career in the University of Francker, a small university built by the local pride of the Frisians which, in a modest way, had contributed a remarkably large number of excellent scholars.

Trotz had left the field of purely theoretical discussions and had restricted his lectures more to the practical aspects of the law which he taught. In connection with his lectures, old collections of Dutch law were being published. There was a good deal of investigating into old judicial practices and into the common law of the Middle Ages. These studies taught in the first place the great difference between the law of the eighteenth century and that of the fifteenth, but they also showed how, in a great many ways, the position of the lower and middle classes was worse than it had been three hundred years before. At the end of the Middle

Ages, the artisans and the members of the guilds in general had possessed an influence in the management of their town government which they had long since lost to the Regents, that is, to the hereditary oligarchy.

Mere theoretical studies about such matters invariably lead to their application to the practical questions of every-day life. Van der Capellen was in no way a genius. Still, judging by his letters, he was possessed of a certain amount of imagination and idealism, the latter a very rare commodity among his material and prosperous countrymen. It is not strange that a man of his turn of mind should soon find a comparison between the conditions under which his forefathers had lived and the conditions which were at that moment actually existing in the thirteen colonies of America.

Gradually, by reading all that was being published upon the subject and by a correspondence with such American statesmen as had sufficient leisure to answer his lengthy epistles, van der Capellen came to believe himself called upon by Providence to be, within his own little sphere, the defender and upholder of the good cause that was being fought out across the ocean. His first orations upon the subject, delivered in the Estates of Overysel, are to our modern ears very stilted and very bombastic. But we should not forget that he spoke in a time which loved that sort of thing and in a country which was not accustomed to parliament-

ary discussions. Except in the Church, there was no place in the Republic where oratorical gifts could be developed. The meetings of the estates were totally unlike the sessions of our modern parliament. Nothing could be accomplished there by eloquent speech. If one wanted a measure adopted, the only possible course was to go and see everybody connected with it in his own hotel and talk the matter over with him—very much in the way in which the modern lobbyist does his work. The dearth of good speakers made it easy for van der Capellen, with his humble gifts, to create quite a sensation by his little orations in the Estates of Overysel.

There were many men in the Republic who thought the way he did. They were not organized, however, into a party. They had hardly known of one another's existence. Van der Capellen, by the attention he drew from his little speech, made himself suddenly their unofficial leader. This rôle he continued to play until the end of his days. With all his failings, we must at least do him the justice to recognize his perfect sincerity. He died comparatively young and before civil war had broken out in his country. In this way only did he escape actual violence. The only revenge which the partisans of the Prince could take on him was to blow up his grave. Several members of his family, however, who shared his opinions, suffered both physically and financially for their doctrines. Van der Capellen himself was continually exposed

to all sorts of annoyances from all sorts of people, who thought him a traitor to the interests of his own class and a most dangerous demagogue.

We should not forget that this affection for human rights and for the people was an absolutely new notion in the Republic. A few highly superior people took an æsthetic interest in it, but it did not appeal in the least to the minds of the majority of either the rich or the poor. Among the Regents these new doctrines were considered a terrible heresy, touching the soundness of the very basis of the Commonwealth.

"The People" were all very well in their way. They were a highly necessary commodity to be treated with care and a certain amount of consideration. They were not to be treated harshly, unless harshness was absolutely necessary, and they should be cared for with hospitals and almshouses and orphan asylums. It was not necessary, however, to go into the street and fraternize with them in order to show how much one appreciated them. If a lot of butchers and grocers and farmers preferred to make a revolution somewhere in America, it was very pleasant, indeed, to sell them such commodities as they needed and could pay for, but this did not mean that they should be directly encouraged in their rebellion. If they should be successful, what would prevent the butchers and grocers and bakers of Amsterdam from clamoring for equal rights and demanding representation and proclaim-

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ing themselves the equals of their legitimate rulers, the Regents?

When we consider for a moment among what sort of prejudices and aristocratic notions Baron van der Capellen had grown up, we can understand that, after all, a large amount of moral courage was necessary for him to act contrary to all the traditions and instincts of his own class and race. On the other hand, however, we must regretfully decline to paint van der Capellen as the glorious hero which some of his ardent supporters believed him to be. That he was actually able to play a rôle in our history was largely due to the fact that he lived in a time when there was an absolute dearth of first-class men. His wealth and his social position made it easy for him to occupy a conspicuous position, and as nobody else could be found to champion the new doctrines, he naturally and almost involuntarily fell into a rôle for which he was not a big enough man.

Since, by the stand he had taken on the question of the Scottish troops, he had become a national figure, van der Capellen felt it his duty to enlighten his fellow countrymen about the real issues in the quarrel between Great Britain and her rebellious colonists. He therefore presented the public with a translation of the little book by Dominie Richard Price. This booklet, "Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government and the Justice and Policy of the War with America,"

by Richard Price, D.D., F.R.S., now forgotten, was famous enough in its own day to go through a large number of editions. It was better known on the Continent than in England. It was not only intended to prove the injustice of England's behavior towards her colonies, but also by means of an appendix full of statistics it tried to demonstrate that the war must inevitably end in failure for England. The British public, however, was too certain of ultimate victory to take an interest in these pessimistic prophecies and refused to read the reverend gentleman's exhortations.

Van der Capellen translated the pamphlet with great care and had it printed in Leyden. In a lengthy introduction, he tells the public a few things about himself. He apologizes for possible mistakes in the translation on the ground of not being an "accomplished literary man." He then confides to his readers that this is only his second attempt at similar work. A year before he had anonymously published a translation of a pamphlet by Andrew Fletcher, in order that his fellow countrymen might be made familiar with the advantages of a wellregulated civic militia. The translation of Dr. Price's work was undertaken to show the people of the Netherlands the unsound condition of the English public finances and the impending danger of an official bankruptcy in that country.29

In the light of history it is rather curious to read the works of several of those amateur economists of the end of the eighteenth century, who undertake to prove the impending financial ruin of England and also predict a splendid future for France. As a matter of fact, France had been for years on the road to bankruptcy, while England without any apparent effort managed to increase her national debt and remain as sound as ever.

Van der Capellen's translation was divided into three parts. The first one was again divided into three sections, which bore the names: "Of the Nature of Liberty in General," "Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government," and "Of the Authority of One Country over Another." The second part was an investigation of the justice of the war with America, and examined England's policy in connection with it. The third part was filled with statistics, and, the author was convinced, furnished proofs that Great Britain was on the certain road towards financial ruin.

It was this third part which was read with the greatest interest by most people. Those who wanted to know about the new doctrines could use the first two parts as a sort of Social Primer. But the third part, with its conclusive statistics, was accepted as gospel truth by people who wished nothing more than to see the Republic's commercial rival in the hands of a receiver.

Meanwhile things were going on very much as before. The edicts of the Estates General against the export of materials of war had not had the slightest

effect. On the contrary, Mr. Heyliger, the new governor of St. Eustatius, the centre of the smuggling trade in the West Indies, was himself greatly interested in the business and encouraged it with all his might. Finally, England lodged such a severe complaint about him in the Hague that the West India Company was obliged to call her governor back. Heyliger was ordered to return to the country at once and a certain de Graeff was appointed as his successor. De Graeff was worse than his predecessor. He was the type of the shortsighted, eighteenth-century merchant who looked only for his immediate profit, who cared nothing for any further consequences as long as he got his dividends. While he omitted to curb the activity of the Dutch smugglers who made St. Eustatius their headquarters, at the same time he omitted to provide for any means of defense of the island. Neither in 1775 nor in 1776 did it come to an open break between England and the Republic. It was a time of continual misunderstandings between the two nations and mutual annoyances, but England was still too busy to enter upon a new war and the Republic was left in peace.

Travel was slow in those days — the fame of van der Capellen's great oration had crossed the ocean and the orator received the official thanks of the Congress of the United States for his laudable exertions in behalf of civic liberty in general and American liberty in particular. After which, van der

Capellen, who was a vain man if anything, returned with renewed ardor to the task of preaching his doctrines and got out a new edition of the translation of the Rev. Dr. Price's work. Soon, however, he had to suffer from competition. Other political writers began to use the printing-press to inform the expectant public of what, in their opinion, ought to be done about these rebellious colonists.

As in France, it was in the highest classes that interest was first shown in all the burning questions of the day. The problem of the relation between subject and ruler, the inherent right of mankind to certain things or the absence of such an inherent right, were discussed by the leaders of the community many years before the masses took any interest in the questions. The man with all the privileges and honors of the world thrust upon him worried about human rights long before the downtrodden citizen bothered himself about the yoke which he had to carry. From among the highest classes the interest in these questions gradually trickled down to lower ones, until it finally reached the people and brought about what we now know as the Revolutionary Period. If the process was somewhat different in America, and if the discussion there started at the bottom, it was not because of any inherent superiority of her plain people, but merely because at that blessed period of her economic history all the people of the thirteen colonies lived on the same floor, and were saved the annoyance of having rich neighbors living above them or paupers inhabiting the cellar.

During the years following the debate on the Scottish troops a series of pamphlets was published in the Republic, discussing American affairs both practically and theoretically. During 1777, and continuing during 1778, a series of "Open Letters about the American Troubles" was written by a member of the House of Orange, Louis Theodore. Count of Nassau La Leck. He was a descendant of one of the many remarkable illegitimate sons of Prince Maurice. The Count of Nassau lived quietly in the little town of Culemborg in Gelderland. His letters, which in the days before the invention of the editorial took the place of well-written leading articles, discussed American affairs with great impartiality and subjected all the aspects of the question to a close inspection.30

These letters show us that there was one side of the question which greatly worried those who took an interest in the struggles of the American colonists. The weakness of the East India Company was becoming more and more evident, and a good many people felt uneasy about the outcome of a possible rebellion in the Indies. "What will happen," people asked, "when the Dutch colonists in India, America, or Africa shall hear of the success of the American yeoman? Will not they wish to imitate the American example and rid themselves of the Dutch yoke? Is n't it the duty of all Christian nations to



JOAN DERCK VAN DER CAPELLEN VAN DE POLL
After an engraving by L. J. Cathelin

assist England in her present difficulties in order to prevent all future outbreaks of a similar nature in other colonies?"

The fact that the Count of Nassau thought it necessary in his fifth letter to enter upon a discussion of these questions shows us how common the anxiety must have been. According to him, however, there was no such danger in the Dutch colonies. Yes! In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. governed as they were by a civil and ecclesiastic inquisition, a similar outbreak might occur. But he was convinced that the Dutch colonists would never so far forget the ancestors who gave their lives that their descendants might be free as to turn their hand against their own fatherland. The author, however, seems not to have been an absolute believer in the right of self-government for colonies. On the contrary, he rather fears that the American Revolution was provoked by the large amount of liberty which England had allowed her colonists, a liberty far surpassing that of the inhabitants of other colonies, - which allowed the Americans to develop their own local political commonwealth until the present clash had resulted.

Those letters by Nassau La Leck, published in many editions during several years, are among the most judicious publications of the day upon any subject. They are almost the only articles about the American troubles which do not lose themselves in rabid accusations of England, or which

try to base their assertions upon documentary fact.

Unfortunately there were not many authentic documents at the disposal of the public. There were no blue-books or statistics of any sort. There were hardly a score of Americans in Europe to give verbal information. The chief source of information for the Count was Thomas Paine's "Common Sense," a book which, notwithstanding its great success, was hardly a reliable guide. The popularity of this book in America was soon equaled by that it enjoyed in Europe. As early as 1776 it had been printed in French in Amsterdam. Henceforth it served all pamphleteers — "those poor devils whose pangs of hunger drive them to their desk," as van der Capellen calls them — as a handbook for their studies of affairs in the thirteen colonies. This had the curious result that a good many writers worried about the ability of the colonists to manage their own political affairs. For Mr. Paine, with legitimate pride in his native state of Pennsylvania and its population of "Pennsylvania Dutch," had tried to prove that this rebellion was not a matter of Anglo-Saxon interest alone, but that Germany, so largely represented in the noble country of his birth, and Europe in general, were immediately concerned in the outcome of the struggle. "If," so the Dutch pamphleteer reasoned, "this is true, and we have no reason to believe to the contrary, then we fail to see how, with so many Germans.

the American commonwealth can ever maintain its independence." Nobody at that period of history could believe that the German race would ever understand or be able to live under the Anglo-Saxon form of government, with its characteristic traits of self-help and self-reliance.

All in all, during the years 1776 and 1777 about thirty-four different pamphlets were printed discussing the American question directly or indirectly. When we compare this number with the countless pamphlets printed during the next years, it seems rather small, and indicates no very great interest in the question which so excited van der Capellen and his friends. But we must not forget that we are only at the beginning of this strange period in our history when there were almost as many new pamphlets as there were days in the year. During the years that were to follow everybody who had something to say, or who thought that he had something to say, rushed into the nearest printing-shop and favored the world with an expression of his profound reflections. Often the public refused to be so favored and refused to buy the writer's literary product. In that case the latter eventually returned to the paper-mill and was resolved into its original pulp.

The only person who fared well by this industry was the printer, who asked for payment in advance. A laudable desire for economy on the latter's part and the extremely cheap paper which he used in consequence, have saved us from the contemplation

of our great-grandfathers' literary labors. The eternal demand of grocers and butchers for packing-paper has done away with countless other bales of printed paper, but enough remains to give us a fair idea of the amount of ink that was wasted between the years 1778 and 1800.³¹

It is true that the pamphleteering industry had never been wholly unknown in the Republic. Upon certain occasions, such as discussion about the management of the East India Company, the bulb craze, or the appointment of a stadholder, there usually had been a fair crop of booklets which set forth the pros and cons of the matter under discussion. During the period which we are about to describe, however, the "Ode to a Dead Frog" is a serious piece of literature compared to most of what was being held for sale in the book-shops of that day. Everybody was trying to get into print. The clergyman had no sooner delivered himself of a sermon on the affairs of the day, but he must needs run to the nearest bookseller and give him the job of printing his exhortation. Those poets who made a scant livelihood by bursting into song, for twopence a line, whenever a family was celebrating birth, death, or marriage, now set to work to compose rhymed comedies in which the perfidious Briton was held up to ridicule. Persons with a sentimental turn of mind wept bitter tears on the prospective graves of the Hessian soldier, sold into slavery by a heartless master.

Amateur politicians sprang forth with the most intricate systems of international treaties by which the Republic should surround herself as a safeguard from possible British attacks. The majority of these advised an alliance with France; but others preferred to seek salvation elsewhere — even with poor old Spain, long since forgotten as a first-class nation.

Others, with an eye for the practical side of things, advised the immediate conclusion of a commercial treaty with the new American Republic. The sooner this was done, so they argued, the more advantages the Republic might hope to receive.

There was one very popular way in which to discuss questions from all sides. First, there appeared a "Letter from a Gentleman in London to his Friend in Amsterdam." This was followed by "An Answer from a Gentleman in Amsterdam to his Friend in London." The next pamphlet had as title, "An Answer from a Gentleman in London to an Answer by his Friend from Amsterdam." There also were variations upon this theme. An "Unprejudiced Observer" or an "Open-minded Patriot" could at any moment take part in this correspondence and publish his "Frank Observations on the Answer of a Gentleman from London to the Answer of his Friend in Amsterdam." And so on ad infinitum.

Whenever the supply of homemade articles showed signs of diminishing, the foreign market was

called upon to provide new material. Some poor hack would be hired to translate a few French or English pamphlets, and the fruits of his pen would be sent into the world under a new and imposing name. The public seems to have bought these pamphlets — which cost from three to fivepence a piece — very much in the same way that we now-adays buy newspaper extras. Even when we know that they cannot possibly contain any actual news, we buy them merely out of a sort of nervous desire to "get the latest."

Needless to say, the large majority of the pamphlets were strangely anti-British. The very few which appeared defending the good rights of the English government were not read, and were derided as the shameful products of corrupt writers who for mere lucre put their pen at the disposal of heartless tyrants. (For heartless tyrant read King George, or his friend, the Stadholder.) With the constant intercourse between the two countries and the excellent mail service between Amsterdam and London, it is no matter of great surprise that the English were fairly well informed of the often scandalous libels which were to be found plentifully on the tables of every alehouse in the Republic. Nor can we suspect the British government of being pleased with these loud denunciations which came from a nation supposed to be its friend, which enjoyed the privileges of the most favored nation.

And, to make things worse, England had been

most unhappy in the choice of her diplomatic representative in the Hague. Sir Joseph Yorke belonged to that class of arrogant British diplomats who at all times and in all countries have by their overbearing behavior done so much to prevent a good understanding between their home country and the land to which they were accredited. He was very honest, and belonged to that order of honest people who always speak the truth when it does most harm and is least called for. He represented a country which was then at the height of its glory, the foremost nation of Europe. But he represented it in a country which was then rapidly going towards the lowest depth it would ever reach. Sir Joseph unfortunately had the bad tact to let the Hollanders continually feel their changed condition, and was very apt to treat the Estates General as if they existed only by sufferance of His British Majesty.

The tradition of many centuries had established a privileged position for the British minister in the Hague. He was often called upon to be the unofficial adviser of the stadholders, who were so closely related to the British throne. From the very beginning, however, Sir Joseph could not get along with the friends of the young Stadholder. The Stadholder himself, he soon considered, a negligible quantity, a man who had to be protected occasionally against his enemies who were also the enemies of England.

The Stadholder on his side was afraid of the grouchy old Briton, who would address him without

any ceremony, who would ask such pertinent questions that it was next to impossible to tell him a lie or to spar for time in which to get up an appropriate answer. Neither did William like to be reminded at all times of his complete dependence upon England for a secure hold upon his own high office. The Princess, who had not yet played any political rôle, being too much occupied with her nursery, disliked the Englishman from the beginning and always kept out of his way.

With the Regents Sir Joseph got along even worse. Their High-and-Mightinesses, each one a little potentate in his own small circle, had to be handled with great care. A mistake in the correct title by which they expected to be addressed might cause no end of annoyance. Sir Joseph, who went right ahead, regardless of other people's feelings, was continually stepping on everybody's sensitive toes. Instead of flattering the Regents and cajoling them into complying with his wishes, he used to tell them abruptly what he wanted and then would expect them to do as he desired. Whenever his requests were not immediately granted, he used to rumble with the British thunder and threaten the Republic with the terrible things that might happen if the just demands of His British Majesty's government should be disregarded.

The Regents retaliated by most exasperating slowness in all their dealings with Sir Joseph. They never said "No." They never gave him a chance to call forth the storm which was to destroy them. But neither did they ever say "Yes." They let His Excellency know that "the matter was under discussion," and then they gave him a few months in which to cool off his anger — a proceeding which usually had an effect opposite to that intended. In this way the misunderstanding between the two countries was continually increased. On the side of the Republic there was a good deal of insolence and a prejudiced desire to see everything British in as bad a light as possible. On the side of England there was a good deal of just cause for annoyance, but also an insolent disregard of the feelings of its neighbor.

The only person who benefited by all this quarreling was the French minister. D'Affray had been called back and had been succeeded by a young diplomat, the Duke de Vauguyon. Paul François de Guelen, Duke de Vauguyon, son of the former governor of Louis XIV, was only thirty years old when he was sent to the Hague. What he lacked in experience he made up for by a charming personality and by a large personal fortune which he used most liberally for his diplomatic purposes. He never bothered about the Stadholder. He did not even take the trouble to oppose him, but left him in peace and used all his influence towards establishing a firm friendship with the Regents. To the Regents his palace and his purse were open at all times, and around his excellent dinners he used to collect as many of them as were willing to come.

Van der Capellen and his democratic friends he carefully avoided. It is true that a good many Frenchmen at that moment shared the Republic's popular enthusiasm for the Americans and for everything American, up to the wearing of hats and coats à l'Américain. But such enthusiasm was considered a pastime for fashionable people. For those who were not fashionable the system of "by the grace of God" was considered good enough and was rigorously maintained. Even when in 1778 France entered into a treaty with the Americans, this was done not so much out of an abstract love for those principles which the Americans were supposed to defend as in the hope of earning sweet revenge for the loss of Canada.

His Excellency the French ambassador had not been sent to the Republic for sentimental reasons. His duty was to get the Republic away from England and to force her into an alliance with France. For France needed money, and with the impending expedition to America would soon need more, and the Republic possessed those indispensable funds. De Vauguyon, therefore, took great pains to get into the right relationship with the banking interests of the country. In Amsterdam he had a host of friends. Gradually he established for himself the position of unofficial head of all those among the Regents who opposed the Stadholder. Outwardly, however, he maintained correct relations with William. For the Prince of Orange was an excellent weapon with

which to menace the Regents. Should they show themselves unmanageable, de Vauguyon could always threaten to throw France's influence in favor of their enemy, the Stadholder.

In one word, the French minister did a very clever piece of balancing between the different parties. Wherever Sir Joseph by his boorishness had made new enemies, de Vauguyon was sure to appear and by the charm of his manner turn the insulted parties into his firm and everlasting friends. Whenever the Dutch merchants were loud in their complaints about the British and denounced their brusque methods in dealing with the smuggling trade, they were informed of the benefits that would result if only they were willing to leave an ally who no longer behaved as such and throw their fate in with that of magnanimous France.

Circumstances greatly favored the Frenchman. In the West Indies the relations between Dutch and English grew steadily from bad to worse. Not only had England increased her fleet in the Caribbean Sea, but she had also hinted to her merchants at home and abroad that a little privateering at the expense of the Dutch would not be punished with the gallows, and might even be looked upon with favor by the authorities at home. And the patriotic British ship-owners from Bristol and Plymouth, and all the many seaports along the English coast, had caught the hint and had started chasing Dutch ships wherever they could find them. The Carib-

bean Sea was soon full of respectable buccaneers, who stopped and plundered whatever ships fell into their hands in the interest of the mother country. Let us, at least, pay tribute to their impartiality. They took quite as many French, Spanish, and Danish as they did Dutch ships. Whenever they could not find anything on the sea, they were apt to extend their operations to the South American continent. England still refused to recognize the United States as an independent nation, and wherever American ships were found in Dutch harbors the English quietly declared them their prizes.

Upon one occasion an English privateer met an American merchantman going from Surinam to Virginia.³² The American ship fled and returned to the coast, where it was captured under the very nose of a Dutch fortress and a Dutch man-of-war. Loud was the wail which the Dutch press made about this "attack upon Dutch sovereignty" and the insult offered to the captain of the Dutch ship, who, when he tried to demand an explanation of the English captain, was told to "get out or take care that he did not get shot, too."

The matter was immediately carried to the attention of Sir Joseph. But His Excellency had waited for just such an occasion to say what was in his mind. The Estates General, so he told them, might as well know once and for all that the King of England, his august master, had decided that in the future he would exercise what was merely his good

right, everywhere and under all conditions. The King, therefore, intended to attack the rebellious Americans wherever His Majesty's arms or fleet could find them, and would inflict due punishment upon all those who either supported said Americans or who gave them hospitality. Finally, His Majesty thought that it would be of much greater advantage to his country to have open and duly recognized enemies than to have so-called allies who provided His Majesty's rebellious subjects with all the contraband of war they needed.

Sir Joseph did not do things by halves. The hint which he gave was broad enough. The Republic in this period of her history was playing a miserable rôle. She openly encouraged the enemies of her ally in order to make some money. She so neglected her fortifications that her harbors were at the mercy of any English catboat that ventured to sail across the ocean. When, in consequence of this dishonest policy, the Republic finally got into trouble, she knew no way to get redress but by allowing her hired scribes to vilify England and to call the British minister a boor.

Meanwhile, everybody in the Republic was asking everybody else: "Why is not something being done?" "Why does not the Stadholder send out a fleet to protect our interests?" "Are we always going to be at the mercy of this British insolence?" Just that sort of questions were asked in Athens when Sparta destroyed its prosperity and in Rome

when the Barbarians swooped down upon the outlying provinces.

"Why is not something being done?" As a matter of fact, the Stadholder did try to do something. There were plans and discussions about sending a fleet of twenty ships to the Caribbean Sea to defend the Dutch colonies and protect the merchantmen against the English privateers. The first question was where to find twenty ships. The second, where to find the sailors with which to man the twenty ships. Not only was there a lack of funds with which to build ships, but the renewed activity in the smuggling business and the high wages paid to the sailors who engaged in it caused a scarcity of men for the fleet which no promise of a high enlistment premium could remedy.

After many months of delay, however, eight ships were made more or less seaworthy and equipped for the trip across the Atlantic. In the last month of 1777, this small fleet, under command of Count Louis van Bylandt, sailed to South America with strict orders to protect only the legitimate trade. Bylandt had no orders to suppress the "illegitimate trade." Therefore, while he defended the Dutch merchantmen against the English privateers, he did nothing to stop the export of contraband goods to the United States. From an English point of view, therefore, the Dutch fleet was only another insult to Great Britain and had no other purpose than to encourage Mr. George Washington to continue

in his rebellious conduct. Chance only prevented an open outbreak at that time. From both sides everything was being done to create mutual illwill.

As we have seen before, one of the governors of St. Eustatius, the big department store of the American Revolution, had been called back upon a number of complaints by the English and had been replaced by a certain de Graeff. This de Graeff, as we also have had a chance to remark, was a very common individual and saw his only duty in making the greatest profit in the shortest time. As he was a man of great commercial industry and no integrity whatsoever, his activities were all the more detrimental to the reputation of the island of which he happened to be governor.

One of his first acts caused no end of irritation in England. On the 16th of November, 1776, a ship flying the American flag entered the harbor of St. Eustatius. The governor, though he knew that the American colonies were not yet recognized as an independent nation, ordered his men to find a gun that could be fired and to salute the new flag. Since the American Revolution has been successful and everything has come out as well as the most ardent American patriot could hope, this act of de Graeff is lauded as the first honor which the nations of the world paid to the free and enlightened commonwealth of the West. At that moment, however, the act of de Graeff was a decided breach

of tact committed against a friendly nation, and it is no wonder that England resented it.

When the matter was reported to the Hague, via London, — Sir Joseph in his usual way made a great ado about it. Even when making the most reasonable complaint he had the unhappy faculty of irritating everybody to the point where they felt that they, and not he, were the persons who had suffered an injustice. In this case, however, the fact could not possibly be denied. The Estates General followed the only course open to them and ordered de Graeff to be recalled. The investigation of his conduct was dragged along in the customary way. From all sides pressure was being brought to bear upon the authorities not to let such a valuable man be lost. Soon de Graeff complained that his health, after so many years in the tropics, could not stand the strain of the Dutch climate. He was then allowed to return to his old home, and was reinstated as governor of St. Eustatius. Neither England's remonstrance nor Sir Joseph's violence of language had done the slightest good.

Everything remained as before. The Dutch smuggled, the English buccaneered. The Stadholder grew pale in the face and stammered apologies; Sir Joseph grew red in the face and bellowed revenge. Finally, events took their natural course and war broke out between the Republic and England.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAST ENGLISH WAR

On the 6th of February, 1778, France made a secret treaty with America. It took exactly one month for the secret to become known. In March, France and England were in open warfare. There was great joy in the Republic. France depended upon the Dutch merchant marine to furnish her with many of the necessities of war and there was a prospect of a few years of good business. Most of all, France would need wood for the building of her ships, and wood was one product of which the Dutch storehouses were full. During the last few years there had been so much talk about the building of a new fleet that the Dutch merchants, as a speculation, had bought large quantities of wood in Scandinavia and in the Black Forest. When it became clear that no new Dutch ships were to be built, these merchants found themselves overstocked. They now had the prospect of getting rid of their large supply at a very neat profit.

On the sea England was much stronger than France. As we have said, the latter part of the eighteenth century was the age of the wooden Dreadnought. In the sixteenth century it was a comparatively easy matter to equip a fleet. A few guns on the deck of a lugger or a schooner and your

man-of-war was ready. Many of the greatest battles in the naval warfare between Spain and Holland had been fought by the Hollanders with sloops provided with a few inferior cannon. In the days of de Witt, the regular navy, with ships of from five hundred to seven hundred tons, had replaced the old amateur fleet. From that time on, the size of naval vessels was constantly increased until the iron construction of the nineteenth century did away with all the old wooden glory.

When in 1778 war broke out between England and France, England had no fewer than two hundred and ninety-five ships, one hundred and thirty-seven of which carried between fifty and one hundred guns each. At the beginning of the war, England employed some sixty thousand sailors, but this number was gradually increased until, in 1780, it reached the total of one hundred thousand men, a number never dreamed of before.

France, on the other hand, had only two hundred and seventeen ships, of which sixty-eight were of the larger size. As in modern warfare, only the bigger vessels counted in actual battle. France, therefore, would have been outnumbered almost two to one. She would never have begun this war if there had not been a reasonable hope that Spain would soon join her. Spain, just then, was experiencing one of those sporadic attempts at political and economic improvement which occurred frequently during the eighteenth century. Thus it

happened that her fleet, though numbering only one hundred and thirty-four vessels, was of recent construction and that many were big ships of from sixty to one hundred and twelve guns each.

The united Spanish and French fleets might have held their own against England, and France wisely refrained from beginning the war alone. With the exception of the fight at Ouessant on the 27th of July, France allowed England to be complete mistress of the sea, and restricted her activities to the building of new ships and the strengthening of her position on land.

The alliance between France and America meant a great personal victory for the American delegates in Europe, and more especially for Benjamin Franklin. Now that their work in France was done, the delegates had their hands free and could extend their operations to other countries. In 1777, before the outbreak of the war between France and England, Franklin had made one attempt to establish closer relations with the Republic, but had been quite unsuccessful. While perfectly willing to sell things to the Americans for cash, the Dutch were not in the least desirous of venturing their good money in such a risky undertaking as an American loan.

A year later, just before the secret alliance between France and America became generally known, the three American envoys, Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee, wrote to the Commission on Foreign Affairs that they had been informed that it might be to their advantage if one of them should visit the Republic, and that, therefore, either Franklin or Deane would visit Holland as soon as the treaty between France and America should have become known and the winter be over.³⁴

Before either of them came to Holland, however, the French minister in the Hague visited Paris and conferred repeatedly with the American envoys. He advised them to make a definite attempt to establish friendly relations with the Republic. He assured the Americans of his moral support and promised his help wherever he could give it unofficially.

On the 10th of April, 1778, the three envoys sent a letter to van Bleiswyk, the Raadpensionaris of Holland. In this letter, dated from Paris, the Americans informed the Raadpensionaris, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Republic, that the United States of North America was now an independent state, had been recognized as such by France, and had concluded a friendly alliance and a commercial treaty with that country. Of this treaty they allowed themselves to inclose a copy for His Excellency's consideration. Would His Excellency, if he thought it advisable, communicate this document to the Estates General, for whom the United States felt such a great respect? And would His Excellency accept the expression of their sincere desire to see pleasant relations established between their respective countries, in order that a

commerce, beneficial to both, might soon be established between the two nations?

As a matter of fact His Excellency the Raadpensionaris, who was no hero, was greatly embarrassed by this document. He went immediately to tell his trouble to the Stadholder. The Stadholder at once went to the Duke of Brunswick. Before they had come to their decision, Amsterdam, which had been informed of the details of this correspondence by its good friend, the French minister, advised that the matter should not be brought up for discussion in the Estates General, but that the different cities should be informed of the contents of the letter and should agree to keep it secret. So it was decided. A copy of the letter from Messrs. Franklin, Deane, and Lee was sent to the delegations of the different cities, to be submitted by them to the wise councils of their respective home towns. In this way one secret was communicated to several hundred people, and within a week the English newspapers printed all the details.

Sir Joseph, who was often better informed about what was going on in the Hague than the Stadholder himself, had known of the arrival of the American letter almost as soon as it had reached the Raadpensionaris. Without giving him time to consult van Bleiswyk or the Duke of Brunswick, the English minister hastened to interview the Prince. He asked His Highness point-blank what the truth of the matter was. The Prince, much em-

barrassed, stammered a denial, then told Sir Joseph how much he was personally attached to the King of England, and finally confessed that such a letter as the British minister had just mentioned did exist.

Sir Joseph, according to his own testimony, flattered himself that during the interview he "omitted nothing that was proper to be said," and afterward stated that he had "left the Prince with a strong and friendly recommendation not to suffer himself to be entrapped again." With England in full possession of all the facts, the only thing the Estates General could possibly do was to ignore the American communication. It was filed away in the archives.

This proceeding, however, was little to the taste of Amsterdam. When Amsterdam is mentioned, the Burgomasters are in mind; not the two hundred thousand people residing within its walls, but the town council and the few families which made up its hereditary government and which ruled the city as if it were their own private possession. Amsterdam, then, which of all Dutch cities had the greatest interest in a commercial treaty with America, deeply regretted this outcome of the affair. Since it was no longer possible to consider the question openly in the Estates General, Amsterdam decided to take matters into her own hands and to continue the negotiations with the American envoys at her own risk. She preferred not to communicate

directly with the American envoys in Paris, but corresponded with them through a certain Dumas, who was the American man-of-all-work in the Republic. This Dumas was a typical product of his time. By profession he was a tutor, a governor of the children of rich families. On the side he was an amateur diplomatist and looked after the Dutch interests of the American delegation in Paris. He kept this office all during the first negotiations between the Republic and the United States. He then became the private secretary of Adams, the first American representative in Holland, and left him to enter the service of the French minister in the Hague.

On the 23d of September, 1778, van Berckel, the radical Pensionaris of Amsterdam, wrote a letter to Dumas. Of course, so van Berckel said, it would be foolish for Amsterdam to conclude a treaty with America all alone and without informing the other cities and provinces. But on the other hand, Amsterdam is the largest and most influential city in the Republic, and nothing can happen in the Republic without Amsterdam's consent and coöperation. Therefore, it would be a good idea for Amsterdam to begin to pave the way for a future treaty. As soon as the war between England and America is finished, all the preliminary work will have been done and the treaty can be signed at once.

The plan was as simple as it was beautiful. In a letter of the same day, meant directly for the Amer-

ican envoys, van Berckel expressed the same ideas. The existing alliance between America and France could serve as an example, he thought, for a similar one between the Republic and America. Of course there must first be peace between America and England, but in expectation of this peace, why should not Amsterdam and the envoys of the American Congress perform the preliminary work now? And would the Americans kindly keep the greatest secrecy about this matter, in order that nobody whose interest it was to prevent the plan might interfere and spoil it?

This letter was most welcome in the American camp. An answer was sent without delay. The Americans were delighted. Then followed a few compliments. But why, asked the Americans, wait until peace shall have been declared? Why wait until England shall have recognized the independence of the colonies? Are not those colonies practically independent at this very moment? To wait might be dangerous for the Republic. The colonies might conclude a peace with England at any moment, and the Republic would then run the risk that England in this event might wish to reserve for herself certain commercial privileges, to the disadvantage of other nations, and the Republic might just happen to be one of the other nations.

From now on the correspondence moved swiftly. Dumas reported that he had seen van Berckel, that Amsterdam was quite as willing as ever to enter into negotiations with the Americans, but that at the moment Sir Joseph was once more making a terrible fuss about the Dutch smugglers and Amsterdam was obliged to move with great circumspection. The Americans thereupon suggested that Amsterdam send a plenipotentiary to some foreign city where he could meet one of the American delegates with whom he could discuss the matter more fully.

Amsterdam, however, did not care to run the risk of sending a member of the town government. She let some of the influential merchants who were interested in the American trade into the secret. One of those, Jean de Neufville, head of a house of American merchants, was unofficially authorized to discuss the possibilities of a commercial treaty with the American delegate. None of the three American envoys in Paris could leave at that moment, and as their representative they sent William Lee, who was looking after the American interests in Germany and Austria.

In September, 1778, in Aix-les-Bains, a fashionable watering-place, where a cosmopolitan crowd offered a splendid opportunity for a clandestine meeting, Lee and de Neufville drew up the rough draft of a commercial treaty between the American and the Dutch Republics. This rough draft contained thirty-four articles. It was to be kept a secret until England should have recognized the independence of the American States. It would

then be submitted to the American Congress and to the Dutch Estates General for their approval.

Having finished these negotiations to their mutual content, the gentlemen left Aix-les-Bains without having been discovered. Lee went to Frankfurt, and thence to Paris, where he reported the success of his mission to the Commission on Foreign Affairs in America. De Neufville went back to Amsterdam, and delivered the concept-treaty to the Burgomasters, who subjected it to a careful examination and suggested some minor changes. Marvelously enough, the whole transaction actually remained a secret. A copy of the treaty in its preliminary form reached America safely, and during the next two years nobody except the few initiated officials knew about its existence. Then, by the purest chance, it was discovered by England and led to war with the Republic.

But brief mention should be made of the happenings of the intervening two years. The Dutch merchants now delivered their contraband wares not only to the Americans but also to France. As we have seen before, wood was their chief article of export. England, however, had declared wood to be contraband of war. It took every Dutch ship which transported such wood, sold the contents thereof in an English harbor, and then allowed the ship to go home with the proceeds of the auction. Such forced sales never produced anything, and the Dutch merchants whose ships were caught lost much money.

Hence there arose a great debate, and the question was, "Is or is not wood contraband of war?" The Republic pointed to a treaty made between the two countries in 1674 in which wood was not mentioned as contraband of war. England could not deny the existence of this treaty, but it claimed that circumstances had changed. By selling the wood to the French, so they reasoned, you are selling to our enemies that commodity of which at present they are most in need.

It was, however, useless to start upon a discussion of the ethical points of law involved. That the Dutch merchants, who during their own war of independence had steadily sold powder and guns to the Spaniards, would suddenly become possessed of higher notions of business ethics, was not to be expected. They continued to trade with France as well as they could under the constant supervision of the English fleet, and nothing was changed.

It is interesting to read the letters and papers of the years immediately preceding the disastrous English war of 1780. It seemed that nobody in the Republic was as yet aware of the fact that his nation had become a sixth-rate power; that against the hundreds of ships of England, the Republic could not oppose a dozen of her own. The diplomatic information of that day was extremely poor. The government in the Hague was kept badly informed, and the notions which the majority of the

people held about everything were usually not borne out by fact.

The belief that England was responsible for their decline in prosperity made most Hollanders blind to the real facts. If only the alliance with England were given up, so they reasoned, and a new one were made with France, everything would come out all right, and yet at the very moment France was beginning to suffer from chronic starvation and was very near bankruptcy! It was this blindness which made it so easy for the French minister in the Hague to bully the Republic into submission.

After a long series of protests from England, the Estates General, on the 19th of November, were forced to proclaim officially that "henceforth, no vessels loaded with wood, suitable for the building of ships, would be given convoy by the Republic's men-of-war." France immediately informed the Republic that she never would consent to this ruling, that she was obliged to consider this decision of the Estates General a breach of neutrality, and that in case the Republic was going to align herself at England's side by the promulgation of such a law, France would be obliged to deprive the Republic of all the rights and privileges which her merchants so far had enjoyed.

The French minister sent this communication on the 7th of December. Twelve days passed, and the Estates General had not yet sent an answer. On the 19th of December France repeated her demand and renewed her threats. Eleven days later, the Estates General informed the French minister that the question was under discussion.

This, however, did not satisfy the government in Paris. An edict revoking all such laws as favored the Hollanders above other nations was signed by the King and sent to the Hague. The French minister had orders not to deliver it immediately. He was told to show it to the members of the Estates General and to his friends in Amsterdam. Soon all the Dutch merchants knew of the document the French minister carried around in his pocket. They were greatly scared. On the 28th of March, the Estates General of the Independent Republic of the United Seven Netherlands recalled their decision of the 19th of November.

We do not intend to describe in detail the many humiliations of a similar nature which the Republic suffered during the next year. They were all brought about in the same general way. On one day, driven by fear of England, the Republic would adopt a certain measure, and on the next, through dread of offending France and losing some commercial profit, she would recall her decision. She was completely at the mercy of England, which had the stronger navy, and of France, which provided the greater revenue. Both nations she tried to placate by halfway measures which had continually to be patched up to please one or the other of the two belligerent nations. By so doing she systematically

weakened her own prestige and ended by being despised by both. Only after wasting many precious years and finally being driven into a corner, from which she could no longer hope to extricate herself by delays or excuses, did she at last determine to do something towards the defense of her independence. Nothing, however, was done hurriedly. First of all, a commission was appointed to "investigate the condition of the fleet and to report thereon." In January of 1779, a committee of delegates from the five different admiralties met in the Hague to make a study of the problem and to propose a plan of reform.

After deliberations lasting three months, this committee brought out its report. It discovered that the Republic did not possess a single ship of the size then considered necessary for naval warfare, of which England, France, and Spain each possessed a large number. It advised that the Republic begin at once to build twelve ships of seventy guns, thirty of sixty guns, and forty-two of from twenty to fifty guns. The next question which the commission discussed was, what to do with those ships when they were once built. The Republic no longer possessed any harbors which could contain a large fleet. Amsterdam had always been a difficult port to reach on account of the sandbanks in the Zuyderzee, which made it necessary for a man-ofwar to unload all her cannon and most of her rigging before she could be towed over the principal banks. Helder, which was later made a naval port by Napoleon, then offered a harbor which could only be used in summer-time, and then only when the weather was fine. Rotterdam had allowed the Maas to run so full of sand that only ships of less than twelve feet draught could reach her harbors. The only safe place which offered any accommodations for large ships was Flushing in Zeeland. William III had made it an important naval base. But no sooner was William dead than the bankruptcy of the admiralty of Zeeland and the jealousy of other cities had allowed this harbor and its dock and storehouses to go to ruin.

As for all the thousand and one things which go towards the equipping of ships, the committee found that nothing had been provided. There was no powder for the cannon; there were no sails; there was no rope; there were no supplies. The magazines were empty. Where could these supplies be found, the commission asked, and where was the wood necessary for the building of new ships and the repairing of the old ones?

This was a difficulty which soon proved to be insurmountable. All the wood and all the supplies of every sort and description had been bought up by the Dutch merchants as soon as France got into war, and most of it had been sold abroad. What remained at home the Dutch admiralties could now buy only at exorbitant prices. It was to no avail, then, that the naval commission sent in its detailed

report on the 10th of March, which gave the number of ships that ought to be built, the names of the harbors that ought to be enlarged, indicated the storehouses that ought to be restocked, and specified premiums that ought to be offered to sailors in order to entice them away from the more lucrative service with the merchant marine.

To make the European political situation more complicated, Spain had joined France and had also declared war upon England. A French-Spanish fleet was reported to have sailed northward, in the direction of the English coast. It threatened to invade the British Islands. According to the treaties of 1678 and 1716, England had a right to demand a certain number of soldiers and ships from the Dutch Republic.

On the 21st of July, Sir Joseph reminded the Estates of the existing treaties and in the name of the British government asked for assistance. This time the Estates General could not excuse themselves upon the ground that the war was being fought outside of Europe. They all escaped the difficult issue by sending no answer at all. The Franco-Spanish expedition soon came to nothing, and the Republic, at least in this respect, was saved further trouble. But after each new refusal, England went a step farther. She now treated the ships of the United Provinces as if they belonged to a belligerent nation and refused to listen any longer to the feeble protests which came from the Hague. The British

minister had but one answer to give to all Dutch remonstrances: "If the Republic wished to act openly as if she had taken the side of France, she ought not to expect to receive any preferential treatment from that country which was the chief sufferer through her unfriendly actions."

But, behold, right in the middle of all this commotion, with the Regents accusing the Prince of gross neglect of duty because he did not strengthen the fleet, and the Prince accusing the Regents of gross neglect of duty because they did not give him the funds wherewith to build new ships, and the crowd shouting, "Down with England!" and "Hurray for France and America!" the American Revolution came sailing into a Dutch harbor. This was no less a personage than Commodore Paul Jones, the best propagandist the American colonies had on the Continent. Franklin appealed to the fashionable element in the community by reason of his own studied unfashionableness. But Jones appealed to the masses by reason of his natural characteristics. He was the mixture of pirate and gentleman, blaqueur and stout fighter, which will always make an impression upon the imagination of a peaceful community, those who stay at home and smell the smoke of battle only in their dreams.

In the year 1778, Jones, just thirty years old, had been sent from America to Europe with a ship of eighteen guns called the Ranger. He started his operations in the Irish Sea and captured an English

ship of twenty guns, the Drake. Thereupon he went to Brest; arrived in Brest, he sent his own ship back to America and assumed command of a squadron which Franklin had equipped for him in the French harbor. Jones hoisted his flag on an old ship which had previously sailed between France and the Indies, which had been rebaptized the Bon Homme Richard, in honor of Franklin's "Poor Richard." The Bon Homme Richard carried thirtyeight guns and three hundred and eighty men, about one hundred of whom were Americans. The others came from all countries of Europe and a few from Asia. Jones's fleet consisted further of the Alliance. so called in honor of the alliance between France and America, and three small French ships of from twelve to thirty-two guns.

With this outfit Jones sailed through the Channel and into the North Sea, which as usual was full of British ships. Several times he landed on British territory in Scotland, and he captured some English vessels. On the 23d of September, he got into conflict with an English squadron which was accompanying a number of merchantmen to the Baltic Sea. The English vessels, the Serapis of forty-four guns, and the Countess of Scarborough, allowed the merchantmen to escape while they themselves remained and gave fight to the Americans.

I take it for granted that the battle which followed is known to all my readers. It has been written about by many excellent American historians. As a result of the engagement the Serapis was surrendered, and when later in the day the Bon Homme Richard sank, Jones moved his flag to his prize and with what remained of his fleet set sail for France. Soon, however, it appeared that with the large number of wounded it was too dangerous to risk a trip through the English Channel, and Jones therefore decided to make for the nearest port, which in this case happened to be Texel.

On the 4th of October of the year 1779, the American flag appeared for the first time in one of the harbors of the Republic. It was greeted with great enthusiasm. The Amsterdam merchants and especially de Neufville, who previously had conducted the negotiations with Lee, immediately got into touch with the American admiral. Van der Capellen, who dearly loved to write letters to famous people and tell them all about himself and the noble sentiments which were ever present in his breast, favored Jones with an epistle from his own hand. He hoped that Commodore Jones would forgive an old and tried friend of America the liberty he was taking in addressing him. He gave expression to the unspeakable satisfaction with which he had received the tidings of Mr. Jones's many successes, and wanted an "authentick and circumstanced" account containing "all the particulars relating to a sea-fight rather to be found in the books of the former centuries than in our present age." Postscript: "Will Commodore Jones excuse the Baron van der Capellen's indiscretion in asking him whether he is an American by birth?" 35

Commodore Jones, whatever his antecedents, was a polished correspondent. His letter to the Countess Selkirk upon the sad necessity of having had to take away her husband's plate, and promising to buy it himself in order that he may gratify his own feelings by restoring it to her Ladyship, is one which might be used in our own day as a classical example of the lost art of letter-writing.

"My Lord [his answer to Capellen began] — Human nature and America are under a very singular obligation to you for your patriotism and friendship and I feel every grateful sentiment for your generous and polite letter." Then follows a bitter wail about the way in which he, Jones, has been assailed by the British press. He encloses a number of letters for the inspection of the Baron van der Capellen in order that the Baron may see for himself how falsely he has been accused. Alas, it is true he was not born in America. By birth he is a Briton, but fortunately he does not inherit the degenerate spirit of that fallen nation, which he at once laments and despises. America has been the land of his fond election from the age of thirteen, when he first saw it. After expressing the hope that the two Republics will join hands, - in which case, they will give Peace to the world, — Mr. Jones signs himself the Baron van der Capellen's very obliged and very obedient humble servant.

Now, while this visit of Commodore Jones was most welcome to the friends of liberty and to the increasing number of democrats, it was very embarrassing to the government at the Hague. The situation, indeed, was unique. A naval commander of a country, the existence of which was not recognized by England, at the head of a number of ships of a nation in open warfare with England, comes into a Dutch port with his vessel full of English prisoners of war; and before he has been there a week he has become a popular hero, his picture is spread broadcast, and his fame is being sung in the street in popular ballads. What could the Estates General do? Jones by his behavior did not give them the slightest chance to object to his presence in one of their harbors. He was politeness itself.

It happened that those few ships which the admiralties had been collecting for the protection of the mercantile fleet were just at that moment gathered at Texel. Immediately upon arriving at this port, Commodore Jones had paid his respects to the Dutch admiral and had asked for permission to hire a house on shore to serve as a hospital for the wounded sailors. Post-haste the government informed the Dutch admiral not to return the visit, and ordered Mr. Jones to keep his wounded on board his ships.

Neither were any of the French sailors allowed to land. This led to immediate protest from the

French minister, who had hoped that the arrival of this fleet might force the Republic into a war with England. No sooner had he lodged his complaint than Sir Joseph descended upon the Estates General and expressed himself with great violence. He had gone to Texel, but he had not been allowed to visit his imprisoned countrymen on board the American ships. All his attempts to get into communication with the British prisoners on board the American ships had failed through the obstinacy of the Dutch authorities. Sir Joseph wanted to know what this meant. A certain British subject, now turned pirate, had taken two of His Majesty's ships and had brought them into a Dutch harbor. It was plainly the duty of the Estates General to see that the English prisoners in the port of Texel were at once set free, and to surrender Jones to the English courts in order that they might hang him as a traitor to his country.

To this violent outbreak the Estates General gave no answer. They consented, however, that the wounded English prisoners be sent on shore for treatment. At the same time they ordered the Dutch admiral at Texel to offer his medical assistance and medical supplies to the American wounded. For the Republic was now placed in such a position that the smallest favor shown to the English had to be followed by an equal favor to the French, and vice versa.

After a few weeks, when the first glamour of the

novelty of the unusual visit had worn off, the stringent orders forbidding American and French sailors to land were gradually relaxed and the Americans were even allowed to repair their damaged ships. To Jones this was a welcome permission. The sea around Texel was by this time full of English vessels. The French-American squadron could hardly hope to escape them. The longer Jones could stay on neutral ground the better for him. Repairs were really begun, but after two months nothing had been accomplished except that the Countess of Scarborough had been provided with a new bowsprit. While the sailors worked on this bowsprit, Mr. Jones took a little trip through the Republic and allowed himself to be the subject of great popular ovations.

But during all the excitement over Mr. Jones, the Estates General had not come any nearer to a final decision about the important question of contraband. The country provinces still supported the demands of England. The Province of Holland, however, threatened to act upon her own initiative unless the others should discontinue their policy of opposing France. This threat had its effect. In the midst of all her difficulties, the Republic could not risk having her richest province secede. Something had to be done. As usual a compromise was made which dissatisfied all parties. It was decided to gather as many ships as possible and to divide them into three parts. One of these was to accom-

pany the merchantmen who were going to France, the other those going to the Baltic, a third one would protect those destined for the Mediterranean. England's wishes were granted in so far that such merchantmen as accepted the official convoy were not allowed to carry wood. They were allowed, however, to carry iron and hemp, two commodities which France also needed for the building of her ships. By the end of December, this fleet was to leave Texel.

Meanwhile Sir Joseph, in order to show what the British government thought of this decision, once more came with a number of demands which it was impossible for the Republic to grant. What had become of the troops that the Republic was bound to send to England's assistance? No answer. Why did the Republic allow Paul Jones to stay on in her harbor forever? No answer. This latter question, however, produced a result. The Dutch government hinted to Jones that it was about time for him to finish his repairs and to favor another country with his presence. Mr. Jones was in no hurry and bided his own time. But finally, on Christmas Day of 1779, he slipped quietly out of the harbor and sailed in the direction of France, which country he reached in safety.

Three days before his departure, the Dutch fleet, under command of Count van Bylandt, started on her voyage. Until the very last moment the Dutch authorities had feared that Jones would join their

fleet, in which case no end of complications might have arisen. This one difficulty, however, they were spared. But there were others and enough of them.³⁶

Of the merchantmen that had asked for protection, only half appeared at the place of meeting. The other half preferred to make the voyage at their own risk. For so great was the fear that the English might stop the fleet and search the ships that the insurance on the ships under convoy was much higher than on those that ventured out alone and unprotected. It had been promised that four more ships from Rotterdam would join van Bylandt's squadron when he reached the mouth of the Maas. Although van Bylandt waited near the Zeeland Islands a considerable time, no more vessels appeared. The commander of the missing ships afterward excused himself because "a headwind had kept him in the port of Goeree." Apologies and excuses of this sort will be plentiful in the further part of our history. Van Bylandt, tired of waiting, continued his way alone. On the 30th of December he sailed into the British Channel, and soon he approached the British shore. His arrival was immediately reported by a number of small, fast-sailing vessels which had been cruising around in that part of the sea to keep an eye on the Dutch fleet.

The next day — the last day of the year 1779 — the Dutch ships passed through the Channel and were in the neighborhood of the Isle of Wight.

Here they were met by an English fleet of eight large ships, ranging from twenty-eight to ninety guns. Van Bylandt ordered the merchantmen to fall in line behind his five little vessels and continued his way. The English fleet turned right about and accompanied the Dutch fleet at a respectful distance. Neither side showed any desire to begin hostilities. The English still wished, if possible, to avoid an open breach with the Republic, and the Dutch commander had very strict orders to refrain from any act which might lead his country into war with Great Britain. During the morning of that day, however, the English fleet manœuvred in such a way that it finally surrounded the Dutch squadron and their escape was impossible. During the afternoon, the British admiral. Charles Fielding, sent a boat to van Bylandt's flagship and informed him that he — Fielding — was under orders to search the Dutch ships.

To defend himself against the superior English ships was impossible. Van Bylandt, therefore, tried to enter into negotiations. He offered to declare, under oath, that the merchantmen which were under his protection did not carry any contraband of war. Fielding answered that he had a great respect for Mr. van Bylandt's honor and would greatly like to oblige him, but that he was under most positive orders to make a search personally. Some further discussion followed between the two commanders, but it led to no results. Fielding in-

sisted upon searching the Dutch ships. Van Bylandt declared that he would fire upon the first English boat that should attempt to institute such a search. Meanwhile night had come and a goodly number of the Dutch ships extinguished their lights and escaped between the lines of the English ships and made for a Dutch or a French harbor. The morning, however, found both fleets still in the same position, and, as soon as daylight appeared, Fielding prepared to search one of the Dutch merchantmen. True to his word, van Bylandt fired at the British boat which was being rowed to the Dutch ships. Immediately the British vessels turned about and answered by a general volley. The Dutch returned the fire as well as they could and an open battle was in progress. This battle lasted exactly five minutes. Van Bylandt, who knew the hopelessness of his position, then thought that he had done enough for the honor of the flag and stopped firing. No material harm was done. The English proceeded to search all the merchantmen diligently, and discovered that nine of them were loaded with hemp and iron, both of which commodities, according to the English code, were contraband of war and as such should be confiscated. These nine ships were brought to Portsmouth, the others were dismissed, and the Dutch fleet, as belonging to a nation which was in peace and friendship with His British Majesty, was given permission to return to the fatherland. This, however, van Bylandt re-

fused to do. He stayed with the unfortunate nine and accompanied them to Portsmouth, from which place he sent a full report of what had happened to the authorities in the Hague.

As usual, the news of the affair reached the stock exchange long before it reached anybody else. The unfortunate merchant who first started the question, "Have you heard that these British, etc., etc." (stock exchange information always has had its own special flavor) was hooted down as a scheming speculator who was trying to influence the market. The way in which the people took the news shows us very clearly the curious state of mind existing in the Republic at this time. Even the most patriotic Hollander, now, after the lapse of a century, must confess that the Republic had for years done every conceivable thing to anger her mighty neighbor across the North Sea. No amount of violence on the part of the British government can excuse the attitude of our forefathers who persistently did things which they knew must provoke their British allies. They snubbed the British government on every possible occasion. They seldom if ever answered communications asking for explanations. They quite openly supported Great Britain's enemies in all parts of the globe. They loudly clamored for a discontinuation of the old amicable treaties and demanded the immediate conclusion of an alliance with France, England's bitterest foe. More than that, the principal city of

the country had opened secret negotiations with the rebellious American colonists and was only waiting for the first opportunity to reap the rewards of its intrigue. Then, when England, exasperated at these continual annoyances and this prolonged breach of good faith, at last determined to take matters into her own hands, the outcry in the Republic was loud indeed.

When in the due course of events, the mail — via Ostend — brought the authentic news of the battle off the Isle of Wight, Divine Providence was kept working overtime, listening to all the prayers of patriotic citizens who implored a speedy and just revenge upon the heads of such unbelievable scoundrels as the subjects of His Majesty King George III.

The pamphleteer worked with a zeal only surpassed by the yellow reporter of the Spanish-American war.⁸⁷ The spirits of de Ruyter and Tromp were called forth from the grave to avenge the insult which the Dutch flag had just suffered. Others, with a truer conception of the actual state of affairs, bade the Goddess of the Republic speed to the grave of her great sailors and there shed tears over her present sad condition. Cato Batavus and other pseudo-classical poets (and oh, how bad the poetry of these Batavians was!) called upon a righteous Jehovah to smite the perpetrators of such atrocious perfidy. All of which (at sixpence a copy) was of great benefit to many a needy scribbler, but

did not return the nine ships now lying in Portsmouth harbor.

The next thing on the somewhat hysterical public programme was to put the blame on some person. Admiral van Bylandt was the first candidate for the position of scapegoat. He was called back to Holland and placed before a court martial. This, however, could only exonerate him, as he could prove that he had only acted according to the sealed orders which he had received before he had left Texel. Who had given him those positive orders? Amsterdam directed the honorable public to the man who, as the hereditary and constitutional head of the navy, would probably know more about these orders than anybody else.

The Stadholder, however, let the storm pass without deigning to answer. Thereupon the honorable public condemned him "in absentia," and adopted the firm belief that but for those secret orders, which bade the Dutch admiral avoid war at any cost, the five old junks under his command might have blown the strong British squadron from the face of the ocean.

And who did finally come out of the whole affair with flying colors and with a halo of incorruptible patriotism? No one else than the good town of Amsterdam. If only its advice had been followed; if only the obnoxious alliance with England had been broken long ago and had been replaced by a treaty with the great French nation (the citizens of

which were just then starting upon that prolonged course of extreme dieting which ultimately led to the glorious Revolution); if only the Republic had listened to the sound counsel of the true patriots and had refused to obey a man who through tradition and inclination was closely allied to the Republic's worst enemies, then, and so on, and so on. With all the energy of which the town was capable (and until the very end of the Republic, that was a good deal), Amsterdam now agitated in favor of a repeal of the decision of November 19, 1778, which granted England's wishes in the matter of contraband, and once more the Estates General had to face this momentous question.

Less than ever did England show a desire to compromise. On the 28th of March, Sir Joseph addressed a new note of warning to the Estates. "The Government of His British Majesty desired most emphatically to know whether the Republic still considered herself to be England's ally or desired to be treated as any other neutral power. In case she preferred to renounce the alliance, His British Majesty would be forced to rescind all such privileges as the Republic had hitherto enjoyed." The Estates General filed this communication in their archives, and made no answer to it. Whereupon, on the 17th of April, His British Majesty, having lost all patience, declared that he no longer considered himself bound by any of the ancient treaties and alliances between his country and the

Seven United Netherlands, and henceforth he allowed all his loyal men-of-war (and his not less loyal and enthusiastic privateers) to stop and search such Dutch ships as they might encounter upon the high seas and to confiscate all such goods as were either contraband of war or were consigned to French customers.

The British fleet was now in complete command of the Channel. With the ports of France wide open to Dutch goods, it was yet impossible to transport them hither except by taking the long and dangerous route around the north of Scotland. Nor did many weeks elapse before the direct results of antagonizing England began to make themselves felt. After this long period of provocation England no longer bothered about the fine points of international law. Dutch ships, no matter what their cargo, were without any formal process declared good prizes and were brought to English ports. A fleet with which to protect the Dutch traders did not exist. The decree of the Estates General of the 2d of May, 1779, ordering the immediate construction of a fleet of fifty-two vessels. looked extremely well on paper, but neither the money nor the wood nor the men necessary for building and equipping it had as yet been found.

The English now extended their operations to the coast of Holland. English privateers closely guarded the mouth of the Dutch rivers. A French privateer, having sought shelter in the port of Hellevoetsluis.

tried to reach the North Sea. But before he was out. in the open, he was attacked by two English vessels. Unable to regain the safe harbor, the Frenchman beached his ship. The English ships waited patiently until high tide lifted the ship off, then boarded it and took it home as a prize. While this action took place there was great commotion on the shore. Two hundred years before, the Hollanders might, for lack of boats, have waded out to the British ships and taken them by assault, as they not infrequently had taken Spanish ships. In the year 1779, however, they looked on in profound indignation, referred the matter to the vengeance of Righteous Providence, and went home to discuss the affair for the next six months. The Estates General were foolish enough to protest in London against this "Insult to the Republic's sovereignty." It is easy to guess how respectfully such a protest was received.


Now, instead of drawing a helpful lesson out of all these many unfortunate events, the leading powers in the Province of Holland, and as such the leading powers in the whole Republic, preferred to try everything but the one rational course which was at their disposal. The general feeling against England, however, was such that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to convince the majority of the people of the desirability of establishing at least a modus vivendi with her overbearing neighbor until the day when the Republic should once more

have become strong enough to maintain her rights by force.

It was just at this critical moment that Catherine of Russia, having successfully murdered her husband and having generally established order in the country of her adoption, started out upon a career among the civilized nations of Europe and invented what has become known in history as the "Armed Neutrality." 38

England's curious conception of international law and her persistent adherence to the doctrine that might goes before right in the matter of searching ships, had done damage, not only to the Republic, which was herself guilty of a continual breach of good faith, but also to less offensive neutrals, who were only trying to make an honest penny out of the existing political complications. The "Armed Neutrality" was a forceful proclamation of the principle that "Neutral ships make neutral goods." A few commodities, which by their very nature were contraband of war, were excepted, but otherwise the contracting parties maintained that reasonably inoffensive articles could not be confiscated because a board of periwigged lordships in the town of London held that they could be, and because these particular gentlemen had the might to enforce whatever laws they thought fit to proclaim.

'This Armed Neutrality, which began as a defensive union of the northern powers and the member-



DRESS PARADE OF THE AMSTERDAM VOLUNTEER CORPS CALLED "TOT NUT DER SCHUTTERY"

After an engraving by J. S. van der Meer

ship of which was open to all interested parties, came as a very unwelcome surprise to England, which had secretly hoped to gain Her Russian Majesty's support for very different plans. The Russian fleet amounted to little and was already possessed of that most unfortunate habit of blowing itself up by the medium of gunpowder and brandy. On land, however, Russia was a power which had to be reckoned with, and for almost a generation — since 1763, as a matter of fact — England had not had a single friend or ally on the Continent.

To the Republic, the Armed Neutrality appeared as a most welcome innovation, as a favor of Heaven. If only she could join she would be as fortunate as a man who is allowed to insure his house while it is already on fire. The five articles which the high contracting parties had laid down as sound principles of international law would have been of the greatest benefit to the Dutch merchants. France advised the Republic to join the coalition at once. But, even in that hour of peril, the authorities in the Hague could not bring themselves to act with dispatch, and as they did not maintain a regular diplomatic representative in St. Petersburg, and had no authentic information as to the intentions of the very fickle Empress, they first sent two ambassadors extraordinary to the Russian capital to talk things over. This was a fatal mistake. Several months went by with unprofitable negotiations and the Empress became less and less willing to admit this bankrupt firm, which hoped to reëstablish its credit by joining a more vigorous concern. As for the British government, it made no secret of its sentiments. In no vague terms the Dutch minister in London was informed that should the Republic join the Armed Neutrality, such an act might have far-reaching and serious consequences. It was the same old story. France said, "Do"; England said, "Don't"; and both threatened vengeance in case of disobedience.

In the midst of the debate as to what course to pursue, a most unfortunate occurrence took away the Republic's last chance to strengthen her desperate position. As the industrious reader may remember, in the fall of the year 1778, Jean de Neufville, as the unofficial ambassador of the sovereign city of Amsterdam, had met Mr. Lee, the official representative of the American Congress, and together these two gentlemen had drawn up a rough draft of a treaty of peace and commerce which should be brought up in the parliaments of their respective countries as soon as peace between England and the colonies should have been declared.

The original of this concept-treaty had been forwarded to America, had there been inspected by the powers that were, and was now on its return voyage to Europe. It was among the effects of Henry Laurens, Esq., former President of the American Congress and now on his way as provisory minister to the Hague or Amsterdam, or wherever the best

interests of the American colonists should be found to lie. The chief purpose of his mission was to raise money, — a commodity of which the American rebels were in dire need.

On the 10th of September, Laurens set sail in the packet Mercurius. After two days on the Newfoundland Banks his ship met an English man-ofwar under command of Captain Keppel, and was hailed and stopped. The English captain was not aware of the presence of Laurens on board the ship, but in the course of routine he sent an officer to the Mercurius to examine her papers. Laurens, who well knew the incriminating nature of the papers he carried with him, repaired to his cabin and threw the trunk which contained his documents overboard. The rest of the story is familiar. The trunk did not sink, but swam gayly on the waters. A British sailor discovered it, fished it out of the deep, and presented it to his captain. The captain read the documents, and congratulated himself on his luck. For, he thought, and for a long period afterwards everybody else thought, that these documents contained the key to all the affairs of the enemy — their plan of campaign as well as their many and varied diplomatic negotiations. Laurens was locked up on board the British war-vessel, which immediately set course for home, and on the 1st of October landed its prisoner and his unfortunate trunk at the town of Dartmouth. The American was sent to the Tower and treated as a

dangerous enemy of state. The trunk also was taken to London and its contents were carefully examined. Much to the regret of His Majesty's ministers, the documents did not disclose the diverse wickedness of His Majesty's many enemies. But they contained a number of letters the exposure of which was to be most painful to their authors.³⁹

Unfortunately the Republic suffered most through Laurens's clumsiness. Not less than seven documents revealing the interest which the Republic took in American affairs were found among his papers. Among these seven was the illfated original of the commercial treaty drawn up two years before by a representative of Amsterdam and the American Congress. From the hand of de Neufville, the man who had conducted these negotiations for Amsterdam, there was also a letter written on the 28th of July, 1779, and addressed to the President of the American Congress. In this letter de Neufville once more assured that high functionary of Amsterdam's continued support, and informed him of the zeal with which Amsterdam represented America's interests in the Estates General. Document number three was a letter written by a certain Stockton (S. W.; further particulars unknown), of Amsterdam, to the Rev. Mr. Witherspoon, signer of the Declaration of Independence and ex-President of Princeton College. Mr. Stockton took it for granted that Mr. Wither-

spoon knew all about the secret commercial treaty and paid a high compliment to Mr. de Neufville, "who has such a clear conception of the best interests of his country and understands that its best advantage lies in an alliance with France and America and not with England." Then followed a eulogy of the democratic — the so-called Patriotic party. The unfortunate Patriots, according to Mr. Stockton, had a very hard time of it defending themselves against the intrigues of the Stadholder, who was the most intimate friend of the King of England, and who, according to current reports, had exactly as much love for liberty as His British Majesty. The Stadholder is accused generally of being responsible for every calamity that has so far befallen the Republic. He alone is responsible for the laxity with which the Republic is espousing the cause of the Americans.

Document number four was of a more practical nature. It was a list of rich people who might possibly have money available for an American loan. This list had been prepared by a certain Dircks, a soldier of fortune, who had been an officer in the American army and who was considered a sort of specialist on American affairs. He had come into the good graces of the Baron van der Capellen, and corresponded with him until the friendship was broken off by a violent quarrel.

Letter number five was written by a certain Gillon, who had come to Europe to supervise the

construction of two new American war-vessels which were to be built in a French port. In his report, directed to John Rutledge, the Governor of South Carolina, Gillon writes that the plan for their construction had failed, but that he had spent his credits for powder and other necessities of war. These were purchased from Nicholas and Jan van Staphorst, two honorable Amsterdam merchants, and had been forwarded to America via St. Eustatius, the ordinary route for smuggled goods. Mr. Gillon, too, has high hopes of an American loan, to be placed among the Amsterdam merchants. Of course, so he points out, it is impossible for the Hollanders to take the side of America openly, but they are quite willing to support the good cause secretly with their money. Therefore, he thinks it would be well if the Congress of America should send a special minister to the Republic, and not conduct its Dutch affairs as it has done hitherto through their diplomatic representatives who reside in Paris.

Finally, there were two letters from van der Capellen. They did not show to whom they had been addressed. The first one, dated Zwolle, April 28, 1778, contained an expression of the pleasure the writer had experienced upon hearing of new American victories. Then followed the customary enumerations of his own humble endeavors on behalf of the just cause of the American revolutionists; how he had translated the work of

the Rev. Dr. Price; how he alone in the Republic was fighting for the rights of the Americans; and how he would love to offer his life for the righteous Cause of Liberty were it not that a tender wife and a small son detained him at home, where he could fight the good fight only in a humble way with his pen and by word of mouth. Then we return to solid earth and find a sentence which must have interested his readers infinitely more than the rhetorical outburst that had gone before. For at the end of his letter van der Capellen gives his correspondent some advice as to how the American loan could be best placed, and how a serious attempt should be made to induce people to sell their English securities and to replace them by American ones.

The second letter of van der Capellen was dated later (September), after the Americans had suffered several reverses. In this one he expresses his fear that it will now be more difficult to get money from the Hollanders than before, and he advises the Americans to provide the European public with more reliable news than they are getting at that moment in order that they may know exactly how things stand in the continent across the ocean and may not be misguided by English reports.

After all that had gone before, these seven documents, showing the actual participation and the direct encouragement which the Hollanders had given to the American rebels, could not be expected to arouse in England any feelings of deep approval.

It was made very evident to His Majesty's ministers that, while the Stadholder professed an honest desire to maintain good relations with England, the town of Amsterdam was forcing upon the whole country a policy which was absolutely opposed to that which William tried to follow, and was conducting the country's political affairs very much as if she were lord and master over the whole commonwealth.

Therefore, instead of immediately declaring war upon the Republic, the British government decided first to try and use the incriminating evidence to break the power of Amsterdam in the Estates General and to strengthen the position of the Stadholder. Accordingly, on the 11th of October, the documents were sent to the British minister in the Hague to be used by him as he thought best.

On the 16th of October, Sir Joseph presented them to the Stadholder. William accepted them, but, ever unable to make a quick decision, he lost four days before he could make up his mind what to do. This delay was of great advantage to Amsterdam, which, being immediately informed of what had happened, could now prepare her defense in all leisure.

With great energy she agitated for an immediate decision upon the question of joining the Armed Neutrality, and as a matter of fact, on the 19th of October, the Estates of Holland, with a large majority, voted in favor of accepting the conditions

which Russia imposed before she would allow the Republic to join the coalition. After this decision of Holland, it would be impossible for the other provinces to oppose the plan, even if they felt so inclined.

A day later, on the 20th of October, the Stadholder appeared in the secret committee on foreign affairs of the Estates General and in the meeting of the Estates of Holland, and read to the members the papers which the British minister had given him. At the same time he solemnly declared that he himself had never been aware of the existence of a commercial treaty with the American colonies or known about the negotiations concerning such a treaty. All of which was undoubtedly true. The Estates of Holland seconded his sentiments. They thanked the Stadholder for his paternal care for the interests of the country, and solemnly professed that they, too, were entirely unaware of the existence of such a treaty as had been just read to them. Furthermore, they declared that they had never even recognized the independence of the United States, and that, before they could do anything else. they should have to hear what Amsterdam, the real offending party, had to say for herself. After which the Stadholder, having performed his duty to the satisfaction of himself and all those concerned, repaired home, and the town of Amsterdam was requested to account for her conduct within five days.

During the next few days the news of this latest deed of Amsterdam traveled throughout the country, and it was received with very little approval. To hate England in the abstract, to twist the British Lion's tail in an alehouse discussion, was one thing. To suffer pecuniary loss through the claws of the same animal was quite a different story. So many Dutch ships had by this time fallen into British hands that prudence was almost gaining over hysteria. What would become of them, the people asked, if the English should really declare war upon them at that very moment? Would Amsterdam, which had driven the country directly into the conflict, then step forward and defend it against the British fleet?

But those who expected that the proud city would now make humble apologies, and express regret at the reckless way in which she had imperiled the safety of all the provinces, were mistaken. When the day for an explanation came, the mayors of the town were quite willing to take the blame of the provisional American treaty upon themselves. In a sort of offhand way and in a tone of injured innocence they declared that they had only acted for the general good and in order that the Republic might be the first to profit from the American trade, once peace between England and the colonies should be established.⁴⁰

This explanation, given in a tone of "what is all this excitement about anyway," was not acceptable to the British government. The poor Stadholder, instead of using the papers to destroy the power of Amsterdam, — as had been the intention of the British ministers, — had muddled up affairs in such a way that Amsterdam got out of the affair with a certain halo of patriotism — with the reputation of having acted for the benefit of the fatherland. The British government now no longer bothered about the Stadholder, but addressed itself directly to the Estates. It sent what was practically an ultimatum, asking for an apology from the government of Amsterdam and demanding severe punishment for the Pensionaris of that town, who had sanctioned the negotiation of this secret treaty.

War with England was now imminent. We, therefore, might have expected some dispatch, not only in answering the last note of the British minister, but also in the matter of joining the Armed Neutrality. The latter question, after the favorable decision of the Estates of Holland, had again been lost in the labyrinth of committees and subcommittees of the country's complicated government.

But nothing happened. The first weeks of November were spent in further deliberations. A majority of the seven provinces gradually expressed the opinion that it would be, perhaps, wise to instruct the Dutch representatives in St. Petersburg to sign the document which would admit the Republic to the benefits of the Armed Neutrality. But in order that all things might be done in decency

and without haste, and probably in the vague hope that something might turn up at the last moment and that conditions might miraculously improve, it was decided not to inform the other European nations of this step until six more weeks should have elapsed.

As to the punishing of Amsterdam, the opinions were greatly divided. The mayors of Amsterdam, in acting upon their own authority and without consulting the central government, had after all only done what every other city and village was in the habit of doing constantly. The central government was at best a necessary nuisance, which worked with such exceeding clumsiness that it should be consulted as little as possible.

After three weeks of discussion on this matter, no definite decision had as yet been reached. The Estates of Holland and the Estates General then declared themselves ready officially to disapprove Amsterdam's action and to inform the British government of this decision.

Sir Joseph, however, made it clear that no such halfway measure would be acceptable to his country. In rapid succession he sent the Estates a number of notes which left no doubt as to their meaning. Without exception, these notes were left unanswered. Another month had gone by, and it was now near the middle of December. As it was becoming more evident each day that nothing was "going to turn up," the Estates General decided

that there was no longer any profit to be derived from their air of mystery in regard to the Armed Neutrality. Accordingly, on the 10th of December, the different European powers were informed that the Republic had joined the neutrality coalition, and would they kindly take notice of this fact.

This information, however, reached London too late to be of any benefit. It was winter, and a severe storm raged on the North Sea. The mail was delayed for many days, and when at last the letter of the Dutch government reached London, the British government had already decided to declare war upon the Republic. It came to this decision solely upon the ground that the Dutch government refused to give redress for the behavior of Amsterdam. The inexcusable delay in informing the other powers of her decision to join the Armed Neutrality made it possible for England to declare war without once referring to this matter. In this way, the government of His Majesty escaped the risk of making an enemy of Catherine of Russia by declaring war upon one of her allies. England could now sav: "We declared war upon the Republic before we had been informed of the fact that she was one of the members of Your Majestv's coalition." At the same time, it would offer Catherine a chance to refuse the Republic admission, as being "no longer a neutral, but the participant in a war."

In this diplomatic game as well as in the actual war that followed, England was in every instance

the superior of the Republic. In England there was an actual government — a guiding hand that knew what it wanted. In the Republic there was anarchy and a score of little potentates who worked out their own little intrigues and thought only of their own immediate interests.

The same storm which had delayed the Dutch mail detained the ship that was bringing Sir Joseph orders to leave the Hague at once. On the 23d of December, he left for Ostend, regretted by no one. The Dutch minister in London stayed at his post a week longer. On the 29th of December, he tried once more to have an interview with the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who, however, regretted that he was not able to receive him. As a farewell greeting, he presented the Dutchman with an exposition of his views.

"For many years," so he wrote, "the Republic, which was closely connected with England by many treaties and alliances, has secretly aided England's enemies, has persistently refused to perform such acts as it was bound to perform by reason of the aforesaid treaties, and has steadily refused to comply with any of England's wishes. Finally the government of the Republic has allowed a single one of her cities to assume the sovereignty over the whole country, and the Estates General have been either unable or unwilling to force this one city to obey the stipulations of the treaties existing between the two countries."

The Dutch minister left London, and by the first of the year 1781, the whole country knew that once more, and for the fourth time in its history, a war with England had broken out. Now, what sort of an impression did this news have? Incredible though it may seem, it was at first received with very general satisfaction. No doubt the merchants knew that during the beginning of the war the Republic could not expect to be successful. But after the first losses caused by the unpreparedness of the Dutch fleet and army, they hoped that with the help of France and with the coöperation of the American colonists, who showed no signs of weakening in their struggle for freedom, England could be brought to terms.⁴¹

The democrats welcomed the war as a chance of getting even with England. At last the time of wavering was over. No longer was it necessary to submit patiently to insult and injury, but open warfare was to decide the merits of the prolonged quarrel. They even fancied they saw the Republic play a rôle as the defender of human rights, meting out punishment to the perfidious Briton who so long had escaped the wrath of a just Jehovah.

But, most of all, there was rejoicing among the Regents. Their anti-British policy of the last years had been in reality a movement against the Stadholder. The welfare of the country meant little to them compared to the interest of their own class. They foresaw (what actually did happen) that

when once war should have broken out, the Prince would be utterly incapable of conducting it with any vigor and would lose himself so entirely in unimportant details that no enterprise of any importance would ever be undertaken. The worse the Stadholder should mismanage the affairs of the navy (and he alone as commander-in-chief was responsible), the better it would be for the prestige of the Regents.

For the first time in the history of the Republic the majority of the people were no longer entirely on the side of the Prince of Orange. The utter incapacity of the Princes of the House of Nassau-Diez, — the line to which the Frisian stadholders belonged, — their lack of political sagacity, their awkwardness in dealing with the people, their foolish pride, which did not allow them to make friends even among their most faithful adherents, in one word, their absolute separateness from their people in their daily joys and sorrows; -all of these qualities had begun to do their work. The century-old affection of the common people for any member of that famous family, to which more than anybody or anything else they owed their independence and their prosperity, had at last begun to show signs of weakening. What good did it do these princes that they led a proper life, went to church on Sundays, surrounded themselves with a crowd of equally excellent, dull, and bigoted courtiers; taught their children the Heidelberg Catechism and led in prayer-meetings at home, when they persisted in keeping a continual abyss between themselves and their subjects?

The popular feeling that, so long as a Prince of the House of Orange was at the head of affairs, everything was all right, died hard. The people would have greatly preferred obeying William to taking orders from the unpopular Regents. They did not desert the Stadholder. It was the Stadholder who deliberately deserted them.

An inventive journalist of that day wrote that England had begun her war upon the Republic because she needed ready money. The country, so he reasoned, had, during the many years of warfare in all parts of the world, contracted an enormous debt. Taxes were high, and could not be increased without inconveniencing the public. It was difficult to see who would grant England a new loan. An easy way out of the difficulty was provided by a war with the rich Republic. This fantastic story, if it did not give the true cause of the war, certainly painted its immediate effect.

England grew rich at the expense of Holland. In the first place, while the war lasted England did not need to pay the interest on the Dutch money invested in its national debt or its private enterprises. In this way the Dutch shareholders lost several million pounds which now remained in the treasury of the British government or in the pocket of the English manufacturer.

In the second place, England so completely commanded the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean that it could, by declaring war at an unexpected moment, count upon capturing the larger part of the Dutch merchantmen, who would only hear of the existence of war after they were in the possession of some British privateer. When the war broke out, Amsterdam, according to the insurance written out, had some fifteen million guilders invested in ships and merchandise that were still on the high seas. The other Dutch cities together were interested up to approximately fifty million guilders. This shows us what large sums were at issue.

In the third place, England could now positively prevent the smuggling trade in America and deprive the American colonists of their chief source of supply of all their necessaries of war.

Finally, the British fleet, which was complete master of the Caribbean Sea, could take such Dutch colonies as it wished, and in case of peace could use them to enforce certain concessions.

The Dutch minister in London had been very slow in informing his home government about the course of events. In a time when days and hours counted, he took weeks about his official notices. It had therefore been impossible to warn the Dutch vessels that were still on the North Sea, and within six days after war had been declared sixty Dutch ships had fallen into British hands. By the 1st of February the number of ships that were lost

exceeded more than two hundred, and they represented a value of almost twenty-five million guilders.

It was of little benefit to the Republic that she could raise a loan of fourteen million guilders at a rate of interest of only two and a half per cent, and that the admiralties were authorized to increase the premium for service with the fleet to fifty guilders. The loan was immediately taken up because the two and a half per cent was guaranteed, but even with the higher premium no sailors came to man the ships. Such Dutch merchantmen as had sought refuge in foreign harbors were left to their own fate. They either sold their cargo as best they could and laid up to wait for the end of the war, or they were sold to a foreign firm, and henceforward sailed under a foreign flag.

The old love for privateering, once so strongly developed in the people along the coast, seemed to have died out. Few or no letters of marque were issued. In England, on the other hand, every town and village along the coast participated in the lucrative business of capturing Dutch ships. Within a few months more than five hundred British ships patrolled the North Sea, and they inspired such fear that no Dutch ship ventured to leave the Maas or the roads of Texel.

The Baltic trade was completely at a standstill. Where formerly thousands of Dutch ships had passed through the Sont, only eleven were reported

during the first year of the war. The blockade was so perfect that even the East and West India Companies could not get a single ship through. Some of their vessels had been taken; others received a timely warning, continued their way home along the north coast of Ireland and Scotland, and spent years in the Norwegian harbors where they had taken refuge. For the first time in more than a century and a half the East India Company could not hold its regular auctions of Indian products. Finally no more ships were sent from India, and the company's products lay rotting in her storehouses.

The East India Company could at least count itself happy that she lost none of her Asiatic possessions, for England was so busily engaged in its war for the supremacy in America that it had no ships available for conquests in India, where the uprising of Hyder Ali engaged all her military forces.

The West India Company, however, fared very badly. The larger part of the British fleet was assembled in the North and Central American waters. Immediately upon the declaration of war the British government had sent word to Sir George Rodney, who commanded in the Caribbean Sea, to proceed against the Dutch colonies. This order reached him in Barbados on the 27th of January, 1781. Three days later, Rodney with a fleet of eighteen vessels appeared before Port Royale on Martinique.

Here he left six vessels under Admiral Drake to watch the French squadron which lay in the harbor, well defended by the guns of a number of strong fortifications. With the rest of his fleet he continued his way.

Early on the morning of the 3d of February, the advance guard of the British fleet under Sir Samuel Hood arrived before the harbor of St. Eustatius. 42 Here the population knew of no war, and made ready to receive the unwelcome English guests with such courtesies as the occasion demanded. Hood, however, did not come on shore, but waited until the afternoon, when the rest of Rodney's fleet came up and surrounded the small island. In the harbor of St. Eustatius there was one Dutch manof-war, of thirty-six guns, commanded by Count Frederic van Bylandt, an officer of experience who had served under his namesake, Louis van Bylandt, at the encounter near the Isle of Wight. During the afternoon of the 3d, van Bylandt sent an officer to the English admiral to welcome him officially and offer his kind services. The English admiral then informed the Hollander that war had broken out between their respective countries and that the Island of St. Eustatius must be at once surrendered. The harbor was defended by an old fortress, called Fort Oranje. It did not have a single gun which could be fired, and was manned by a few old veterans, who were kept on the island as pensioners. Van Bylandt with his single ship made

an attempt at defense. He was immediately surrounded by half a dozen British ships, and before their superior number he was forced to surrender.

Without further trouble the English then took the island and all its belongings. It seems incredible that the West India Company should have so neglected the defense of this colony, which for many years had been a veritable gold mine to her. When Rodney took possession of St. Eustatius he found one hundred and fifty ships in its harbor. A great many of these were American vessels. The two thousand American sailors who manned them were taken prisoners. The storehouses which lined the harbor contained goods which were valued at not less than forty million guilders. They now passed into the possession of the English. Rodney kept the Dutch flag flying over the old fort. In this way during the next few weeks a number of ships, which were still unaware of what had happened, visited the harbor, without suspecting anything, and were promptly captured.

But that was not all. The British admiral upon landing learned that just twenty-four hours before his arrival, twenty-three Dutch ships, under the protection of a single war-vessel, had left St. Eustatius bound for home. He at once sent two of his largest ships in pursuit of them.

The Dutch vessels were sailing along in a leisurely way. They were easily overtaken by the English ships. The Dutch captain tried to defend himself. Unfortunately his ship had been constructed after a wrong plan, which made it impossible to use the lower batteries without at the same time swamping the ship. The Dutch commander was killed in the beginning of the battle, and before he had time to take off his dressing-gown and slippers. After forty minutes of fighting a number of men were dead or wounded, and the ship was sinking. The flag was hauled down. Of the twenty-three merchantmen, only one escaped. The others were brought back to St. Eustatius.⁴³

Such was the beginning of the war, and the end was no better. The Armed Neutrality, of which such great expectations had been cherished, proved to be utterly useless. Denmark and Sweden were inclined to help the Republic if Russia would promise to do the same. But Catherine had not the slightest desire to start a war for the benefit of the Estates who had only joined her coalition as a last refuge. She was willing to mediate between England and the Republic, but since the war had been begun before the Republic had actually joined the Armed Neutrality, she could not offer to do anything else. Thereupon Denmark and Sweden also expressed their unwillingness to interfere, and the Republic was left entirely to her own fate. France, which had forced her into this war, was much too occupied trying to save her own skin to pay any attention to the sufferings of the Republic.

More than a month after all these things had

happened (on the 5th of March, to be exact), the first Dutch ship, commanded by Captain de Roock, appeared in the West Indies to inform the Dutch colonists that a war between the mother country and England had broken out. All that Captain de Roock could do was to return home at once and inform the authorities that most of their American colonies had passed into the hands of the British at precisely the moment when he received his first orders to cross the ocean.

During the first six months of the war, nothing was done to repair the damage effected by England's first attacks. The fleet, which had been systematically neglected for almost a century, could not be repaired within a few months. There was no money, there was no wood, there was no management. The Prince was busy day and night and accomplished nothing. Orders were given one day and were revoked the next. The war was not in the least popular with the officers and the sailors, who feared that their ships were to act only as an auxiliary squadron to the French fleet. Under all sorts of pretexts, mostly on the ground of the inefficiency of the sailors and the poor condition of the ships, the officers refused to obey the orders to leave port. The Estates General kept up a continual complaint about the inactivity of the fleet, and clamored for a few good ships which could at least bring home the many Dutch ships now lying in near-by foreign ports. The suspension of the Baltic trade was felt

as a great blow, and from all sides it was demanded that something be done to protect the ships loaded with grain and wood bound for Russia and Sweden.

In April the Prince, in order to show his good intentions, went to Texel to confer with the commanders of the fleet on the best way in which to conduct the war and protect the Dutch trade. It was found that as yet nothing could be done. There were only eight small vessels capable of putting to sea. Not until May would there be enough ships to allow an action with a fair chance of success.

From all sides the blame was put upon the Stadholder. The large cities, with their population depending entirely upon trade for a living, suffered bitterly. Prices went up and ready money could hardly be obtained for less than ten or eleven per cent. In view of all this misery, why did not the Stadholder cause the fleet to leave port and bring home a few of the much-needed ships?

It was then that Amsterdam spoke a word in his defense. The Stadholder had to attend to so many things that he could not adequately perform his many tasks. Would it not be a good idea to appoint an advisory board to help His Highness in his labors? This plan, which Amsterdam now brought up in the meeting of the Estates of Holland, was by no means a new one. Many years before, Bentinck had suggested the institution of a responsible ministry to the Princess Anna. Ever since, the idea had been referred to from time to time. But it

was not in the nature of either Anna or of her son to allow others to help them. They were too suspicious. They preferred to leave numberless things undone rather than share the responsibility with some one else.

Nor was the plan carried out at this time. Instead of having a secretary of the navy or a board of advisers which would exercise such power, William was left to his own fate and such counsel as the Duke of Brunswick could give him. But the days of this adviser were numbered. The Duke had gradually lost the confidence of all parties because he had tried to keep the friendship of all. In the quarrel between Amsterdam and the Stadholder. he had not dared to advise the Prince to break Amsterdam's power for good and all, even at a temporary sacrifice of the internal peace of the country. He had allowed his chance to go by, and since Amsterdam had been victorious all along the line he could expect no clemency on her part. His removal became Part I of the programme of the campaign which was being waged against the Stadholder.

An approaching storm, either against a person or against an institution, was in those days always heralded by an increased activity on the part of the pamphleteers.⁴⁴ The Duke of Brunswick, once the best friend of the country, whose valuable services could not be well enough rewarded, now became an "undesirable citizen," "an alien," who through

his friendship for England had brought grave danger to the country which had done so well by him, and so on, through all the grades up to the most disgusting scandal. The accusations, however, did not disturb the Duke. Though he had hardly another friend left in the Republic, he could still count upon the loyalty of the Prince, who, against the wishes of his own wife (who had come to dislike the Duke most sincerely), supported his former guardian against all opposition. Even when Amsterdam in a solemn audience informed William that so long as the Duke of Brunswick should be his adviser, no amicable dealings between the Stadholder and the principal city of the land would be possible, the Prince did not give in. On the contrary, for once he lost his temper in righteous anger, sent the Amsterdam delegation about its business, and immediately told the Duke about all that had happened.

In the period which now followed the whole country became one large "debating society," with the subject of the debate: Resolved, that the Duke of Brunswick be dismissed as adviser of the Stadholder. Amsterdam started the discussion with a pamphlet which contained all the many accusations the town had brought before the Prince in support of her demand for the Duke's dismissal. The Duke then answered with a printed apology, in which he returned Amsterdam's compliments. Up and down the land the discussion, upon the truth or the lack

of truth of one or the other statement, raged with great violence.

The Prince, who for once in his life had shown gratitude to a man who had befriended him, now found himself between two fires. While the war with England continued and the country was continually getting into a worse economic position, the citizens were flying at one another's throats on the question as to what should happen to the German Duke who for the last twenty years by their own permission had pulled the strings of their political theatre. The Prince and the Duke tried to get an open reparation for Amsterdam's accusations in an investigation which they asked to be instituted in the Estates General. It was hoped that in that body the influence of the Prince upon the country provinces would be able to effect a decision in favor of the Duke and against Amsterdam. But it appeared that several of the most loyal provinces, even Friesland, where the ancestors of William had been stadholders since the beginning of the Republic, had experienced a change of heart.

The investigation started by the Estates General, which in the ordinary course of business had again been referred to the estates of the different provinces, threatened to be another defeat for the Stadholder. The Duke then recognized the futility of further struggle, and decided not to wait for a final decision. On the 24th of May, 1782, he left the Hague and went to Bois-le-Duc, where

he had command of the fortifications. There he remained for several years in the vague hope that a reaction might set in in favor of the Stadholder and himself.

Now, while all this dirty political linen was being washed as much in public as possible, what had become of the war? The war had almost been forgotten. Instead of fighting their enemies, the people preferred to fight their own Stadholder and to use the British merely as a convenient background. Indeed, the attack upon the Prince was so successful, with the scenery of blood and murder provided by the war, that many of the Stadholder's enemies prayed for a continuation of the conflict, in order that they might the better continue their fight against his power.

As a pleasant relief in these mean political squabbles, we must mention the arrival of the first American minister to the Republic, sent to replace Laurens, who still graced the Tower of London with his presence. John Adams, a graduate of Harvard College in 1775, later second President of the United States, arrived in the Republic in the year of our Lord 1781. There was considerable difficulty about his status, as only Friesland had as yet recognized the independence of the United States, the Estates General having so far failed to do this. But Adams, like the thirsty traveler who bothers not about registering, but at once makes for the room where good things are dispensed, took himself

immediately to Amsterdam, where the supposed fleshpots of the Republic were to be found, and started a new agitation for a large American loan. At first he was not successful. News of the capitulation of Charleston and the invasion of Georgia had just reached the Republic, and the cause of the colonists was not looked upon in quite so favorable a light as before. While the Dutch had completely lost their heads in their violent partisanships and their political quarrels, they were still unwilling to venture good money on bad securities.

Van der Capellen, who had just then inherited some money from his mother-in-law, was willing to risk a few thousand dollars. He also wrote to his friends and asked them to do the same. But their sentiments stopped where dividends began, and Adams had to wait until a year later, when a final turn in the affairs of the colonists, and the certainty that they would gain their independence and would be able to pay their lawful debts, convinced the Dutch business world that an American loan was no longer connected with an extraordinary peril.

More than once during the war did England try to influence the Republic to conclude a peace. The terms which she offered were acceptable, were, indeed, infinitely better than the weak Republic had any right to expect. But each time the British secret agent who was sent to Holland to suggest a cessation of hostilities met with failure. The

Regents continued to maintain a vague hope that France might come to her assistance.

William, now left entirely to his own devices, was still puttering away at the fleet. After endless debates, at last a small squadron was collected to protect the ships bound for the Baltic. On the 20th of July, 1781, this fleet of eight ships of twenty-four to twenty-six guns each, commanded by Zoutman, left Texel accompanying seventy-one merchantmen, who were bound for northern ports. On the 5th of August, on the Dogger Bank it met with an English fleet, protecting two hundred English traders which had just left the Baltic and which were now on their way home. The British, who were under command of Hyde Parker, had the same number of ships as the Dutch, but they were of much larger tonnage and carried from forty to eighty guns each. In the fight which now occurred the Dutch sailors conducted themselves with great valor and not without success. All the merchant vessels were able to escape. When evening came, both fleets were so disabled that neither could continue the fight another day. They made for the nearest ports. The Dutch had lost one hundred and forty-two men and one ship, and had four hundred and three men wounded. The English losses about equaled the Dutch, but none of their ships were lost. Zoutman's fight caused unprecedented joy in the Republic. In open battle his men had held their own against great odds. A wave of enthusiasm

spread over the country. It manifested itself in patriotic odes to the valiant shades of the ancestors, in gifts of swords and medals to the sailors who had actually taken part in the combat, and in an imposing funeral to those who had given their lives for their country. Even the Prince came in for some praise. Of practical results, however, the battle had none. The Dutch ships were in such a disabled condition that when, after almost two weeks, Zoutman finally reached Texel, it was evident that, for that year at least, the fleet could not again leave port. A very little glory was the sole consolation for the failure in getting the merchant fleet into the Baltic.⁴⁵

After a few weeks the natural reaction set in, and the heroes that had just been extolled to the sky were once more pulled to earth. By this time the Republic had met with difficulties from an entirely different quarter. While the commotion about the Duke of Brunswick's removal was in full swing, the Republic had been honored by a visit from Joseph II, Emperor of Austria. Joseph had just paid a visit of state to his Belgian provinces, and, under the incognito of Count Falckenstein, had made a little trip of inspection through the Republic. The Republic had invited him to watch the laundering of its political linen, and Joseph had speedily seen that from these United Provinces no peril on earth need be expected. Therefore, as soon as he returned home, he informed the Estates General that the

Barrière had ceased to exist. This Barrière consisted of a number of fortifications along the French frontier which, since the year 1715, had been occupied by Dutch troops in order to protect Holland against another French invasion. Their original purpose had almost been forgotten. At the present time, when the Republic and France were intimate friends, there was absolutely no occasion for these fortifications. They were badly garrisoned, their ramparts had been turned into cow pastures and bleacheries, and for the sake of economy they had been generally neglected for many years. Joseph considered the existence of these Dutch troops on Belgian soil an insult to the honor of his own private establishment. Accordingly he descended upon the fortifications, sent the Dutch troops home, razed the ramparts, and without a word of explanation declared the Barrière abolished. The Estates General, having no possible way of redress, had to bear the inevitable as best they could. They found some consolation in the fact that the Austrian Emperor had not at the same time decided to open the river Scheldt, an occurrence which they had great reason to fear at almost any moment.

About the rest of the English war, we can be very brief. Except for the encounter on the Dogger no event of importance happened on the high seas. The Dutch trade suffered terribly, while Hamburg, Bremen, and a number of Scandinavian cities profited by taking the places vacated by the Dutch

merchants. The friendship with France, for which such great sacrifices had been made, cost the Republic much and brought no profits. In September of the year 1782, plans were made for a common action of the French and the Dutch fleets. The Dutch fleet was to join the French one in Brest. But again the Dutch officers opposed this plan. Their fear that they would be commanded by a French admiral made them find a number of excuses to delay the departure of the expedition. Several of the best officers even asked for leave of absence for a prolonged period. The ships were never ready, the men were never trained, the weather was too stormy, or there was too little wind. In December the fleet was still in the roads of Texel. The combined action of the French and Dutch fleet never took place at all. This experience caused a good deal of resentment in France, which thereafter turned a deaf ear to the wishes of her incompetent Dutch friends and, in February of 1783, concluded peace with England without consulting the Republic.

Seven months later, England recognized the independence of the American colonies. The American adventure, entered upon partly out of hope for gain and partly out of sentiment, brought the Republic nothing but disappointment. On the 19th of April, 1782, the Estates General recognized Adams as minister from the United States of America. A Dutch minister was appointed for the United States. The first to hold this dignified office

was Pieter Johan van Berckel, brother of the Pensionaris of Amsterdam.

The ill-fated commercial treaty, the discovery of which had caused so much excitement and had been the immediate occasion of the English war, was officially ratified in October of 1782. Adams finally secured his loan of five million guilders, and left the Republic to proceed to Versailles as one of the American delegates for the negotiations of peace then going on between England and the colonies.

As for the commercial treaty, it did not in any way have the results which had been hoped for. The expectation that America would cease to trade with her former enemies, and would give preference to those nations of Europe who had supported her, proved to be wrong. The commerce between America and England went on after the war as it had gone on for centuries before. Amsterdam's money market continued to have great attraction for the Americans. But when the Dutch capitalists discovered that the new commonwealth possessed very curious notions about their obligations towards their creditors, they became very reluctant about granting new loans, and preferred to invest their money in such countries as did not continually threaten to annul their just debts.

On the 3d of September, 1783, peace between the United States and England was concluded. The Republic now enjoyed that honor which some of the extreme patriots had once wished for her. She was allowed to fight England all alone. As a matter of fact, she was allowed to pay for costs all around. Before she finally concluded peace with England, on the 20th of May, 1784, she had become involved in new troubles with her neighbor Joseph II.

In the fall of 1783, without any previous declaration of war, Austrian troops attacked and captured the Dutch fortifications at the mouth of the Scheldt and sent the Dutch troops home. An official protest on the part of the Estates General had no result, and Joseph prepared to open the Scheldt for general navigation. In the same month in which the Republic signed her peace with England, Joseph presented the Republic with a long list containing his wishes. It was discovered that the Austrian Emperor, who lived in full peace with the Republic, made far greater demands than the victorious English had done. Not only did he desire what practically amounted to opening the Scheldt, but he also wanted the town of Maastricht, a piece of Limburg, and a couple of millions of guilders. The only ground upon which most of these demands were based was the fact that Austria possessed an army with which she could enforce them and that the Republic was absolutely defenseless. Joseph was an idealist, but an idealist with a practical turn of mind.

In this precarious position the Republic was com-

pelled to look for help elsewhere. While Joseph was collecting forty thousand Austrian soldiers on the Dutch frontier, the Republic agreed to accept such terms as France offered in return for her friendship and good will. For the consideration of nine million guilders in cash, of which France promised to pay half, Joseph allowed himself to be bribed into giving up his many and varied claims.

A year after the conclusion of peace with England, the Republic signed the offensive and defensive treaty which bound her to France. In case of war she was bound to support France with a fleet of nine ships and six thousand men. France was to perform the same service with eighteen ships and eighteen thousand men.

The Regents and the democrats at last obtained what they had so ardently wished, that for which they had so energetically worked. The Stadholder, and such of his party as had through tradition supported England, had suffered a severe defeat. The policy of friendship with England, continued for almost two centuries, was now definitely given up. Henceforth the Republic, by its own free will, would share the destinies of the mighty French nation. She paid for this mistake with complete political annihilation, and with almost a century of stagnation, — a stagnation which only during the last generation has given way to a revival of the old intellectual and commercial activity.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PATRIOTS

In the previous pages we have briefly described the foreign affairs of the Republic during the years 1775 to 1784, and have mentioned such external events as led directly to the final destruction of her commerce and to the end of her pretensions to be counted as a political power of importance. We have also tried to make clear that from then on the only feeling which she inspired in her fellow nations was one of enthusiasm for her great and undiminished capacity as a money-lender. The essential facts in the rest of our history are very simple.

- 1. The Stadholder was incompetent.
- 2. During the years of the English war the Regents and all those who either on theoretical or practical grounds were opposed to the Stadholder combined into one party, which was called the party of the Patriots.
- 3. This party of opposition was so successful that at the end of the English war the power of the Stadholder, in the principal provinces at least, was virtually broken.
- 4. The Stadholder was obliged to leave the Hague and retire to one of the less important country provinces.

- 5. No sooner had he left than the heterogeneous parts of the Patriotic party flew at one another's throats on account of the division of the spoils.
- 6. They were therefore unable to resist the King of Prussia, whose armies by brute force reëstablished His Majesty's brother-in-law in all his former rights and prerogatives as hereditary stadholder.
- 7. This restoration was followed by the inevitable reaction.
- 8. The extreme left wing of the Patriotic party had by this time become so radical that the extreme right wing was forced to make common cause with the Stadholder.
- 9. Since the Stadholder had been willing to accept salvation from the hands of a foreign power, the Patriotic party felt no compunction about doing the same thing.
- 10. The Restoration, brought about by the Prussians, was followed by a Revolution, brought about by the French.

The facts are well known and their sequence is very simple. Our task is to relate what inspired these events and under what circumstances they took place. We must admit that this is no easy matter. Most of the participants in the events between 1780 and 1795 left no memoirs. They lived to see the evil days which befell their country as a result of their own lack of political sagacity, and they were not desirous that posterity should know exactly how they had brought about the ruin of

their fatherland. Their correspondence was either lost or was purposely destroyed. A few collections of letters exist. They have been excellently edited by the Dutch historical societies, but they do not tell us what we most wish to know.

There remain to us the contemporary newspapers and pamphlets. These two streams of information flow abundantly, but they are so far from pure and so polluted by strong feelings of partisanship that we have to distill and pasteurize their waters many times before we can derive any benefit from them.

William V lived in the Hague, and he lived well. The House of Orange had prospered since the days when the first stadholder took up his residence in Delft. The great William the Silent had camped out in the barren rooms of a confiscated cloister, and, heavily in debt, had often not known where to get the common supplies of the day. William V lived in royal style in the comfortable quarters of the Binnenhof in the Hague, and had too much to eat.

The House of Orange has always been singularly devoid of constructive qualities. Neither in state-craft nor in architecture have they ever erected anything new or lasting. Their labor on the internal politics of the Republic consisted of nothing but patchwork. They patched up such laws as they needed for their own interests at a particular moment, but they never undertook to reshape the

complicated and useless machinery of the Republic's government into a satisfactory form.

Neither did they ever feel any interest for buildings of a material sort — for houses made of brick and mortar. We are not aware that they ever constructed a single new palace or edifice of any sort. They preferred to occupy houses already existing and to patch them up until they were suitable for men of their high position.

The residence of William V in the Hague is a typical example. It was a collection of buildings of different styles and different periods. Small rooms had been made by putting partitions into large ones, and large rooms had been made by knocking down intervening walls. It was furnished after the style of the day. William shared the general lack of taste of his House, and kept whatever things of value he had in a separate museum. It is curious to reflect that at no point of their history did the Princes of Orange come into contact with that vast army of artists whose names stand to the outsider for the highest fame which our small country has ever reached.

Such works of art as the stadholders needed to furnish their palaces they ordered from abroad. Rembrandt knew little about the Stadholder under whom he lived the better part of his long life, except that he experienced great difficulty in getting the money which His Highness owed him. Such pictures as had at one time or the other come into

possession of the stadholders were sold wholesale by their descendants in the nineteenth century.

Besides a residence in the Hague, William V possessed several houses in capitals of the different provinces, notably in Nymegen, a town where his influence remained strong until the end of the Republic. He also maintained a number of summer residences. Of those the best known was the "Loo," situated in the Province of Gelderland. It had first come to fame in the days of William III, who had changed it from a simple hunting lodge into an inhabitable palace. In Leeuwarden the Prince owned the old palace of the stadholders.

The Stadholder usually lived in the Hague. The other provinces he visited only when his presence was absolutely necessary on account of some matter of internal government. The Hague was a pleasant little town, and before the Patriotic troubles began, William had been quite comfortable there. If he wanted to escape the noise of the city, never very great, he could drive out to the House in the Woods which belonged to him, and there completely separate himself from the outside world.

William, however, was no recluse. He liked to see people around him, but he liked to see them in his own way. William the Silent had been waited on by the soldiers of his guard, who at the same time performed the services of butlers and waiters. William V had a complete court. From the upper and the lower grooms of the chamber down to the

upper and lower cooks, all the grades of officialdom pertaining to a well-established court were represented. The lower officials were mostly foreigners. The higher ones were Hollanders, and belonged either to the old aristocracy or to such families as through long habit were considered worthy of being received at court. It is useless to give their names, as not one of them ever played any rôle in our history. They were ornamental but vapid. The Prince and his court rolled around each other like peas in a box. Of what happened outside of their little box, they knew nothing.

Social life as it exists in Anglo-Saxon countries has never been known in the Dutch Republic. In the Hague the foreign ambassadors kept up some sort of society, but the Hollanders took little part in it. Small talk did not come easy to their heavy minds. The court of the Stadholder was never a centre of gayety such as were the courts of the rulers in other countries. A few official balls and parties formed all the entertainment of the year. The people who were invited to those functions invariably belonged to the ultra-conservative, ultra-respectable, ultra-dull class of society.

Of the other layers of the extremely complex Dutch social world, not to speak of the men of commerce, the court of the Stadholder saw nothing. It was supposed that these people would not know how to eat with forks and would not possess dress clothes. The immediate surroundings of the Prince

were such that when the Baroness von Danckelmann, the old Prussian governess who had been sent to Holland by King Frederic to look after the interests of the Princess, once met a terribly dull individual wandering forlornly in the rooms of the Loo, she said to her companion, "Look at that man. He must be one of our friends."

The Stadholder was a very busy man. He had a number of secretaries to help him with his mail and his dispatches, but, as we have mentioned before, he loved to attend to all sorts of matters himself and was kept occupied many hours of the day with perfectly futile labors.

At noon, before dinner, he used to go out to inspect his life guard. William I had been so badly guarded that it was found an easy matter to murder him in his own house. William V, whom no earthly peril threatened, maintained a life guard, like every other well-conducted sovereign, and was greatly proud of it. He dearly loved to fuss about details in his men's uniforms—to change a button here and a cockade there.

The daily inspection of the life guard was one of the sights of the Hague, and collected all the distinguished strangers and the Orangist rabble of the Residence. After the inspection came dinner, which was a dull affair. A few persons of distinction, a visiting political delegation, or the clergyman who had preached that day were usually present. The Prince ate much and regularly fell asleep after his

meal. The rest of the day was spent with more work or a trip to the woods. In the evening people bored themselves at home.

There was a French opera in the Hague, but it was of inferior quality. Of music there was very little except an occasional performance by some foreign talent. A theatre where Dutch plays were given did not exist in the Hague. Not only had the stage always suffered from the continual attacks of the established church, but during this part of the eighteenth century the Dutch language was no longer considered fashionable in educated circles and people of quality never spoke it except with the servants. In polite society they spoke French. The governor of their children they addressed in German.

When the Prince was in one of the other provinces things went on very much the same. In every province there were a few families whom it was customary to invite to dinner, the heads of which usually received some honorary position at the court of the Prince. But here again the Stadholder never met anybody outside of his little circle, and was never in a position to learn the views of the men who made up the average workaday world.

The Princess enjoyed the respect of all those who knew her, but she did not possess a personality which inspired affection. She tried her best to gather round her husband men of some force and

character, but she never seemed able to attract the right ones. A certain haughtiness and stiffness in dealing with all who did not belong to her own small circle frightened away many useful people. In general, all who did not belong to their own clique were treated by the Stadholder's court with such arrogance that they preferred to stay at home rather than submit to gratuitous insult.

It is a sad fact in this sad history that there was not a single man among those immediately surrounding the Stadholder who by his talents or his character or his energy rose above mediocrity. The family of Bentinck, since the days of William III high in the favor of the House of Orange, tried to continue its rôle as close advisers of His Highness. Old Bentinck van Roon, who had offered his services to William IV and the Princess Anna, had received little gratitude for his trouble. He was dead now, and his grandson William Frederic Gustavus was trying to maintain his position as head of the Orangist party. But as the young man was terribly in debt, was of a very unbalanced and impetuous character, and possessed pronounced feudal notions about everything connected with politics, he was absolutely unfit for the rôle which he was called upon to play.

Another candidate for the leadership of the Stadholder's party was van Bleiswyk, the Raadpensionaris of Holland. The old gentleman, however, had so often made himself guilty of breaches of good faith, and had tried so hard to stay friends with everybody, that he was distrusted by all and useless as a leader.

When the civic troubles were at their worst, one of the younger leaders of the Patriotic party, a certain Pieter Paulus, appeared for a moment in the councils of the Princess and promised to play the rôle which a few years later Mirabeau might have played during the French Revolution. He was a man of more than ordinary ability, who saw that the course his party was then following was leading to disaster. He was for a time willing to try to bridge over the difficulties which separated the Stadholder from the Patriots. But nothing came of his negotiations with the Orangist party, and the Prussian restoration took place and spoiled all further plans.

So much for the leaders. Now let us see who were still adherents of the Prince and of the system which made him the first power in the land. As we have just said, there were in every province a number of noble families who through tradition and habit were partisans of the Princes of Orange. In the second place, there was the army and the navy. Officers and men had little to expect from the Regents, who hated them as a costly and unproductive institution. Their interest lay with the Prince, the only man who was likely to need them, and who therefore was willing to treat them well. But both the army and the navy were in such disreput-

able condition that their support at that moment meant next to nothing.

In the third place, we must mention the established clergy. Surrounded on all sides by other denominations who were excluded from the benefits which went to the established church, the clergy had always felt its strength to be in a close union with the Stadholder, the only power in the Republic who could support them against their enemies. In return for this support they obliged the stadholders by preaching among their flocks the well-known gospel of the obligations of the servant towards his master and of the duties of subjects to obey those whom it had pleased God to set up over them. When the days of evil came, they had at least the courage to stick to the party of the Prince. Of the very few people who defended the Stadholder at a time when such conduct was accompanied by risk to their persons and much annoyance to their families, many were clergymen.

The great strength of the Stadholder, however, lay in the lower classes of society. The masses, the men of the people, the common men, were usually too much occupied with the difficult immediate problem of how to make both ends meet to bother themselves with politics. Nobody cared about them and they did not mind that nobody cared. They no more expected a share in the government of their nation than at present the domestic cows in our pastures expect to be represented in the country's

parliament. They became conscious of the form of government under which they lived only when through a mistake of the ruling party their source of income momentarily ceased to flow. Upon such occasions they used to rise up in their might, usually influenced by a liberal amount of brandy supplied by those who wished to use them for their own ends, and used to run to the town hall and demand that a change in policy be made. Then having exercised sufficient pressure upon the government to bring about the desired change, and prosperity having once more returned, they were quite willing to resume their humble occupations and leave the difficult problem of government to their betters. Their immediate masters were the Regents. These were very strict masters and were never popular with their subjects.

Here is where the advantage of the Prince came in. He was to most people a sort of mythical person who lived far away in the Hague. His power they considered to be immense, since upon occasions he could even dismiss the almighty Regents. Since he was the one person who never did harm to common man and often benefited him, the masses felt instinctively that it was to their interest to support him. This they did until the end with great faithfulness. For their lack of political wisdom they made up by an excess of zeal. But left without guidance by William, their efforts on his behalf never achieved any success. And here endeth the

enumeration of those upon whom the Stadholder could count as his supporters: the army, the navy, the established clergy, and the mob were his party.

We must now consider the different elements of which the opposition, the Patriotic party, was composed. Here our task becomes vastly more difficult.

We must at once rid ourselves of any modern ideas about a party system. In former times, with stadholder and regents opposing each other, the country had been vaguely divided into two parties, one of which was in and the other of which was trying to get in. But neither party represented the people at large. During the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, the fight against the Stadholder was no longer made exclusively by those who wanted to possess for themselves what the Stadholder happened to have, but by numbers of parties and small groups of parties and individuals, all of whom had their own particular reason for wishing to have a hand in the government under which they lived.

In every separate province, in every different city, and even in some of the larger villages, we shall find individuals and small groups of individuals who are making opposition to the Stadholder at first and to the Regents later, inspired by the most varied of motives.

At the head of all this opposition, easily first by reason of her economic strength, stood the town of Amsterdam. Most of the other towns in Hol-



VIOLENT ENCOUNTER BETWEEN PATRIOTIC MILITIA AND CITIZENS IN ROTTERDAM ON APRIL 3, 1784

land, especially those in the northern part of the province, were in so many ways dependent upon Amsterdam that they could not well afford to oppose her in the meetings of the provincial estates. It was Amsterdam which had most of all been opposed to the traditional policy of friendship with England, which had been at the head of those who agitated for an alliance with France. It was Amsterdam which, on her own account, had entered upon negotiations with America before the Republic had recognized the independence of the United States.

In all matters of internal politics the government of the town acted with all the overbearing haughtiness of persons who are accustomed to buy their way in the world. In many ways the town was far ahead of the rest of the country. It felt annoyed because the other parts of the Republic did not keep up the pace, and without the slightest feeling for the common fatherland it simply went ahead and did not bother about its neighbors. If the others did not approve of Amsterdam's actions, so much the worse for the others. In the Estates of Holland, as well as in the Estates General, Amsterdam behaved in all matters as if it knew no other law than her own interests. Her spokesman was the Pensionaris of the town, van Berckel, a man who having made a failure of the law had made a success of marriage, and, owing to the large funds which his wife had put at his disposal and the protection of one of Amsterdam's mayors, had made an excellent career.

Towards the Stadholder the conduct of Amsterdam was often most insulting. In their direct dealings with the Prince, the Amsterdam Regents regularly used a tone which was overbearing and insolent.

The middle classes of Amsterdam were only gradually drawn into the opposition. They, like their fellow citizens elsewhere, had not the slightest influence upon the government under which they lived, which levied their taxes. They paid their money and obeyed the "lordships" who sat in the town hall. With the increasing interest in political life the middle classes began to form debating societies, and in their clubs discussed the many reasons for their discontent. Since the Stadholder showed no desire to champion their cause, they were quite naturally driven into the opposition, and there welcomed by the Regents, who were grateful for any allies in their war upon the Prince.

The fourth estate of Amsterdam, like the masses everywhere, was unreasonably pro-Stadholder. Time and again had they risen up from among their slums to defend their Prince, and in this way had incurred the displeasure of their lordships, who were severe masters and quick to decide who should swing outside of the windows of the municipal weighing house and who should be merely flogged.

During the days of the Patriotic troubles these

poor people remained faithful to the Prince. Having been first ordered about by the Regents, they were then for some time bullied by the Patriotic militia; and when the day of the restoration of the Stadholder came, they were allowed to knock in the windows of all those who had lorded it over them. Finally, the French Revolution upset the whole existing order of things, and the common people with all those fine gentlemen above them were put into Mr. Bonaparte's uniform and were given a chance to prove whether they could stand the Spanish or Russian climate better than their former masters did.

In Rotterdam, the second city of the land, conditions were slightly different. Rotterdam, by its very situation and the fact that it contained a numerous English and Scotch colony, has always been closely related to England. The town was not powerful enough to prevent the war with England and was with all the others drawn into the Patriotic movement. But its Regents never acted against the Stadholder with the personal bitterness which was assumed by their colleagues in Amsterdam.

Paulus, one of the Patriots who, as we have seen before, had endeavored to bring about an understanding between his party and the supporters of the Prince, lived in Rotterdam as the director of the Admiralty of the Maas. The middle class in Rotterdam was Patriotic. It read its Rousseau and discussed its Montesquieu and met in its Patriotic

clubs, and later on drilled and marched with great zeal for the glory and defense of civic liberty. The lower class was possessed of a most ardent love for the House of Orange, and if there was one place in the Republic where the Prince was more popular than among his own court, it was in the fish-market of the good town of Rotterdam.

The towns of Haarlem and Dordrecht presented very much the same sort of conditions. The top and the middle class were opposed to the Stadholder, the lower one was his friend. The smaller cities simply took their orders from the larger ones, and, except Delft, which had for a long time been the residence of the stadholders, they all united in an everincreasing spirit of opposition to everything good or bad which came from the side of the Stadholder. In the Province of Zeeland, the Prince as Marquis of Veere and Flushing always had maintained a certain influence. Unfortunately William was represented in the estates there by a man who was considerable of a fool. Among the Zeeland Regents, however, he was supported by a small but important party of able men. Hence the Patriotic middle classes in this province did not go hand in hand with the Regents. In the estates of the province three of the cities remained on the side of the Stadholder, and they, together with the representative of the Prince, outvoted the three other cities which took their orders from Holland and voted the Patriotic programme.

In the Province of Utrecht the opposition to the Stadholder was quite general. In this province the capital, the town of Utrecht, was the domineering force. Situated in the centre of the country, prosperous and with an excellent university, the people of Utrecht were perhaps a little better informed of the affairs of the day and took a more intelligent interest in them than their fellow countrymen. Since the year 1674, when Utrecht had been evacuated by the French and had entered the Union once more as conquered territory, the town had suffered under the infamous "Reglements" which William III, in his desire to establish his own power firmly, had forced upon the city and which made the Stadholder practically the master of the municipal government. Hence the Stadholder was a most unpopular official with all classes of society.

The next province, Gelderland, was divided into many different parties. Here the Stadholder had great influence in the cities, where he had the absolute right of appointment. In Gelderland, however, there was a large class of landed gentry, who were independent of the Stadholder and of the Regents alike. Under the leadership of the family of van der Capellen these men were among the very first to adopt the current modern ideas; therefore they were of the opposition to the Stadholder, whose power in their province they considered to be entirely too great. They were soon joined by the middle class of the cities, who suffered under the bad

appointments made by the Stadholder or his lieutenant.

Here we must note that only the cities where the court of the Stadholder used to reside regularly showed any affection for the Prince. Opposition to this rich dignitary, whose household ate more sugar and bread and used more candles and had more horses shod than anybody else, would have resulted in a direct loss to the pockets of the merchants of those cities, and we can hardly blame them for hooraying when the Prince once more returned to reside in their midst.

A large part of the population of Gelderland had remained faithful to the Catholic Church, and these people, like all the Protestant dissenters, were opposed to the Stadholder as the one power in the Republic which helped their enemies maintain the strict discrimination against all those who did not belong to the official church.

In Overysel the opposition to the Stadholder came chiefly from the larger cities and from several of the nobles. It was in the Estates of Overysel that our friend van der Capellen had first distinguished himself with his ardent speeches on behalf of the Americans. Through his family he belonged in Gelderland, but he had not been able to obtain a seat in the estates of that province. He had, therefore, taken a nominal residence in Overysel, and after a couple of years had been able to secure a seat in the estates of that province.

The province of Drenthe did not count. It was sparsely populated, very poor, and, though allowed to pay its share of the expenses of the Republic, it was never represented in the Estates General.

In Groningen the century-old quarrel between the country and the town was continued as before. The town, the centre of which was a liberal university with a large number of liberal professors, was Patriotic; the country districts were Orangist. The rustic element was, however, outvoted by the city people; and when William mixed himself in a university quarrel about the lack of orthodoxy of one of the Groningen professors and supported the dominies who were attacking the liberal teacher, his last prestige in the city disappeared.

Friesland was essentially an agricultural country. Its larger farmers were independent men with a share in the government, and with few exceptions they did not take kindly to the new notions of the Patriots. The Patriotic party, however, was well represented in the cities, and counted in its ranks some very capable and very energetic young men, who, following in general lines the democratic doctrines preached by van der Capellen and his friends, made violent opposition to the Prince.

The many Jews residing in the Republic were divided into two parties. The Spanish and Portuguese Jewish families were strongly aristocratic and on the side of the Prince. The others, in so far as

they took any interest in politics, adopted the most extreme modern views.

Now we are well aware that this short description is not so clear as we should wish it to be. But the problem is strangely complicated. During the years of the Patriotic troubles the most heterogeneous characters came to the surface of the agitated political sea, played their little rôle, and disappeared again. Respectable citizens, whose only interest had hitherto centred around their standing on the Exchange, were discovered to be publishing pamphlets written in a language of such violence as men expected to hear only in the lowest dives.

Clergymen, who for years had followed their pious calling to the general contentment of their devoted flock, suddenly gave up flock, wife, children, and reputation, and went about drilling shop clerks and barbers' apprentices in order that they might forcibly defend their Human Rights against a Tyrant's encroachments.

Regents, whose pride and arrogance had become proverbial, were seen hand in glove with members of the despised lower classes, and openly received men who a year before would not have been allowed to enter their houses except by the back doors.

All old standards, all former proportions, seem to have been temporarily lost sight of. Families connected with each other by years of the most intimate friendships suddenly ceased to be on speaking terms. Members of the same family attacked each other in the yellow press of their day with a fury hardly imaginable in the phlegmatic race to which they belonged.

Those who were the Opposition to-day were the Established Government of to-morrow and the Reactionaries of the day after. The Defender of Human Liberty of one week was the Tyrant who attacked Human Freedom the next. And so on, for fifteen whole years. For fifteen years the country represented a complete topsy-turvydom, of which it has never ceased to be ashamed.

The first part of the programme of the Patriotic party had consisted in a combined attack of all the discontented elements upon the Prince, as the one person responsible for the terrible failure of the Dutch fleet in the English war. As we have briefly mentioned in the last chapter, this attack, while directed against the Prince, had been more especially waged against the Duke of Brunswick. The Duke, unable to maintain himself against this onslaught from all sides, had been forced to leave the court of the Prince and had retired to Bois-le-Duc. This was the first great victory of the Opposition, and they were inordinately proud of it.

Under these circumstances it cannot astonish us that the Opposition and its leader, the town of Amsterdam, were greatly annoyed at a certain piece of news which was spread about in March of 1781. According to this bit of information a new pam-

phlet had just been published which in very severe terms attacked Amsterdam for her conduct just previous to the outbreak of the war with England. The story proved to be true. The pamphlet did exist, and was in such great demand that single copies of it were immediately traded for their weight in silver. Now if the author of this pamphlet had been the ordinary little penny-a-liner, Amsterdam would not have been greatly agitated by the news. But the attack came from no one less than the erstwhile "Infant Prodigy" of the University of Utrecht, Professor van Goens.

Rycklof Michiel van Goens belonged by birth to the governing class of the town of Utrecht. His mother was an Englishwoman, daughter of one of the officers of the Scottish brigade in the Hague. Her son had been educated half as a Hollander and half as an Englishman. By preference van Goens was English, and regretted that through his father he was bound to a country which lacked all appreciation of his many remarkable gifts.46 He spent his early youth in the pursuit of all the varied studies which were usually reserved for boys of an older age, and at seventeen was given a professorship in the University of Utrecht. He was hailed as the successor of Grotius, who also at the age when other boys learn to smoke their first pipes passed his leisure hours in writing Latin and Greek poetry.

At the age of eighteen, van Goens had developed into a hopeless neurasthenic and was teaching

history, classical antiquities, rhetoric, and Greek philology in the university of his native town. For ten years he taught men twice his age, and now in his twenty-eighth year had grown into an unbearable egotist. He had collected a famous library, had edited the works of many classical authors, and had received the worship and homage of all those who took an interest in literature. Then, by pure chance, he got into trouble with the clergy. A few years before he had incurred the anger of the orthodox brethren, on account of his defense of the "virtues of Socrates." Van Goens, in one of his books, had hinted at a possibility of Socrates having entered Paradise. This sentiment had given offense to some obscure theological scribe who, however, had been speedily subdued by the clever pen of the young Utrecht professor.

All this had occurred before the feelings of political partisanship had attained such great proportions in the daily life of all good citizens. With the increase of the sentiments of atheism and indifference towards the Church, there had been an increase in the violence with which the ultra-orthodox clergy defended their own principles. There was a revival of good, old-fashioned Calvinism, and at the head of this movement stood a certain Dominie Hofstede, a great friend of the Stadholder. In order to make propaganda for his ideas, Hofstede had founded a little paper and at the same time he had appointed himself Grand Inquisitor of the religious

feelings of all his fellow citizens. Such as were for any reason found to be lax in their beliefs were dragged by him into the court of justice of his little magazine, were there held up for public disapproval, and were punished according to their deserts. Van Goens had been on his list of "suspected persons" for a long time. As Professor of Greek, van Goens had to teach and explain the books of the New Testament, and their explanation has always been a subject of great concern to those opposed to all radical criticism.

Now it so happened that in the year 1776 van Goens translated a perfectly harmless booklet of a certain German rationalist, called Moses Mendelsohn. Furthermore, it so happened that this translation fell into the hands of Dominie Hofstede and greatly displeased the reverend gentleman. There were in the little pamphlet of only a few pages some remarks about Christ and the Gospels which smacked of a certain modern frivolity of expression. So the dominie sat himself down and wrote an article in which he admonished van Goens in a most fatherly way never to forget those wise lessons which he had received from his venerable parents.

But that was not all. From the highest pinnacle of his own righteousness Hofstede asked whether the proper respect for Moses and the prophets could be expected from a young man who so greatly revered the works of Voltaire, Diderot, and Hume. Now any other criticism would have been less

objectionable to van Goens than this fatherly epistle. He forgot all prudence and allowed himself to lose his temper. This is a fatal mistake in all disputes with the clergy. Van Goens soon discovered the truth of this statement. He became involved in an absurd dispute, and before he was thirty years old he had made himself impossible as a professor of the university, and had to offer his resignation.

Since he had spent most of his private fortune on his famous private library he had to look for some sort of occupation. Through the influence of the Stadholder, he got an office in the government of his native city, a position for which he was not in the least fitted and which he neglected from the beginning. Gradually he began to take an interest in the politics of his province. In all his ideas about a well-appointed government, van Goens was a strict conservative. The "authorities" meant to him everything. The rest of the people were there to obey and not to question.

When the unexpected happened, and the British were beaten by the Americans, van Goens, who as we have mentioned before considered himself half an Englishman, was very angry, and his anger directed itself against the first persons whom he could connect with the cause of his annoyance. Amsterdam's secret negotiations with America had just then been discovered, and from that moment on Amsterdam meant to van Goens the incarnation

of all those forces the influence of which he thought most pernicious for the weal of the country.

As we have also seen before, Amsterdam was not punished for her conduct, but emerged from the affair into which she had driven the country with a nimbus of Patriotic glory. She even went so far as to hire a professional writer, a certain Calkoen, to compose a defense of her actions.

This was too much for the excitable ex-professor. He set to work and wrote what, among the thousands of pamphlets of this time, is almost the only readable one. He did not intend to inform the vulgar crowd of his sentiments and wrote only for the benefit of his equals. In order to keep his literary product from being read by the crowd in the street, he put the price of it at ten guilders. But the demand immediately surpassed the supply, and there was a sudden boom of the pamphlet which drove the price up to quite an unheard-of height. Several new editions appeared in quick succession. A French translation brought the pamphlet within the understanding of the diplomatic corps in the Hague.⁴⁷

For those lazy readers to whom the three hundred and thirty-six pages were too much of an undertaking, a shorter, abbreviated edition was issued. The first edition of the pamphlet is of the year 1781, dated March 11. The name of the author is not given, but only his picture in vignette.

About the contents we can be brief. Van Goens

first gives a short review of the internal and external politics of the Republic, and carefully describes the attitude of Amsterdam in connection with all these historical events. He comes to the final conclusion that at all times and under all circumstances Amsterdam has worked only for her own interests. The events leading up to the last English war are briefly mentioned. Commodore Jones does not have an admirer in Professor van Goens, but is merely a "Scotchman who has escaped his own fatherland after he has murdered a fellow sailor and then has entered the service of the American rebels." Finally, the author blames Amsterdam directly for all the misery into which the country has been plunged, and for the disastrous break with the best friend of the Republic, which break, according to him, was only brought about by Amsterdam in the hope of increasing her own revenues.

The storm which van Goens called forth by the publication of this pamphlet was terrific, and he himself was to perish in it. He discovered at once that he stood all alone. The friends of the Prince did not dare to come to the support of a man who was personally very unpopular and who had already incurred the displeasure of the clergy. The Stadholder himself, in whose defense the publication had been undertaken, was more embarrassed than pleased. The Duke of Brunswick, who had his own difficulties with Amsterdam, did not advise him to encourage van Goens openly.

On the other hand, the town of Amsterdam at once prepared for the defense. Within three months six different pamphlets appeared which defended her conduct and attacked the libelous accusations of van Goens. They also published a good deal of information about the personal character and habits of the former professor, which delighted the reading public of that day and at the same time spoiled van Goen's chance to act as the apostle of a new school of righteousness.

Embittered by this attack and the neglect of the Stadholder, van Goens at first showed little desire to write an answer. Then, after a period of four months, he had a sudden inspiration, and within a few hours composed a satire on the conditions in the Republic which, like his other publication, stands forth from among the mass of rubbish which at that time was turned out of the printing-shops.⁴⁸

In July of the same year, just at the moment when the Prince was again being attacked from all sides, there appeared a booklet which had as title: "Seven villages in flames through the Imprudence of the Sheriff and a Secretary, or History of the Doughnuts. A Story of day before yesterday translated from the Malayan language by C. P. L. P. Printed in the Castle of Batavia." The initials C. P. L. P. meant "Constant pour la Patrie," and the pamphlet was printed in Utrecht.

In thirty-two pages van Goens describes the complicated history of the "Seven Villages" (the

seven provinces) which belong to one "Lord" (the Stadholder). One of the villages (Amsterdam) was almost as important as all the others together, and was therefore feared and respected by the other six. Gradually the inhabitants of this big village grew insupportably arrogant, and at the same time so careless that more than once they almost set their own village and the other six on fire.

The "Lord" of the combined seven was a kindhearted old soul, who lived in peace with all his subjects except the inhabitants of the "Big Village," who hated him as much as they were indifferent to the interests of their people in the other villages. Unable to counteract this hatred, the "Lord" at least tried to defend his other subjects against the haughtiness of their neighbors in the "Big Village."

Now, as he felt certain that some day or other the "Big Village" by its thoughtlessness would start a conflagration among all his possessions, the "Lord" advised the buying of a good fire engine (the fleet). But the inhabitants of the "Big Village" thought this was absolutely unnecessary. In case of fire, they said, they themselves would see to it that nothing happened. They needed no fire engines. In this way nothing was done, and as the "Lord" did not have the power to enforce his will, no fire engine was bought. Of course, in the end a fire did occur. The inhabitants of the "Big Village" were very proud of their great services towards the community. They often pointed with pride to the

many times when they had enabled fellow members to do a good piece of business. But they forgot to mention that upon such occasions they themselves had always made the greatest profits. For example, when their baker found that he had too large a store of flour he would give a great feast. All the people of the community would come and eat cakes, but in the end they had to pay for those cakes the baker was rid of his superfluous flour and he had made a neat little profit into the bargain. In the same way one day an oil dealer found that he possessed more barrels of oil than he knew what to do with and planned to treat all the people with doughnuts, fried in oil. It was to be a great feast, and everybody was to be happy (this has reference to the benefits which were to accrue from the secret American treaty).

Then the unexpected thing happened. The oil caught fire (it was rapeseed oil), and before the inhabitants of the "Big Village" knew what had happened, one half of their village had burned down. The old fire engines, which they had neglected for years, failed to work, and the fields of the other villages caught fire, too.

The "Lord" of the villages came and wanted to know what had happened. But the guilty parties excused themselves by saying that they had only tried to arrange a little celebration for the benefit of all the subjects of His Lordship. Then, quite accidentally, a fire had broken out, and it was found that there was no efficient extinguishing material to stop the conflagration. "Who," so the people of the "Big Village" asked, "was responsible for the fire-fighting apparatus? Who else but His Lordship?" "And would he please tell them why he had neglected the fire department for so many years?"

Of course in the end nobody would listen to the "Lord," who could deliver positive proof that he himself was the one person who had always agitated for the institution of a better fire department, and everybody blamed the Master for his carelessness, while they were deeply grateful to the kind people of the "Big Village," who were now reaping such ingratitude for their efforts to give the whole of the community a "good time."

Van Goen's witticism was immediately imitated by a number of penny-a-liners.⁴⁹ His "Seven Villages" served as a pattern for a number of allegories of a similar nature. His own pamphlet was ridiculed in many ways and translated into miserable poetry. Soon the rabble in the street sang his story to the music of popular airs. And still there came no one to support him, and the Stadholder, the kindhearted "Lord" of the many villages, paid no attention to the embittered individual who was fighting his fight for him.

On the contrary, van Goens began to be attacked in caricature as well as in pamphlet. The art of the political cartoon had been highly developed in the

Republic at an early date, and no event of importance took place in the eighteenth century of which we do not possess some cartoons often from the hands of the very best draughtsmen. Like everything else of the eighteenth century the cartooning is of a vastly inferior sort. Every vestige of art seems absent from the pictures, and they appear to the twentieth-century student just mere vulgarities and indecencies.

Having by this time successfully established himself as the most hated individual in the Republic, van Goens decided to go one step further. In August of the year 1781 he started a newspaper. No one in the Republic had as yet dared to start an Orangist paper. The enterprise in this line of work had all been on the side of the Opposition. Van Goens managed to get together the small capital necessary to start his undertaking and began printing the "Old-Fashioned Dutch Patriot." Among its many contemporaries it was the only paper with some literary merit. But, alas! — nobody wanted to read it.

While one of the worst Patriotic papers, the "Post of the Lower Rhine," within a very short time brought its list of subscribers up to more than twenty-four thousand, van Goens had to content himself with only seven hundred subscribers, and did not make enough to pay for the paper and the printing.

And no wonder. For van Goens not only at-

tacked Amsterdam, but also made bitter warfare upon the "stupid masses who are incapable of any ideas about government, whose opinions on political matters are only ridiculous, and who should be content to leave the business of government to those who for uncountable centuries have occupied themselves with that difficult task." These were not exactly sentiments which made a man a popular hero in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

After a few months, van Goens, whose temper had not improved under his many tribulations, got into a quarrel with his associate editor and the paper was suspended. The news of its decease was received with great joy. Mock funerals were arranged, and the population was invited to attend the solemn obsequies which were to take place at the nearest dog-cemetery.

These explosions of highly vulgar wit incensed the professor to such an extent that he actually recommenced publishing his paper. But all his trouble was of no avail. Gradually he lost even his last subscribers, and after a year the "Old-Fashioned Dutch Patriot" definitely ceased to appear.

And here we say farewell to its publisher. Without the encouragement of the Stadholder, who did not dare to support him openly, and deserted by the members of his own class, who resented his attack upon their fellow Regents in Amsterdam, a subject of ridicule to the boys in the gutter, van Goens could not maintain himself even in his own city.

At the age of thirty-six he left his native country and as a voluntary exile went to live in Switzerland. Only from the English government did van Goens receive some recognition of his services. England proposed to make him her representative with the Swiss cantons. Van Goens, therefore, asked the Stadholder to release him from the oath of fidelity which he had sworn when he entered the Utrecht government. The Stadholder, however, did not answer this letter until it was so late that van Goens had lost all chance of receiving the position. His Highness afterwards regretted that he had not been able to answer sooner, but Mr. van Goens's letter had been "accidentally mislaid." In 1810, van Goens died in Wernigerode, where he had gone to live as the pensioner of Prince Christian Frederic of Stolberg-Wernigerode.

The autumn of 1781 was the most disastrous time of the war with England. There was a complete stagnation in business, taxes were high, and money was scarce. Everybody was as gloomy as the clouded skies which hung above them. No progress was being made with the equipment of the fleet. The general opinion prevailed that the Prince was purposely delaying matters because he was still opposed to the policy which had driven his country into war with the friendly court of St. James.

Just in the middle of this period of despondency, on the night of the 25th of September, a little pamphlet was spread through the streets of the most important cities of the Republic which in its violence and passion surpassed everything that had so far appeared.⁵⁰ It was a little booklet of seventy-six pages, and was addressed "To the People of the Netherlands." It was dated "Ostend, 3d September, 1781." The names of the author and the publisher were unknown, and remained a secret for more than a century.

This pamphlet soon achieved a fame out of all proportion to its real merits. At last somebody had put into print what very many people vaguely felt to be the truth without being able to give a precise expression to their feelings. The author, whoever he was, fully expected to be prosecuted for his work. At least, so he said in his preface, in which he made some disagreeable remarks about the "high authorities who do not like to hear the truth about themselves." It was soon proved that the author had been right in his premonitions.

The estates, however much they disliked the Stadholder, could not possibly approve of anonymous articles which some fine morning might be found on their own doorsteps, and which might be directed against themselves. They therefore decided to try to put a stop to the zeal of the pamphleteers by offering an enormous reward for the discovery of the culprit. The estates of one province after the other offered hundreds of ducats for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the author or publisher. Even the slow-moving

Estates General took an interest in the matter, and offered a thousand ducats for the discovery of the guilty parties. As they supposed that the booklet had been the work of a number of people, they offered full indemnity to any one of them who would betray his fellow conspirators. No less a punishment than exile for life and a fine of six thousand ducats was to be inflicted upon the authors. Those who offered the pamphlet for sale ran the risk of a similar punishment. After a few weeks the mere possession of the pamphlet became a high offense. Nevertheless it was read in every home, and the copies which fell into the hands of the executioner (to be burned solemnly by him) were very few.

All these draconic laws issued against this poor sheet of paper served as such excellent advertiscment that the pamphlet was at once translated into a number of foreign languages and appeared altogether in seven editions.

No one less than Mirabeau was mentioned as its author. The real author, however, was far less famous. It was our old friend van der Capellen. He had been ably assisted by several people, one of whom was soon to achieve remarkable notoriety. This was the Rev. Francis Adrian van der Kemp, a typical product of this extraordinary time.⁵¹ He belonged to an old family of clergymen and was born in Kampen, one of the strongholds of Dutch orthodoxy. At the age of eighteen he was sent to

the University of Groningen, a strong Calvinistic centre. Here for the first time he left the narrow path of orthodox righteousness.

There happened to be in Groningen at that time a professor of jurisprudence, called van der Marck, who since 1758 had been peacefully lecturing on his particular subject. In 1771, among other subjects, he taught his students about the "Jus Naturale" and held discourse on the original and general depravity of the human race. His remarks shocked some of the clergy of the town of Groningen, and they accused him of maintaining unsound doctrines. They lodged an official complaint with the senate of the university. The senate asked the professor what he had to say for himself. The professor defended his views in two pamphlets. The clergy and the senate declared that they were not satisfied with his answer. Before anybody knew it. politics had been dragged into the affair, and the right and wrong of the question became a matter of dispute for the whole country. Hofstede, the selfappointed Grand Inquisitor of all unorthodoxy, the same one who afterwards attacked van Goens, had used all his influence to induce the Stadholder, who was one of the curators of the university, to support the clergy. This meant, of course, that all the enemies of the Stadholder rushed to the succor of the professor. The clergy, however, were victorious. With the help of the powerful curator, they forced van der Marck to resign. As a reward for his many

years of faithful service, van der Marck was curtly dismissed, was forbidden to partake of the Holy Communion, and was almost lynched by the pious brethren of the congregation, who whenever they visited their tabernacle were violently incited against this enemy of their sacred religion. In order to escape bodily harm, the ex-professor was obliged to leave the country and went to live in Germany, until in 1795 the Revolution occurred, and he was recalled to his old office.

This whole episode had taken place while van der Kemp was studying at the university, and it had disgusted him greatly. Gradually he had drifted away from the church of his fathers and had joined the Baptists, which of all the Dutch sects had produced a proportionally very large number of liberal men who had maintained a high degree of culture among their clergy.

In 1776, van der Kemp was appointed minister in a small village near Amsterdam. Soon his abilities were recognized, and he was called to Leyden, where there was a prosperous Baptist congregation. Here he at once threw himself into active political life. A few months after he had accepted his new call, the pulpit only served him as a suitable place from which to promulgate his political views. He preached the rights of the people, and violently fulminated against the Rehabeam in the Stadholder's palace in the Hague.

The noise which he made was so loud and insist-

ent that he drew upon himself the attention of many of the other rising political lights, and met with the ordinary fate of being made one of van der Capellen's regular correspondents. As he was a man of great impetuosity and loved adventure, van der Capellen had elected him as the person who should do the dangerous work in connection with the publication of the famous pamphlet, "To the People of the Netherlands," and he was chosen to distribute it. The pamphlet itself, in the customary superficial way of that day, gave a general account of Dutch history from the earliest times, with special reference to the rôle played by the Princes of Orange. Van der Capellen began his history at the beginning of things, and laid the foundations for his country's history among the old Batavians (of whom at that time very little was known with any exactness). Oh, glorious Batavians, who lived like free men in a natural way and governed themselves by the will of all the people convened in popular assembly! In this assembly each man appeared, as behooved his sovereign and independent condition. "fully armed." Would their descendants, the Patriots, kindly take notice of this fact?

Then, by way of Charlemagne, under whom the people still maintained part of their old rights through their guilds and their militia, the author brings us to the time of Charles V. Under his son the real misery began. Son Philip tried to destroy the last vestige of the people's liberty by his Inqui-

sition, and in this way started a revolution. In this revolution the people received notable services from a certain German prince, William, Count of Nassau, who, however, did not help them from purely disinterested motives, but because by so doing he could obtain for himself and his house a good position as Count of Holland. Pure chance prevented this plan from being carried out, for William was murdered. His successor as pretender to this high office, Prince Maurice, was a terrible tyrant. The country is near perdition, when it is saved by Oldenbarneveldt. In return for his services Oldenbarneveldt is decapitated. A gratuitous slap at English perfidy follows, based upon the unfortunate experiences of the episode with Leicester.

Next comes Frederic Henry, despot and tyrant, who succeeds by his intrigues in robbing his cousin William Frederic of the stadholdership of Groningen and Drenthe. Driven by ambition, he marries his son to the daughter of the King of England. This son, William II, who, it is quite true, had a short but most turbulent career, is the bugaboo of the author. Only the interference of Divine Providence saved the country from this monster before worse harm had been done. At this point, à propos of Mr. Oliver Cromwell, is made a little digression into the dangers which threaten a country through the presence of hired mercenary troops. "Have a care," so the author sounds his note of warning, "that the command over your troops remain

within your own hands. The country, the whole community, belongs to the whole people and not to a single prince and his few partisans."

It is interesting to note the author's conception of the theory of government. According to him, a state is a stock company, in no way different from some East India Trading Company. In their own interest the stockholders have appointed a president and a board of directors. All these officials, however, are there solely for the benefit of the stockholders, and not vice versa.

After William II, we come to the time of de Witt, and read an apotheosis of the time of this great statesman. Intrigues of the House of Orange and discontent of the people because the Regents have become too powerful bring about the appointment of William III.

With France, which had been our best friend and had helped us in our struggle for independence, and had been betrayed by us when in 1648 we concluded a separate peace with Spain, — with this good and noble France, the Republic now begins a war. The history of the war is reviewed, and people are reminded how when the war was over the government in the provinces which the French had just evacuated was usurped by William III. When this Prince died, the country was in the greatest misery.

Here we have a short intermission while our attention is directed towards the country across the Atlantic. Only in the independent thirteen states of the United States and in a few cantons of Switzerland can real virtue flourish. In those countries each member of the community who wishes to occupy a high office can do so only upon the condition that he will first gain the good will of his neighbors and his fellow citizens by his continued kindness and his thoughtfulness, and after he has shown by his acts that he desires to increase the prosperity of the country and defend its liberty. In the Dutch Republic, however, things are done along very different lines. In order to get ahead, you must first of all curry favor with the Stadholder, and when by flattering this official you have made yourself agreeable to him, you can be sure of a splendid career.

The historical review is resumed with a short account of the reign of William IV. Among the many complaints which the author makes against this prince, he gives prominence to the statement that William suppressed the customary poaching on his private grounds in order to prevent people from becoming acquainted with the use of firearms. The widow of William IV was an English princess, and that fact suffices to prove to us that she was at heart an enemy of her adopted country.

When it finally pleased the Lord to deliver the country from this Jezebel, the Republic falls into the hands of the Duke of Brunswick, who was hired to look after the interests of the House of Orange, but not after those of the country as a whole. The

whole sad period of William's years of government is then reviewed. The episode in which the Baron van der Capellen acted as the upholder of human rights and distinguished himself defending the cause of the Americans is given due prominence.

Finally, the pamphlet ends with a general apotheosis, in which William V is invited to appear before the throne of God and there defend himself against a series of accusations which alone occupy six whole pages. After which the scenery is once more removed from heaven to earth, and the honored public is respectfully but most earnestly invited to arm itself, to elect from its midst persons who, as extraordinary delegates to the Estates, will help them to save the country from the terrible predicament in which it finds itself solely through the culpable negligence of the Stadholder.

This booklet, with its mixture of fact and fancy and its unreasoning attack upon everything connected with the House of Orange, unfortunately became a sort of first primer of the philosophy of government to many people who were trying to understand the political agitation going on around them. Many derived their only notions about a system of popular representation and about a civic militia from this crude little volume. It seems no wonder that the whole reform movement of that day ended in an awful bungle, when we consider in what way public opinion was enlightened and from what sources the people learned their first lessons

about the new theories of government which were then being discussed all over Europe.

The propaganda for the new doctrines now also entered a field in which it had no business at all. It was dragged into the Church. The pulpit as a place from which to spread political wisdom has rarely been a success. In the Republic, where Church and State were tied firmly together, the clergy from time immemorial had used their sermons to favor their congregations with their opinions upon the affairs of the day. The many days of prayer or thanksgiving which were ordered upon all conceivable occasions offered the clergy an excellent chance either to upbraid or praise their flocks and to comment upon the daily affairs of the country. In these days of great excitement the church became a place where public questions were vigorously debated and public sentiment was stirred up by the very persons who should have tried to calm the excited feelings of the souls within their care.

Van der Kemp made himself famous for the ardor with which he preached his political convictions. All sorts of conceivable texts served to prove the wickedness of the existing form of government. The One Hundred and Ninth Psalm was the favorite hymn. The story in I Samuel viii of the terrible time the Hebrews experienced, when Jehovah granted their desire and furnished them with a king, was made applicable to the Republic and its tyrannical stadholder.

As yet nobody dared to touch the fundamental truth of the Holy Scriptures, but the congregation was also admonished to supplement its pious meditations by a perusal of the works of Locke and Hume. In this way they would not only become better Christians, but they would also learn to be more conscious of their rights and would know how to defend them if ever occasion demanded.

But pamphlets and sermons and coffee-house debates did not satisfy the desire of the people to discuss the affairs of the day. They demanded more immediate information, and got it in a series of newspapers, which like the proverbial mushrooms sprang from the soil in one night and disappeared in another. The general disorganization caused by the war had brought about a weakening in the strict supervision of the press. In times of peace their Lordships who resided at the town hall kept strict watch that no undesirable news item should appear in the few papers which were being printed within their walls. Exorbitant fines and a constant threat of exile kept the editors and printers within bounds. But now, when the country was blockaded and deprived of its ordinary sources of income, while taxes were unusually high and were being levied on every necessity of life, now that the whole country was in a turmoil and everybody was talking and nobody listening, it was very difficult to enforce the former strict laws about the printing of objectionable news items. Under these favorable

circumstances the newspapers were beginning to discuss the affairs of the day in "editorials."

Formerly the paper had printed a miscellaneous collection of information, without much order and without any commentary. The journalist was earnestly requested not to benefit his readers with his own personal opinion. But since everybody had become interested in politics, the editor was allowed to throw light upon some specially important subject and to guide the first steps of his readers upon the slippery road of politics.

In other days the Dutch newspapers had been very welcome abroad, on account of their excellent system of news-gathering and their speed in handling commercial and shipping items, and the new invention of the editorial was by no means popular beyond the confines of the Republic. For the editors did not hesitate to express their opinions about foreign potentates quite as freely as they did about the authorities at home. The result was that the Estates General were frequently presented with a number of newspaper clippings, cut from one of the Patriotic papers and accompanied by the indignant complaints of some foreign ambassador or minister, who asked that immediate punishment be inflicted upon the offending editor.

Punishing newspapers has always been an ungrateful task for all governments, and the Estates General hesitated a long time before they took any notice of requests, either foreign or domestic, that

they bridle the journalistic zeal of some of their fellow subjects. In 1782, however, it came to a distinct clash between the Dutch authorities and one of the papers.

The most widely circulated paper on the side of the Patriots was the "Post of the Lower Rhine." It had begun to be published at the beginning of the war with England and had soon outclassed all its competitors in popularity. It was printed in Utrecht and its editor was a certain 't Hoen. At one period of his career this young man had been a student, but he had given up the university to follow the literary profession. He specialized on books for children, and in this mild profession he achieved some small fame. After a good many adventures he had at the age of thirty-six become the editor of the "Post of the Lower Rhine," published by a bookseller named Paddenberg.

Mr. 't Hoen had a number of assistants. Of those the best known was a very young man with the rather extraordinary name of Quint Ondaatje. 52 He was the son of pious parents and the descendant of innumerable generations of ministers of the Gospel in the Island of Ceylon (then a Dutch possession). His presence in Utrecht was explained by the fact that he, too, had been destined to enter the ministry and had been sent to Utrecht to study theology. Being possessed of strong enthusiasm for all those things which did not pertain to his special study, he had speedily drifted into politics,

and was now enjoying that enviable position which young men of good family enjoy in our own day when they take to the stump on behalf of socialism.

A little shouting would go a great way in those days, and Ondaatje, at an age when most young men get stage fright if they have to speak in meetings of their local athletic clubs, enjoyed great popularity as a political orator.

Besides this noisy youth, Mr. 't Hoen was helped in his journalistic labors by a score of very ponderous and dignified gentlemen who were quite willing to supply him with information derogatory to the character of the Stadholder, provided their names should not be used. These were the Regents of Amsterdam and several other cities who provided the ammunition with which the "Post of the Lower Rhine" bombarded His Highness. The smallest and most futile question in a village of which nobody had ever heard the name was considered worthy of front-page notoriety, provided the Prince of Orange could be blamed for something either one way or the other. The appointment of a municipal dry nurse somewhere in the backwoods was considered news, if that useful functionary should happen to be known as a friend of the House of Orange and if her defeated rival for the honorable position was an adherent of the Patriots.

The "Post of the Lower Rhine" had already discovered the fundamental truth that the majority of the public, even the most respectable majority,

dearly loves to read a scandal, and it was making the most of this knowledge. In a very entertaining and gossipy way it dished up all sorts of absurd stories about the Stadholder, and by so doing pleased its patrons and increased its own popularity. This went on gayly for about a year, when things became so bad that the authorities at the Hague considered it necessary to take steps to put an end to the infamous sheet. In the spring of 1782, the Stadholder sent a formal note of protest to the town of Utrecht, asking the very high and very noble members of the council how they could allow within their gates the publication of a sheet which week after week printed the most infamous articles about the Prince, his family, and his friends.

The very high and very noble members of the council answered that they were not familiar with the news printed in this particular paper, and that up to that moment they had heard no complaints about its printing any stories which did harm to the true interests of the country. They were willing, however, to consider the matter, and they asked Mr. Paddenberg to pay them a visit at the town hall to tell them all about his paper.

Mr. Paddenberg came, and said that he was not aware of ever having printed anything opposed to the best interests of the Republic. He also hinted that if he were not allowed to publish his paper within the walls of Utrecht, he would pack up his business and would move to another town, which

would then derive the profits which now came to Utrecht.

When the Stadholder was informed of these proceedings, he was highly indignant. Since his energy never backed up his anger, however, he merely issued a statement saying that he would not commence a judicial action if the publisher promised to leave him and his family out of further discussions.

The publisher regretted that his unselfish devotion to the true interests of his fatherland met with so little gratitude. He calmly went on publishing scandalous stories about the Prince. The town council, afraid of losing a prosperous printing establishment, supported their fellow citizen.

The end of the story was that the Prince actually ordered suit to be brought against the offending paper, and that the court, after a formal investigation of the charges, declared the publisher and the editor "not guilty."

The public loudly applauded the acquittal, the paper continued to be conducted as it had been before the trial, and the relations between the Stadholder and the town of Utrecht became worse than ever.⁵³

The thing which surprises us is that the Prince's advisers ever allowed him to commence such an action. In case of a sentence, they would receive an odious reputation as opponents of the freedom of the press. In case of acquittal, they would look ridiculous and lose what little prestige they had left.

Either the Stadholder should have proceeded in such a way that he was sure of a sentence and a fine or he should have left the whole thing alone. How little good these halfway measures did was shown when within a very short time afterwards a number of pamphlets surpassing in vileness all that had gone before made their anonymous appearance. Ere long the murder of tyrants was preached as the noblest of virtues, and the wish was openly pronounced that a second Brutus might make an end to the career of this enemy of liberty. Neither heavy fines nor the threats of the King of Prussia, who disliked to see his immediate family dragged through the mud, did the slightest good.⁵⁴

It was in this same year that the democratic wing of the Patriotic party gained what to them was a great victory. Their unofficial leader had had for a long time troubles of his own in the estates of his province. There existed in Overysel a remnant of a certain sort of feudal services. Each year the tenants on the large estates were obliged to render to their landlords certain personal services. 55 For a trifling sum the tenant could buy himself off, and generally the service was not felt as a great burden. Van der Capellen, however, had attacked the existence of these "corvées" with great violence, and the language he had used upon this occasion, as well as upon the occasion of his speech against the King of England, had so thoroughly shocked his dignified fellow members that they had

suspended him from attending further meetings of the estates. He had been trying ever since to get reinstated, but the discovery of his letters among the papers of Laurens had again delayed his chances.

But since the English war had brought about a free-for-all fight against the Stadholder, the family and friends of van der Capellen had exerted themselves to the utmost to get the verdict of expulsion repealed; and not without success. In November of 1782, the Baron was once more admitted to the meetings of the estates, and with his popularity increased by the halo of martyrdom he resumed at once the rôle of friend of the exponents of all sorts of liberty.

The Opposition, under the pressure of circumstances, had held together well up to that moment. But already it was becoming evident that these days of peaceful cooperation of all the different parties were approaching an end. To make opposition is a comparatively simple matter. To do constructive work is infinitely more difficult. As an Opposition party, the Patriots were succeeding beyond their fondest expectations. Only a short attack had sufficed to show the utter weakness of the Stadholder's position.

The country had been told that the Prince was an incapable fool. It had been told this so often that it had accepted the statement as Truth No. 1 of its Revised Code of Ideas. Now the people turned to

the teachers who had been imparting this knowledge to them and said, "Show us how you can do things better yourselves."

This, however, was no easy matter, in view of the differences in opinion prevalent among the curious bed-fellows, who, driven by necessity, were temporarily occupying the couch of Patriotism.

In this same year the term of the Raadpensionaris of Holland expired and there was great dissimilarity of ideas as to whether or not he should be reappointed. The present occupant, old van Bleiswyk, as we have often had occasion to remark, was an old fogy, a friend of everybody, but generally used as an instrument by the Patriots. The question was whether to retain him as a sort of dummy or to appoint a man who openly and avowedly was a member of the Opposition. The Pensionaris of Amsterdam, van Berckel, wanted to be appointed. But he was considered to be too impetuous, and France was afraid that he would be too independent - more so than old van Bleiswyk, with whom one could talk. There were two other candidates. They were van Zeeberg, the Pensionaris of the town of Haarlem, and de Gyselaer, Pensionaris of Dordrecht. Together with van Berckel, these three, whenever they were together in the Hague to attend the meetings of the Estates of Holland, met regularly and formed the unofficial executive committee of the Opposition. They were, therefore, all three conversant with the aims and desires of the

Patriots. But the two last-named men did not belong by birth to the exclusive circles, and though they were useful on account of their capacities, they were not considered quite the equals of those Regents who benefited by their services. Furthermore, de Gyselaer was known to be addicted to very democratic views and, opposition or no opposition, the Regents did not desire to further the interests of the left wing of their party, which at any moment might prove itself more dangerous than the Stadholder.

In order to escape all possible complications, everything was left as before. Van Bleiswyk was continued in office and the triumvirate of stadholders was kept out of harm's way. For the present the three pensionarises were kept fully occupied. The fight against the Stadholder was once more taken out of the papers and pamphlets and continued on practical grounds.

The Stadholder derived his greatest power from the right which he enjoyed in most cities to make the appointments for the town council. He could pack those very influential bodies any way he pleased, and not infrequently he used the power more for his own benefit than for that of the city with which he was dealing. The new school of political thought, however, began to reason that since the cities had once upon a time given the Stadholder this right of their own free will, they were also entitled to deprive him of it whenever they pleased. Friesland, which had always done everything just a little bit differently from everybody else, informed the Prince that it considered the right of appointment to have reverted to the Regents. The cities of Rotterdam, Dordrecht, and Schoonhoven did the same in Holland. In this measure the democrats supported the Regents. It was to their interest that the municipal appointments should be decided right at home, where through a threat of violence they could exercise some influence, rather than by the Stadholder, many miles away. Gradually most of the cities followed suit, and made preparations to declare themselves more completely autonomous.

Now the Stadholder might have done either one of two things. He might have said, "I make you a present of it. Take it and be happy." Or he might have said, "I will not have it, and shall prevent it." Either course would have been dignified, and would have settled the problem in a definite way. But instead of doing this, he complained about the infamous way in which he was deprived of the rights and privileges which his ancestors had possessed, and there dropped the matter. Since, according to the Dutch proverb, a scolding does not hurt, the towns promptly relegated His Highness's complaints to their respective archives and continued on their course. As a result, the customary chaos of the Republic's political life was made even worse. For many years there was absolutely

no unity in the matter of appointments. In some cities the Stadholder continued to exercise his right. In others the town council made itself completely autonomous. In Holland, the estates, "pending the decision of this serious question," took it upon themselves to make the appointments which up to that time had been made by the Stadholder, and exercised this right under the very nose of His Highness.

His rebus perfectis, to use the style of the Latin chronicler, the Opposition continued to the next number on their programme. The Stadholder was commander-in-chief of the troops of the Republic. As such he could exercise great influence in the High Military Court, which was the body to which all military cases were appealed. The Regents, with their dislike of all military affairs, almost from the beginning of the Republic's existence, had opposed this court, which often interfered with the civil courts. There had been so many cases in which the decision of the Stadholder had been opposed to what seemed right and just to the civil courts that they filled a number of stately volumes. Especially in cases where trouble had arisen between military and civil persons, all sorts of complicated questions had come up, which had been settled to the dissatisfaction of the citizens involved.

It was said that such great power in the hand of one official might be most detrimental to the safety of the country. The argument, of course, was a purely political one. But as such it was used with great adroitness by the Opposition. Van Berckel had made himself quite famous for his violent attacks upon the Stadholder's power in the military jurisdiction. Dominie van der Kemp had collected the thousand-odd cases which we have just mentioned and had printed them in volumes of convincing weight. The Estates of Holland now made short work of the whole affair by forbidding the High Military Court to hold sessions within the limits of the province and refusing to pay its share of the funds necessary to maintain the court. The other provinces followed suit, and the Prince found himself deprived of this part of his executive power without so much as a word of excuse or explanation.

Having now suffered two humiliations within a short time, it was felt necessary for the Stadholder to do something in return. Therefore some illadvised partisan of His Highness hit upon the idea of going at once to the plain people and asking them to pronounce their unshakable confidence in His Highness.

Accordingly an address was gotten up by a number of citizens and soldiers, "who with the greatest horror had taken cognizance of the terrible calumnies spread abroad about a man who spent all his strength upon the affairs of the country." This document was being circulated for signatures just about the time of the feast of St. Nicholas. The

day, usually one of public jollifications, promised to be exceptionally gloomy in this year of war and depression, when people had neither money nor spirits to waste upon frolic.

Since everybody in the Hague was more or less dependent upon the custom of the Stadholder's court, a large crop of signatures was expected. But with the clumsiness which was the hall-mark of everything the friends of the Prince ever did, they used three notorious town loafers to go about from house to house to collect signatures. The language of the address disgusted a number of people, as being too deferential. They, therefore, got up an address of their own, differently worded. Before a week had gone by, two different parties were circulating two different addresses. They did this with so much ill-feeling between them that the authorities began to fear an open outbreak, and finally the mayor of the town, who was at the same time commander of the militia, forbade the further circulation of the documents.

Unfortunately this order was given on the day of St. Nicholas.⁵⁷ The town was full of people from the neighboring villages. Everybody was out, looking at the special displays in the windows of the shops and the booths which had been put up in the principal streets. It was customary for the Stadholder to go out on the afternoon of this day and buy the presents for his household, and it was customary for the lower classes to become intox-

icated. A most unfortunate moment for the mayor to promulgate an edict which could not be construed in any other light but that of an insult to His Highness, the Prince of Orange. Nothing, however, happened that day. The crowd did get slightly hilarious, did repair to the palace of the Stadholder, and did cheer His Highness and His Highness's family. Part of them also repaired to the house of the Raadpensionaris and hooted him. But to the astonishment of all, nothing whatsoever happened that could be called disorderly.

Notwithstanding this, the Patriotic party made a great commotion about the happenings on St. Nicholas's night. They accused the Orangists of having incited the mob to riot, of having committed gross acts of provocation in the hope of being allowed to massacre all Patriots, and so on, and so on. It was midwinter, and the Estates of Holland had gone home. Only van Berckel and de Gyselaer happened to be in the Hague. Without losing a moment's time they convoked the estates, and with unheard-of speed Their Mightinesses returned to the Hague to deliberate upon the grave danger which they had just escaped by such a narrow margin.

As a result of their deliberations they accused the Stadholder of not having taken sufficient steps to quell the disturbances. The poor Stadholder went personally to the meeting of the estates, and assured the gentlemen that there had been no dis-

turbance at all; that there had been nothing more than the ordinary St. Nicholas celebrations, and that there was no reason to punish any person.

A special commission appointed by the estates to investigate the matter failed to find basis for any proceedings. The story, however, had done its share to confuse the mind of the public. Vague rumors of an intended St. Bartholomew of all the Patriots, of the departure of the estates from the Hague to Haarlem, and of the suspension of the Prince as commander of the former city kept people guessing about the truth of the matter.

From that time on, the leaders of the Opposition began to behave as if the Stadholder no longer resided in their midst. When New Year's Day came — a day rather notorious for the hilarity caused by the amount of liquor spent in drinking people's health — a great ado was made about a possible recurrence of the "riot" of St. Nicholas's Day. Extra patrols were kept on duty all day long, but not-withstanding a great deal of provocation from the Patriots nothing happened.

That winter was as unhappy a winter as ever visited Holland. Business was at a standstill. Ships could neither enter nor leave port. Age-old industries, the mainstay and pride of many small cities, disappeared altogether, never to be revived.

To make matters worse, the grip made its epidemic entrance into the Republic. It was far more deadly then than now. In Amsterdam twice as many people died that winter as ordinarily. The fleet in Texel was condemned to complete inactivity because half of the officers and men were sick. Even van der Capellen had to stop writing letters for a while, until this new invention of the doctors (as he kindly called it) should have left his aching bones. Under these depressing circumstances, in this veritable Black Year, the people were willing to believe anything, to go to any extreme, to give vent to their pent-up feelings of discontent and despair.

If only at this critical moment, there had been a man willing and able to incite the Stadholder to do something "positive," all might not have been lost. There were many people, indeed a majority, who still felt scant sympathy for the extreme Patriots. Though willing to acknowledge that the present state of the Republic was an abnormality, that improvements were most urgently necessary, they feared to trust the work of demolishing and rebuilding to a party which subjected itself to such continual and severe criticism, which showed no capacity whatsoever for constructive statesmanship. We know very well that all such historical conjectures as these are quite futile. Even a first-rate man might have succumbed to the difficulties which centuries of misgovernment had accumulated. Perhaps a radical doctor of the kind of Mr. Bonaparte was the only person who could change the existing order of things by first doing away with the old ruins.

But nothing is so exasperating as this whole period of halfway measures, this stupid and apologetic floundering around when action was the only possible salvation. It is all very well to drop a sentimental tear about the kindness of heart of Good William, who would not spill a drop of the blood of even one of his subjects; but a little strength at that moment might have saved all the many thousand drops that had to be wasted afterwards, before a decision was finally reached. In his habit of indecision and wavering at critical moments, William V was fully the equal of Louis XVI.

Take, for example, the affair which in 1783 occurred in Rotterdam. In Rotterdam the condition was very much like that in all the principal cities of the Republic. On top, the Regents, who, with the exception of a few of the prominent families, were all Patriotic; in the middle, the vast layer of rich non-Regent families, lawyers, doctors, smaller merchants, who were members of the democratic wing of the Patriotic party; at the bottom, the crowd, the thousands of laborers on the docks and in the harbors, the small shopkeepers, artisans, and sailors, who were ardent supporters of the Stadholder.

The higher layers of the community lived a life of comfortable ease. The lowest led a very precarious existence, a dreary workaday life with few enjoyments, and those of the very coarsest sort. A few times a year, whenever there was a celebration in connection with some event in the family of the



THE PRINCESS WILHELMINA
After a bust by M. A. Falconnet

Prince of Orange, the crowd would make a holiday and forget their daily cares in wild and disorderly carousals.

Rotterdam, which of all the Dutch cities was most directly interested in the English trade, suffered terribly through the war. The lowest classes, embittered by their hard fate during those days of misery, were in a very ugly temper. From the Hague came rumors of the continual new insults which the Stadholder suffered at the hands of the Patriots. The fact that their own city government had a hand in these doings made the feeling against the local Regents and their allies, the democrats, very bitter. As a sort of counter-demonstration, the people decided to celebrate the birthday of the Prince with extraordinary brilliancy.⁵⁸

It was an old custom for the inhabitants of the poor quarters to go among the residential sections to collect money for their common festivities. It was good policy to keep the rabble in a pleasant temper by a small gift once in a while, and everybody used to give something. So it was this year. Long before the 8th of March the collection was begun, and the night of the day itself was passed in the customary way. The poorer quarters were decorated with Orange flags and the collected funds were passed over into the cash-boxes of the barkeepers.

Nothing happened. No window-panes were demolished. Nobody was threatened with violence. There was no rioting of any sort.

But the local Patriots followed the example of the Hague, and made a great commotion about the day's doings. They made protestations before the town council and wrote their grievances in papers and pamphlets. Their most valuable lives had been imperiled and their worldly goods had been threatened with devastation.

Their Lordships of the town hall showed no desire to risk their own window-panes for the benefit of their esteemed auxiliaries. They declared that the people had disported themselves as was their good old right, and declined to take steps towards punishing anybody. Similar occurrences happened in many parts of the country. Nowhere was decisive action taken. All the discussion resulted only in a continuation of the existing chaotic conditions.

It became more and more evident that to attain results the Opposition must act according to a more definite programme. The Patriotic movement was gradually developing along entirely different lines, not only in each separate province, but in almost every city. In Holland the three principal pensionarises indicated the general policies which the other provinces could adhere to or not as they saw fit. Frequently the others refused to follow Holland's lead, and concerted action took place in but very few instances. Already the more conservative elements among the Patriots were beginning to show their dislike of the methods practiced by the more radical ones, and to look for ways and means by

which to be rid of friends who threatened to prove more dangerous than enemies.

On the 26th of April, 1783, seventy Regents and leaders of the Patriots met in Amsterdam to celebrate the success of Brother van der Capellen, who had just won his fight for reinstatement in the Estates of Overysel. It was remarked, however, that the conservative members of the Opposition preferred to stay away from a place where the democratic van der Capellen was to be the guest of honor. It was the more radical men of the party, politicians of the type of de Gysclaer, who were prominent upon this occasion.⁵⁹

After this first meeting a general convention of Patriots from all over the country was held later in the year, and the differences of opinion were even more marked. Though there were more members of the nobility from Friesland, Overysel, and Gelderland, there were no leading Holland Regents, and mere plebeians of the sort of van der Kemp and his friends had a great deal to say and were listened to with attention.

From words these more thorough-going members moved gradually to deeds. They felt their helpless position. Beneath them was the large mass of the people, without any understanding of the Patriots' philosophical discussions or their ultimate aims. Above them were the Regents, who supported them because they needed them, but who really feared them and disliked them most cordially.

Finally in the Hague lived the Stadholder, who was still the head of a loyal army (such as it was), and who, if he desired to do so, might crush the whole movement at any moment. The Patriots needed some way in which to defend themselves, and they found this in the crection of a so-called Free Corps.⁶⁰

As we have seen before, the old-fashioned town militia had gradually lost all its force and prestige as a military power. It had developed into a dining society, which, on rare occasions, when a fire broke out or a riot threatened the town, was called upon to help out the local police.

In the Middle Ages, however, these citizen soldiers had done great things, and with the interest newly awakened by the glorious deeds of the American farmer soldiers, it was felt that a rejuvenation of this old institution would bring to the younger generation some of the old prowess of their glorious ancestors.

The Union of Utrecht, that Magna Charta of the Republic, had this in common with similar documents of other nations, that it seemed to provide everybody with a sound argument for his every wish. It was, in a measure, all things to all men. It contained a veritable mine of precedents. There was, for example, Article VIII, to which nobody had ever paid any attention, which stipulated that a census be taken of all men between eighteen and sixty years of age. This census had never been

taken except in one province. The Republic had found it more profitable to have its fighting done by mercenary troops than by its unwilling subjects. But there the article was in black and white, and the leaders of the Patriots now pointed to it to support their good right of forming their own so-called drilling companies.

The country was actually in danger. The English commanded the high seas, the Austrians threatened with an invasion by land. What more noble proof of their devotion to the fatherland could the young men of the country give than by forming bands of volunteers and learning the arts of war?

The authorities were not formally consulted; the members of the Free Corps sprang from the soil like revolutionists in South America. In some cities. where the Patriots were all-powerful, the local militia was entirely changed into a Patriotic corps and given officers who belonged exclusively to the Patriotic party. In other cities, where the Stadholder or the Regents still retained some control, a rival Patriotic Free Corps was established next to the already existing town militia. In several villages the same thing was done. The country districts, as usual, took no interest in the matter. The farmer paid his taxes to support the regular army of the Estates General, and for this money he expected to be protected against all foreign enemies. As for making a fool of himself by sporting a

silly uniform and a pop-gun he would rather be—and so on, and so on.

But from the beginning of the year 1783 until the days of the Restoration the whole country drilled and marched and paraded with an enthusiasm hitherto entirely unknown. This thing began in Dordrecht, where de Gyselaer was the leading spirit. Since the days of its capture by Louis XIV, Utrecht had always suffered under the unjust "Regulations" that gave the Stadholder absolute power over its political machine. It followed suit and changed its town militia into a Patriotic corps. So did Rotterdam, where many of the better-class merchants took positions as officers.

In Amsterdam the formation of the Free Corps did not proceed so easily. There the Regents feared the eventual consequences of allowing such a dangerous element in their community, an element which, though it was now ostensibly directed against the Stadholder, might at any moment be turned against themselves. But the Free Corps movement was too strong to be stopped, and in 1784 the Amsterdam street urchins had a new institution on which to practice their versatility in the throwing of invectives, stones, and mud.

The fact that these Patriotic soldiering companies did not hold out for a single week against the war-worn veterans of Frederick the Great and were sold out by their German commander has seemed sufficient evidence of their insignificance to give every cigar-puffing critic the right to criticize them for their conceit and their miserable failure.

But these military corps brought quite a new element into the somnolent and conservative Dutch community, and with all their defects had certain merits. They broke with all precedent when they opened their ranks to all denominations. The dissenter had as much right to enlist as the most faithful member of the official church. This in itself meant quite a revolution. Furthermore, the membership in these corps gave many people that which they so singularly lacked, self-respect. Dutch society, with its eternal condescension, its system of haughty benevolence, its contrast of "my good man" and "your Lordship," had hammered out of most of the common people the last vestige of independence.

It had been drummed into the ears of so many generations that their "Lordships of the High Town Government" were something different from the rest of the community, that the rest of the community had begun to accept this statement as part of the articles of the established faith.

By joining a Patriotic Free Corps, however, the little man found himself gradually drawn into a somewhat different position towards his betters. The old militia had never worn a regular uniform. An Orange sash fastened over the every-day clothes had turned the citizen into the soldier. The new army corps, however, was put into a regular

uniform, and as such it became a more democratic institution. The officers were elected by the men, and however harmful that system may be to good discipline, it gave the average man his first chance to feel a direct responsibility in a large institution.

Up to that time there had been political clubs in almost every city, but the Free Corps was the place where all men of a certain political conviction were thrown together. Like most new institutions there was a large amount of exaggeration. Each corps was allowed to devise its own standard and motto, and a lot of nonsense was indulged in in connection with this part of the game of soldiery.

Finally, the Free Corps was the first step in the good direction of breaking up the hopeless provincialism of the country. By arranging shooting-matches between the Free Corps of different cities, many men, who had never poked their noses outside of the immediate confines of their own little city, became for the first time in their lives aware of the fact that elsewhere there were people made after their own image. Gradually, when the movement became better organized, manœuvres were held in which the Free Corps of different provinces took part. The officers and men had a chance to see something of their neighbors, and a feeling of unity began to replace the old provincialism.

From this time on we know in a general way what the centre and the left side of the Opposition party actually wanted. Many years later, when the French Revolution had proved victorious, it became the custom to represent this Patriotic programme as an anticipation of the principles which the French Revolution forced upon Europe. Now this is in no way the truth. The Hollanders, who made their own revolution a dozen years before the French, never wanted to go as far as did the French. With the exception of a few very violent extremists, they were quite moderate in their demands.

They were opposed to the Stadholder, but only to the Stadholder in his present condition, which made him a mixture of absolute sovereign and obedient servant and put him continually in a most anomalous position.

The Dutch Patriots seem to have been inspired in many things by the American example.⁶¹ They wanted to retain the Stadholder as the chief executive, much after the pattern of the President of the United States. The real legislative power, however, should be in the hands of the Estates General, who should still be drawn from among the Regents, but with a certain element of influence from the middle class. The Stadholder then should execute the will and desires of this new Estates General. In this way the eternal quarrels between the jurisdiction of the Stadholder and the Estates General would be brought to a close.

In regard to the army and the navy, they should no longer be commanded by the Stadholder, who usually was totally unfit for this work, but they should be commanded by professional soldiers, and the officers should be appointed by the Estates General.

In a like way the Estates General should exercise the right of civil appointments, and the Stadholder should lose his power to pack the town councils as he pleased.

Democratic, in the modern sense of the word, this programme certainly was not. The large mass of the people would have benefited but little by it. It was, however, a step in the right direction, and if it had been carried out would have made the final change from the old to the new system less sudden and less disastrous.

This programme was never published officially. The party never came forward with a printed pamphlet and said, "Fellow citizens, read this, and if you agree with it, come and join our ranks." It was a so-called secret programme, which, however, was generally known and discussed, and shows us fairly accurately what was the sentiment of those who still hoped to reform the commonwealth before it was too late, and who were neither too conservative nor too radical to despair of a gradual building-up on a sounder basis.

Under all the appearance of empty-headedness which we notice in the speeches and the writings of the Patriots, we are surprised to find some sound common sense. There were still a number of serious

men in their ranks who judged questions upon their merits and not upon the merits of the amount of political capital which they could possibly make out of them. The minutes of some of the Patriotic meetings have come down to us and we know what questions were discussed. Besides the questions of a purely political nature, there was a serious discussion of a possible way of reorganizing the fleet, the country's finances, and the East and West India Companies. These companies had long survived their usefulness as monopolies, and it was felt that they should eventually be taken over by the country at large.

The debates upon those questions, it is true, came to no practical results, but we should not forget that we have to deal with people who for the most part had been kept strictly outside of all political affairs, who had no knowledge of how to deal with questions of a public nature, and who now made their first attempt at practical politics.

They took another step in the right direction, moreover, when they decided to bring these matters before the public at large. For this purpose they discussed the erection of a central bureau which should reside in the Hague and conduct a campaign of publicity. They even considered an undertaking of a more stupendous nature, a complete edition of all the old laws and privileges of the different provinces, in order that the public might be better acquainted with the state of affairs from

which their own commonwealth had gradually developed.

Alas! the conservative elements of the Opposition who supported these reforms soon lost all control of the party. The men that came to the force and forced their opinions upon the whole Opposition were of an entirely different calibre.

The inexcusable weakness shown by the Stadholder and his friends made it inevitable that the Patriotic party should become more and more aggressive. Caution was not necessary in a fight which appeared to be so easy. So much had been accomplished by mere noise and insolence, that it was quite natural for many to feel that a little more shouting and a few more insults would result in a complete victory over the Stadholder.

What was to be done next to harass that forlorn prince? He had been deprived of the immediate companionship of his faithful guardian, but was not that guardian still on Dutch territory and in constant correspondence with his former pupil? Indeed he was. He lived only two days' distance from the Hague, and was kept well informed of what happened in the Residence.

It was decided that he should be removed from the Republic's territory entirely, and for this purpose any pretext would do as well as another. Therefore the triumvirate of pensionarises dug up from among the archives of the Council of State an old matter that had to do with a certain report which, six years before, had been made about the condition of the Dutch fortifications along the frontier. The author, who had inspected these neglected strongholds, was General Dumoulin, a well-known engineer who was a personal enemy of the Duke of Brunswick. The engineer had found the fortifications to be in a most deplorable state of neglect, and in his report he had accused the Duke of Brunswick of gross carelessness in the exercise of his duty as commander-in-chief, while acting for the Prince, who was then a minor.

When that report was made, the Duke was still in favor with the Prince and the whole affair had been hushed up. Dumoulin had not been expected to communicate his secret investigation to anybody else, but, according to the existing custom, he had talked the whole matter over with several of the city pensionarises, and had even given to de Gyselaer the notes upon which he had based his report.

All this evidence, acquired in an illegal way, was presented by de Gyselaer to the estates at a moment when almost everybody was absent on account of the Christmas holidays. By a bit of parliamentary juggling a committee was immediately appointed by the Estates of Holland to investigate the charges that the Duke of Brunswick had allowed the fortifications to tumble to pieces, and had never taken the trouble to stock the empty storehouses. This new attack upon the Duke had fur-

nished the excitement for the first two months of the year 1784.

In March, however, the matter was forgotten because of another event which shocked the people a great deal more than the lampoons upon the fat Austrian Duke. This was the notorious affair of Kaat Mossel in Rotterdam. Kaat Mossel was a most prosaic fish-wife, and the way in which she was made to play the rôle of martyr and heroine was as follows.⁶²

Rotterdam had never quieted down from the excitement attending the celebration of the Stadholder's birthday the year before. The sight of the Patriot soldiers marching proudly through the streets, togged up like Prussian grenadiers, was an ever fresh source of annovance to the poorer classes. and these soldiers were about as popular as the American militia doing duty in a town where there is a strike. There was no actual clash between soldiers and mob, but there was the best of ill-feeling between the two. The 8th of March again promised to be a difficult day. Nothing serious, however, happened except that during the afternoon a well-intentioned but intoxicated individual found his way to the Stock Exchange and there cried. "Hooray for the Prince!" The majority of the Rotterdam merchants being strong Patriots, the aforementioned individual found himself promptly on the pavement, outside the Exchange. His humiliation had to be avenged. And it was. The

next afternoon six gigantic sailors, rigged in every conceivable Orange garment, honored the Exchange with their visit, walked through the crowd, bumped into not a few of the honorable merchants there assembled, hurrahed for the Prince, and departed unmolested.

Hence great joy among the populace and great mortification among the members of the Exchange, who had been hurt in that which is dearest to the heart of every Hollander, their respectability.

Now Rotterdam possessed two rival corps of militia. There was the old non-uniformed corps, which did not take much interest in politics, and there was the Patriotic Free Corps, which took no interest in anything else. Of the nine companies of which the latter consisted, there was one that contained all the most offensive elements and which found itself in continual trouble with the street crowds. This was the company of a certain Captain Elzevier. Each of the companies was supposed to mount guard during the night at regular intervals. When, on the 22d of March, it came the turn of Captain Elzevier's company, there was grave fear of an outbreak. But no outbreak occurred. The soldiers were jeered at and were accompanied on their way by a band of boys singing Orangist songs, but the soldiers and the citizens did not come to blows. All the same, the Patriots assembled the next day, gravely discussed the danger in which they had been the night before, and

took a solemn oath to defend themselves unto their last drop of blood, should they be attacked. The oath sounded well and cost them nothing.

On the 3d of April, it was again the turn of Captain Elzevier's men to mount guard, and this time it happened to be Saturday. Now Saturday night has been since time immemorial the night when the sailor is on shore and when the tough element goes out for trouble with the police.

The Patriotic soldiers assembled in front of the town hall. The small place in front of the town hall was filled with a boisterous crowd which tried to prevent the men from forming ranks. A good deal was heard about "Chocolate" soldiers, and the free-born Batavians, when requested to move on and make room for the Patriots, had a good deal to say about "having as much right to be in the street as any dressed-up fool of a monkey, who, merely because he was dressed up like a monkey, expected the whole world to get out of the way."

Finally, the company mustered and marched away. When they were crossing a small bridge, they were assailed with a veritable bombardment of stones. The captain commanded his men to fire a volley of blank cartridges. This, however, had no effect. On the contrary, it made the crowd more aggressive. The jeering was renewed. "The soldiers are afraid. They will never dare to fire with real bullets," said the crowd. The bombardment of stones was renewed. And then happened what

always happens in such cases. The soldiers fired with ball cartridges, one of the crowd was killed instantly, and the rest disappeared in hasty flight, leaving behind them a score of wounded.

This was the first time that political passions had been directly responsible for the shedding of a citizen's blood, and great was the commotion that followed. The news of the Rotterdam "massacre" spread throughout the country and was received with very mixed but equally intense feelings everywhere. The Patriots came to the fore with the argument that they had only acted in self-defense. In consequence no one of Elzevier's company was punished. But since their presence was a constant menace to the peace of the town, the Free Corps was disbanded and the Patriots were forbidden to wear their uniforms in the town. At the same time, to be equally just to all parties, the Solomons of the town hall gave out an interdict against the wearing of all orange-colored ribbons, flowers, neckties, or other adornment.

But even these wise measures did not bring about the desired peace. The most fantastic rumors spread throughout the city at the most inopportune moments. Now there was a panic because an English bombardment was feared; then again because the Patriots were said to be organizing a massacre of all the supporters of the Prince. In July, again on a Saturday night, there was more trouble between the poorer classes and the Patriots. The latter by this time held over ten seats in the town hall and sent urgent letters to the Estates of Holland and complained that their lives were no longer secure against the violence of the Orangist mob.

Whereupon (notice the humorous side of the occasion!) the good Prince, at the request of the Estates of Holland, sent some regular troops to the town of Rotterdam to protect the valuable lives of his most esteemed enemies. But since nothing in the Republic was adjudged to be complete without the existence of a committee to report thereon, the Estates at the same time appointed a number of gentlemen who were to proceed to the place of disturbance and investigate the matter. This committee traveled leisurely to Rotterdam and there made itself comfortable in the best hotel. It took just two years in which to make its report and cost Rotterdam one hundred and five thousand guilders for its "expenses."

As there had been great provocation on both sides, it was found difficult to put the blame on either of the parties. But since a committee is of no value unless it reports upon something, the whole affair was at last brought down to two women of the fish-market who were known to be strong adherents of the Prince, and who had spoken about the Patriotic soldiers in language which was far from flattering. For this offense they were condemned to ten and six years imprisonment, respectively, and were actually sent to jail. There they stayed until

the Prussian army brought about the Restoration, when they were set free and were allowed to return to their humble profession of selling mussels. They were vulgar people and their methods of expressing enthusiasm should not be followed by well-behaved citizens. But they suffered in an absurdly unjust way for their convictions, and a small reward on the part of the Prince would not have been out of place. This, however, was not in the man's character, and we must pass on to the next question.

The industrious reader may remember that when we took him on this side trip to Rotterdam there was at that moment in the Hague a certain committee in session which was to report upon the affair of General Dumoulin vs. the Duke of Brunswick. The committee had not yet finished its investigation. The Duke refused to budge. Even for an offer of so much money in cash down, if only he would leave the Republic, he had firmly refused to give up the excellent emoluments which he still derived from his present post as commander of Bois-le-Duc.

The committee was in doubt what to do next, when all of a sudden a new piece of heavy artillery was brought into the field, blew away the Duke, and seriously damaged the Stadholder. This was the publication of the famous "Acte van Consulent-schap," the document by which William had given himself into the keeping of the Duke. The publication of this document, by this time known to a

score of people, had often been discussed, but had been held back as a sort of reserve force to be used only in case of dire need.

In the beginning of the year 1784, it was whispered about in the leading Patriotic paper, the "Post of the Lower Rhine," that there was said to exist a secret document of agreement between the Prince and his former guardian. This information was one of the many bits of news which the editor got from his friends in Amsterdam, who used his paper as an unofficial mouthpiece for their own special purposes.

Since this statement had been made openly in a newspaper, it was easy to continue to follow the matter up more openly. The delegates of the town of Zierikzee asked the Estates of Zeeland whether their Lordships knew of any such thing. Their Lordships did not, but they would investigate the matter.

This was the sign for Holland to act, since it would never do to be beaten in such matters by one of the inferior provinces. The Estates of Holland, therefore, appointed a commission, consisting among others of the Raadpensionaris van Berckel, and de Gyselaer, and sent them to the Stadholder to ask him officially what was the truth about this secret agreement. If such a document did exist, would His Highness be willing to send a copy thereof to the estates?

The Prince confessed that the document did ex-

ist, and promised that he would send copies thereof not only to the Estates of Holland, but to all of the provincial estates and to the Estates General.

It took ten days to make the eight copies and they were then forwarded to the different estates, accompanied by a letter of the Stadholder explaining just how the agreement had come to be made. In this letter the Prince openly defended his former guardian. He reminded the estates that the Duke had only remained in the service of the Republic at the urgent entreaties of the estates themselves (which was quite true). He stated that he had not bound himself to ask the advice of the Duke upon every possible occasion, but only at times when he himself thought this necessary. Therefore it seemed no more than just that the Duke should not be held responsible for advice given under such circumstances.

The publication of the document came exactly at the moment when the difficulties with Joseph of Austria were threatening the country with another war. Just when the popular anger against Austria was at its height, it was discovered that one of the Emperor's own field marshals had for years been the absolute dictator of the acts of the Stadholder of the Republic. It was not a time to expect a sober discussion of the pros and cons of the question. It was a time of hysterical fears, and the storm which broke loose against the Duke was such that his position in the Republic became absolutely

untenable. The Prince began to see visions of the scaffold, and was being followed in his dreams by the spook of Charles I. He contemplated a flight to his German possessions, there to end his days in peace. At last the Duke packed his trunks. He left nothing behind but his considerable debts. On the 16th of October, 1784, he left for Brunswick, where he spent the rest of his days trying to explain in an apology how it had all happened.

For the estates, however, this was not yet the end of the affair. They made several attempts to get hold of the correspondence of the Duke, in the hope that it might contain documents incriminating the Prince. A number of foreign soldiers of fortune were hired to steal such letters as they could find. They went to Aix-les-Bains, where the Duke happened to be, but they were sold out by one of their colleagues and the noble plan failed.

Van der Capellen did not witness this great victory of the Patriots! On the 6th of June, 1784, he died in Zwolle, at the age of forty-three. For many years, almost since childhood, he had suffered from a chronic disease of the stomach, and his political activities had been continually interrupted by sickness. His loss was felt sincerely by his many friends. Poetical admirers foresaw the honor which awaited him in high heaven as a just reward for his labors. Other of his fellow citizens thought differently, and as soon as they had a chance to do so without fear of punishment they blew up his grave. 62

CHAPTER IX

LAST YEARS

In 1785 the Republic was in a terrible condition. The war with England was over. The public debt had been increased until it was found almost impossible to pay the interest thereon. The Dutch ships that had been taken during the last four years had not been returned. The East India Company, practically bankrupt, had a hard time to hold its own against English competition, which it was obliged to permit in part of its possessions. A number of colonies had been lost to the Republic forever. The trade with America since the loss of St. Eustatius had dwindled to nothing.

The people at large, deprived of their ordinary revenues, were suffering in mute discontent. The well-to-do classes were wasting their energy in futile quarrels. Every town and every village, almost every family, was divided against itself. The Orangist families kept quietly to themselves. The Patriots swaggered about, discussed their affairs high and low in the cafés and clubs, and in the fashion of some of our modern politicians imputed the lowest motives to all those who did not share their opinions. Since a large part of the population was out of work, the Patriots tried hard to use the opportunity to interest these men in the new

doctrines. Next to the more fashionable Patriotic Club they established societies where the workman and the employer should meet each other, and where the one should instruct the other in the first principles of such wisdom as he himself possessed. These clubs were not very successful. The absolute class distinction had been so rigorously maintained for such a number of years that this fraternization was always marred by servility on the one side and condescension on the other. It seemed as if the very bottom was beginning to fall out of Dutch society when the master so far forgot himself that he agreed to sit at one and the same table with the servant.

Already there were a number of signs that great changes were taking place in this staid old community. The order against the orange color, promulgated in Rotterdam after the riots of March, 1784, had been followed in July of the same year by even more drastic orders on the part of the Estates of Holland. Not only did they forbid the wearing of all orange-colored articles, but they changed the names of such vegetables and fruits as it had pleased the Almighty Lord to favor with an orange skin, or which it had pleased the popular fancy to call after the members of the illustrious house whose fate was so closely allied to that of their country. Finally it was made a penal offense to sing, whistle, play, or otherwise produce a certain piece of music which, under the name of "Wilhelmus of Nassau," had for the last two hundred

and fifty years been the honorable national anthem of the United Netherlands.

The Stadholder, who lived in the same building with the men who made these absurd laws, had to accept all these insults without a word of remonstrance, and henceforward had to order his "Princess beans" by whatever name it pleased the Patriots to rebaptize that good vegetable. More and more it was made clear to him that he was no longer wanted, and that his removal was the real object of the Opposition, now that the ultra-radical elements were gradually pushing to the front and were taking hold of the leadership of their party.

In January of the year 1785, the troops of Austria threatened to invade the Republic at any moment. There being no army and no fortifications, there was nothing with which to stop their attack. William asked that the Patriotic Free Corps be used for the defense of the fatherland and be sent to the frontier to stop the progress of the Austrians. The request was met with an immediate refusal.

The Free Corps had been formed as a means of defense of the Patriotic party against the Stadholder and not for the benefit of the common fatherland. As long as the interests of the party were secure, the country could go to the dogs. Accordingly one province after the other refused to accept a plan which might even for a moment deprive them of their defense against a possible reaction on the part of the Prince's adherents. There was

nothing to do but to bribe the Austrian Emperor into giving up, for a sum in cash, his outrageous demands.

It is curious to notice the helplessness of the Stadholder and to examine the actual force that was opposing him with so much vehemence. Even in the turbulent Estates of Holland the Patriots were only certain of a majority when absolutely all the members of the Opposition were present. The nobility was still on the side of the Prince, and with the increasing violence of the Opposition a great many of its former supporters saw their best advantage in voting for the Prince. But they suffered from the same indifference which so often characterizes the more philosophical elements of a political party. They often stayed away when their presence was most needed, and the Patriots, well whipped by their three pensionarises, carried victory after victory by sheer parliamentary strategy, just as a few years later a ridiculously small minority of France's citizens bullied the rest and cut throats to its heart's content because it was better organized and more resolute than the others.

The citizens of almost every town let themselves be ordered around by the soldiers of the Free Corps, but all in all no more than twenty thousand men ever enlisted in these corps, and of those more than a quarter came from Holland alone.

Take Utrecht in this year, for example. In this city a few thousand citizen-soldiers and a noisy

orator kept the whole community in commotion. In Utrecht, as we have had reason to mention before, things had never been as they should have been. In 1672 Louis XIV had taken the town, and after he had retreated, the Stadholder, William III, had managed to acquire complete control of the political system of the city and had been the "Boss" of the town until his death in 1702. Then Utrecht had regained her autonomy. In 1747, however, when the stadholders were restored, William IV, and later on his son, William V, had again been masters of the town. They had control of all the offices in the city, and no person, of whatever rank or position, could hope to achieve anything without paying tribute to the Prince or his representative. The Prince was never personally present, but his representative, who was always in Utrecht, enriched himself at the expense of the public, and therefore was thoroughly hated, and unpopular with all classes. As we have also remarked before, Utrecht was a university town, and, situated in the centre of the country, it knew what was going on abroad as well as at home. The town was prosperous and the population a little better informed upon a number of questions than most people in the Republic.

For a score of years there had been active opposition, from a most respectable part of the inhabitants, to the so-called "Regulation," which delivered the town into the power of the Stadholder. William, however, was headstrong and obstinate,

and refused to give up his ancient rights and adhered to the smallest of his prerogatives. Since he had no understanding whatsoever of the events which were taking place around him, he considered the opposition to the "Regulation" merely another manifestation of that personal cussedness which unfortunately marked so many of his subjects. Now it happened that in 1784 there was a vacancy in the town council, and according to the law the Stadholder was at liberty to appoint some one for the place without considering the wishes of the other members of the council.

Before the Prince had appointed any one, however, seven hundred citizens of Utrecht petitioned the council to disregard the doubtful privilege of the Stadholder, to take matters into their own hands, and to appoint whomever they pleased to fill the vacancy in their midst. The petition formally stated that the council, as the representative of the ancient guilds and the militia, was perfectly entitled to follow this course.

With a majority of twenty-six votes the council actually did what it was requested to do and filled the vacancy without consulting the Prince. The new councillor was noisily acclaimed by the Patriots, and upon the occasion of his first appearance in the town hall was accompanied by a guard of honor of Free Corps soldiers.

The Stadholder protested. He sent a formal document to the estates of the province, called the

diocese, although for the last two hundred and forty-six years there had been no bishop connected with it. The estates, however, declined to give the Stadholder satisfaction. They left it to the town of Utrecht herself to decide whether the Regulation of 1672 was contrary to the ancient laws of the province or not. If it was, the council was completely within its rights in disregarding the so-called privilege of the Stadholder. But after this first heroic act a reaction followed, and the wise and prudent councillors of the good town of Utrecht were frightened by their own intrepidity. When all was said and done they had allowed themselves to be imposed upon by the crowd in the street, and in this way they had established a very dangerous precedent. What would prevent the people from another time petitioning them to dismiss the man they had just appointed?

Thus it happened that ere long, when a second vacancy took place, a number of councillors fell suddenly ill and were prevented from attending the session which was to elect their new fellow member. This time the majority by which the new man was elected was quite small. The next time it proved to be turned into a minority.

This backsliding on the part of their town council was very little to the taste of the Patriots, who in Utrecht were thoroughly imbued with democratic doctrines. They continued the agitation for several much needed local improvements, and obtained

from the town council the decision that a committee of nine aldermen should sit for five weeks to hear the humble requests of the citizens about such improvements as they thought necessary. No sooner was this request granted than it rained a storm of petitions. In every bookshop monster petitions were open to all those who would come and sign them.

What the Regents of the town had feared actually happened. The Patriots not only directed their attacks against the Stadholder, but they also asked for the appointment of a consulting body of citizens which should control the finances of the city and should be heard before new taxes were written out. Such a consulting board of citizens was not a novelty. In several of the small cities of Overysel such committees had been appointed at the instigation of van der Capellen. But never before had the plan been tried in a city of the size of Utrecht.

The Regents were sorely pressed to know what answer to give to this request. The civic budget had from ancient times been the most private reservation, one from which they had derived their riches, and they hated beyond words to be controlled in their expenditures. They now began to see that, of the two evils, the Prince was really the lesser. When in the course of events another vacancy occurred, — this time for the place of burgomaster and sheriff, — they refused to appoint

new men as the Patriots asked them to do, but continued the old ones in their position until the next year. And immediately they started out to repair the damage they had inflicted upon their own class by their opposition to the Stadholder, and to curb the arrogance of the man in the street.

It was too late, however. Under the leader-ship of the former student of theology, young Mr. Ondaatje, at present professional Patriot, the excited people demanded that the consulting board of sixteen be increased to twenty-four, and should be chiefly composed of representatives from among the Free Corps. The Regents refused point-blank to appoint such a body. Whereupon the people went ahead and appointed it themselves. The eight Free Corps then elected a special committee to watch over their own particular interests, and the town of Utrecht suddenly found itself in the possession of three different independent political bodies, each of which wanted to do certain things in a different way.

The fight between the Stadholder and the town of Utrecht now became a quarrel between the Regents and the Patriots. Against the united opposition of all the Patriotic elements in the town, the council, in the summer of 1785, elected, with a majority of sixteen, a gentleman who was greatly disliked by the rank and file of the Patriots. The Patriots threatened violence unless the appointment was canceled. The council immediately lost

its courage, and promised not to allow the new member to attend its sessions until it should have heard what the people had to say. The people came and through their spokesman, Ondaatje, delivered to the High and Mighty Gentlemen of the Council a beautiful speech on the Rights of the People and the Duties of the Government.

The Gentlemen of the Council promised that they would consider the matter; which they did ad infinitum. Therefore, when the days went by and no decisive answer was given, the Patriots addressed themselves again to the most honorable council and asked for a definite reply. No reply was forthcoming. Whereupon, after another interval of several days, a turbulent mass of Patriots and Free Corps soldiers appeared before the town hall, and once more, through Ondaatje, asked the gentlemen what they intended to do. The Honorable Gentlemen of the Council, who did not belong to the race of Oldenbarneveldt and de Witt, were scared beyond words at the sight of the agitated crowd. They reversed their former decision and unseated the man whom they had just appointed.

This was too much for many of the members of the council. They felt ashamed of their cowardice and resigned their seats rather than continue in a position where they could be bullied into submission by a squad of "strong-arm" men.

The Opposition in Utrecht, however, was from now on sharply divided. The democratic Patriots had been the victors. But all the conservative elements of the party began to hold back and to look for a possible coöperation with the Stadholder and the other conservatives in the Republic.

The same thing happened in the estates of the province. The Regents who had seats in the estates discovered that, as a result of their agitation against the Prince, they now had to deal with an infinitely more dangerous enemy. In a number of small towns the example of Utrecht was at once followed. Committees of citizens were appointed, and besides the existing town council, rival councils were being established. In a short while the conditions became so chaotic that an appeal for troops had to be made to the Stadholder, and garrisons had to be established in several of the rebellious cities to make their citizens behave themselves and stop disturbing the peace.

No wonder that at the general meetings of the Patriots which took place in this year the Regents were entirely absent, and that the differences between the right and the left wing of the party became more pronounced than ever. Of the three pensionarises only de Gyselaer was present. Gelderland and Overysel sent many members, but Utrecht, which had just suffered on account of the Patriotic agitation, was not represented at all. There was a good deal of talk about the danger in which the party found itself, and in order to watch the occurrences of the day more carefully a com-

mission of seven was appointed, and it was decided to appeal to the whole nation for money.

During all these events, the Stadholder still resided in the Hague, but entirely as a negligible quantity. His communications to the Estates, asking for an investigation of the lampoons that were being daily published about him, were left unanswered. His requests for redress for the many insults and personal attacks to which he was constantly subjected, were unceremoniously put upon the table.

And now a row between some town loafers and some Free Corps soldiers was taken as an excuse to deprive the Prince of the command of the garrison of the Hague and to transfer it to the Estates of Holland.⁶⁴ The Prince protested. In an angry letter he asked who had dared take command of his troops. The only answer to this document was an attempt made by Holland to deprive His Highness also of his commandership of the troops of the Union. This was too much even for such a patient individual as William V. On September 15 he left the Hague and went to Breda. His wife and children he sent to Leeuwarden. It was his plan that after a while they should all move to his German estates. But he never got so far as that, for the Princess managed to convince her husband that such a step would look like a flight before the Patriots and would spoil his chance of ever returning. Therefore the Prince agreed to stay in the Republic, and chose

Nymegen in Gelderland as his residence. There he amused himself as best he could hunting and visiting such families as remained faithful. Like his father before him he was a great "waiter." He could wait patiently until the day of vindication should come. For the moment there was little hope that that day would soon arrive. Uncle Frederic in Berlin was very old and had gathered enough fame for one lifetime. He preferred not to mix himself up in what was so essentially a family quarrel. The only hope was that the Opposition would become disorganized over the question of how to divide the spoils.

And this is what actually happened. A very natural reaction was bringing about a sudden change in the minds of many people. They had never cared much for the weak Stadholder. But now that he had been obliged to leave the Province of Holland they asked themselves whether he had really deserved such a fate. And they came to the conclusion that he had not; that he had not been quite so bad after all, and that all the trouble was the work of the wicked Patriots.

The Patriots had fallen upon difficult days. The democratic wing of the party found that since it had done the work for the Regents it was no longer needed, and was being pushed back to the obscure position from which it had just arisen with so much trouble. This was not what the democratic Patriots had entered the fight for, and they made this very

clear to the Regents. But the Regents, under the pressure of danger to their own position, made a firm stand and prepared to reëstablish the old order of things.

It was too late, however. The harm had been done! The butcher and the baker and the candle-stick-maker, who for so many years had been accustomed to count as a very small item in the machinery of State, refused to return to their old positions of most humble servants and take orders from their betters. The members of the middle class, which had been all-powerful for almost three years, did not fancy a return of the conditions which gave them about as much power as the meanest coal-heaver.

The Regents tried to disband the Free Corps. All of a sudden they had scruples about the existence of armed bodies which were not primarily destined to protect the town in case of riot and fire. Would the members of the Free Corps please give up their arms and return to their former occupations? No, the Free Corps would do nothing of the sort. They liked their life, with its cheap and easy glory, much too well to give it up for a return of the old dull days.

The period of unrest continued to last for many years. The Prince, still nominally the Stadholder of all the provinces, lived in semi-exile in Gelderland, and tried by a series of trips through the country provinces to regain some of his lost prestige. Holland and Utrecht, however, formed a state within a state, and treated their stadholder as if he were an enemy of their little sovereign nation and should not be allowed upon their territory.

The Republic began more and more to resemble the South American Republic of comic-opera fame. There was not even a semblance of order. Van der Kemp, who had left the ministry for good, organized in a little village in Utrecht a new commonwealth which suddenly declared itself independent of the Estates as well as of the Stadholder. When he refused to disband the regiment of dragoons which he had formed among the local rustics, a military action against his new republic was planned. At the news thereof volunteers from all parts of Utrecht and Holland flocked to the little town of Wyk-by-Duurstede and diligently worked to put the townlet in a state of defense. The army of the Estates, however, did not appear, and the new republic of seven hundred souls died a natural death.

In Gelderland there were two insignificant villages, called Hattem and Elburg. In the first of the two there was a very active patriotic youth called Daendels, who later made himself famous as one of Napoleon's generals and as governor-general of the Dutch Indies. When his village got into trouble with the Stadholder about some local matter, the inhabitants decided to cease to recognize the orders of the Stadholder. This they did. Even in the

province which the Prince honored with his presence he was to be openly disobeyed by a score of villagers living in a place of which hardly anybody knew the exact location.

Since the Stadholder commanded a number of troops located in the fortresses of the Union along the German frontier, it was possible to take immediate steps against the rebels. At the request of the Estates of Gelderland, who were not in the least enthusiastic about this behavior of their fellow citizens, a number of troops were dispatched against the two little cities. At the news of the intended expedition Patriots from all over the country rushed to the rescue. Day and night they worked at the defenses of the two places, but when the Union troops finally appeared and fired a single shot, their courage left them and they fled; nor did they stop until after they had crossed the frontiers of Utrecht.

The Union troops, however, who for many years had suffered under the insults of the Patriots, got even with their enemies by plundering the houses of some of the local leaders. Whereupon Holland did something which was quite unheard of: it formally protested in the Estates of Gelderland against the barbarous behavior of the Stadholder's soldiers.

They of Gelderland sent a lengthy answer to Holland, the gist of which sounded remarkably like "Mind your own business." This the Estates of Holland declined to do. The game they were really after was the Stadholder and not the estates of a

neighboring province. To William, who during all the commotion had quietly remained in Nymegen, they addressed a very curt note, and asked him to state within twenty-four hours exactly what he thought of the violent measures to which the Estates of Gelderland had resorted in order to subdue a few innocent rioters.

The Prince answered in substance that he had had nothing to do with the whole matter; that at the request of the estates of the province he had furnished some troops as it was his duty to do, but that this was an internal affair of the Estates of Gelderland, which, as the sovereign of their own province, could take such measures as pleased them to maintain order.

Holland, however, had expected a disavowal of the conduct of the Gelderland Estates. The panic caused by the frightened Patriotic soldiers had been followed by a terrible storm in the press. In the Estates of Holland, de Gyselaer had characterized the conduct of William as that of a second Alva. The Patriots had to go back to Philip II of Spain and to Nero to find examples of such cruelty and lust as had just been manifested by William, when he allowed his murderous troops to descend upon the innocent children of the land and transform a peaceful scene into smouldering ruins.

Under the influence of these exaggerated sentiments the Estates of Holland now went one step farther, and by a majority of fifteen votes, on the

22d of September, 1786, they declared that William V had been deprived of his high office of commander-in-chief of the army and the navy. Since the Prince was not appointed to this office by the Estates General, but by each province separately, the Estates of Holland could legally take this step. But it can easily be imagined what the result was upon the general condition of the country. From that time on, so far as Holland and Utrecht were concerned, there was no longer any stadholder at all. Without saying so openly they really seceded, and they hinted that they would never allow the Stadholder to return to their territory.

The fear that the Stadholder might call upon the regular troops and that his adherents in the different large cities might try to throw off the unpopular Patriotic yoke, threw these two provinces into a veritable turmoil. A German princelet, with some reputation as a soldier, was hired to command the army of Free Corps soldiers, and the town of Utrecht, which was the advance post on the road from Nymegen to Amsterdam, was strongly fortified.

All to no purpose. The Stadholder did not move. After long hesitation he went at last to Amersfoort, where, after a continual quarrel between Patriots and Regents, he had been obliged to send a few soldiers. His friends in Holland urged him to move swiftly across the frontier of Holland and show himself in the Hague. The people at large, so they as-

sured him, were so disgusted with the overbearing insolence of the Patriots that they would welcome their stadholder with the greatest joy. No harm would befall him. He would find thousands who were willing to give their lives for his defense, if only he would take the initiative and come.

The Stadholder did not move. Finally his wife, tired of the humiliation of hesitating and of the whole business, decided to go instead of her husband. For many years she really had been the intellectual head of the Prince's whole family and had acted when her husband could not make up his mind what to do. But the clumsiness which had become characteristic of everything undertaken by the Prince or his friends was present even in this supreme moment. In order to succeed, it was necessary that the Stadholder should be in the Hague before the Patriots could become aware of his presence. Except by a complete surprise nothing could possibly be achieved. Instead of preparing the expedition to the Hague secretly, however, everything was done in a most open way. Instead of traveling with only a few friends, a whole staff of maids and flunkeys must needs be dragged along. Instead of going posthaste with fast horses, the regular postal route was used and all the horses along the road were chartered days beforehand.66

No wonder that the Patriots in Holland knew about the plan long beforehand. They sent delegations of their soldiers to the different villages along the frontier and waited. When finally, on the 28th of June, 1787, the Princess and her large retinue set out for the Hague, she was promptly stopped the moment she entered the territory of the Province of Holland and was forced to go back to Nymegen.

Here was something entirely new in the annals of Dutch history. The stories which were circulated about brutal treatment of the Princess were nonsense. She was treated respectfully by the officers who commanded the Patriots, and suffered no hardships. But in 1787 it meant something for a few farmers and cheese-dealers, dressed up to represent soldiers, to stop the sister of the King of Prussia, to put her under technical arrest, and tell her please to return whence she had come. Such things could not pass by unnoticed. Before many days were over, a great rumbling was heard from the direction of the Prussian capital and His Prussian Majesty wanted to know what it all meant. He was informed that this was purely a question of the Estates of Holland. They alone were responsible. The Estates General had neither dared to oppose them nor to encourage them in their conduct, and it was to the Estates of Holland that the King of Prussia was asked to address his remonstrances, which he did with a great showing of righteous anger.

Holland again had vague hopes of help from France. But France was not in the least inclined to risk a war on behalf of the crazy crowd which at that moment governed the once so mighty province. The other provinces tried to appease the wrath of His Majesty by officially disapproving the conduct of Holland. So did the Estates General after all was over.

This was the time for the extremists among the Patriots. All those who still had something to lose went over to the conservative wing of the party. All those who had nothing to lose doubled their energies towards bringing about a conflict. In the Estates of Holland the most absurd laws were being passed against all the enemies of State. Those who were openly caught in any way showing their sympathy for the Stadholder could almost without form of process be shot. It was openly advised to confiscate the possessions of the Stadholder and to exclude him and his house forever from the stadholdership.

From all sides the Free Corps marched to the places where attacks were most feared. The Patriotic papers shrieked in the loudest notes of hysteria. Prussia was collecting twenty thousand men along the frontiers of Gelderland. An invasion might be expected hourly. And still the Estates of Holland refused to offer to the Prussian King their excuses for the insult which his sister had suffered at being returned from Holland territory as if she were a traitor to the State. According to the estates there never had been any insult at all. They, the estates, were sovereign in their own territory and could refuse admittance to whomsoever they pleased.

The first Prussian demand for satisfaction was followed by a second one, in even plainer language. The answer which the estates sent was practically the same. In so many words, they stated what they would rather do than apologize.

Thereupon the King of Prussia sent an ultimatum. Either the Estates of Holland would send their most humble apologies within four days or he would order his troops to invade their province and get satisfaction by means of arms. The four days went by and the Estates of Holland sent no answer. On the 13th of September of the year 1787, the Prussians, commanded by a cousin of the Duke of Brunswick, invaded the Republic and along three routes marched towards Utrecht and Holland. And then the débâcle took place. The Patriots had great hopes of Utrecht. The town was well fortified and defended the route to Amsterdam. The Prussians, however, did not bother about Utrecht and marched around the city. All the cannon and the men defending the city were therefore useless.

A terrible panic followed. One after the other city and village surrendered to the Prussians without an attempt at defense. Amsterdam inundated the country around its walls and in this way maintained itself for a few days. The Hague, which possessed no fortifications, was entirely at the mercy of the enemy. The estates thought of fleeing to Haarlem. But they could not decide this question

in time and kept on deliberating until the Prussians had surrounded their assembly.

Within five days the Restoration had been completed. A week later, when everything was over, William appeared in the Hague, loudly acclaimed by the population. He had done nothing himself to bring this change about, but he took the consequences of the Prussian invasion as his good right, as something which was plainly due him. He saw himself reinstated into all his old dignities and resumed his old comfortable existence in the palace of his ancestors. His wife now had all the satisfaction she wanted. The Prussians received half a million guilders for their trouble and returned home.

The Restoration was not followed by any violence towards the defeated party. There were no hangings, shootings, or executions of any sort. Everywhere the Patriotic Regents were dismissed and their places were taken by friends of the Prince.

No attempt was made to change the constitution of the land in such a way that a repetition of these events should be an impossibility. Everything was left as it was, and a return was made to the old system of patchwork and unsatisfactory, halfway measures.

Neither did the Stadholder try to use the moment of victory to form a solid party around himself. No attempts were made to master the faithful lower classes into a strong Orangist organization. Many of the Regents who had had enough of this one

experiment in hobnobbing with their tradespeople turned into strong conservatives and were willing to support the Prince. The Prince, however, was not willing to accept the support of those who once had been his open enemies and refused to have anything to do with them.

And what became of the Patriots? They formed that most dangerous of things to the healthy life of a state, a class of perpetually discontented people. Thousands of them had so compromised themselves during the years of violent partisanship that they no longer felt happy at home. They left their country as voluntary exiles and went to France or to Belgium. All the little Belgian cities along that frontier, not to speak of Brussels, were full of Dutch immigrants, brooding on their woes and meditating on ways and means by which they could return to power. The Stadholder had been willing to drag a foreign power into the controversy in order to save himself. Why should they be particular about the measures which they chose to promote their own interests? As a matter of fact they were not. More and more they allowed themselves to come under the influence of the doctrines which they heard preached around them in France and in Belgium. The French Revolution was greeted as the daybreak of a new era by thousands of Dutch exiles.

When France started upon her career of bringing the blessings of liberty to the other nations of Europe, these exiles were among the first to enlist in the French armies. From their fellow Patriots in the Republic they knew how little the Restoration had brought that peace and quiet which were so necessary to the country; now, on the other hand, the dullness of the Stadholder and his advisers had turned the momentary enthusiasm into frigid and lasting indifference.

It is true that during the first year strong Prussian garrisons divided among the most rebellious cities kept the old partisanships down. But not only did those soldiers cost the country at large enormous sums, but by their brutal behavior they started among the people a desire for revenge upon the Prince whom they regarded as the cause of all their troubles, whom they held directly responsible for the events which had brought the country under foreign domination.

Attempts to revive the trade and commerce of the Republic failed entirely. Too much territory had been lost during the prolonged war with England. Rivals with more up-to-date business methods had taken the place of the Dutch merchant and could not be moved.

For the army and fleet nothing was done. In despair the Republic was forced to return to its old treaty of friendship with England in order that, in case of need, it might receive support from the British navy. A treaty with Prussia held out hope of military assistance on land.

In a vague and desultory way some efforts were made to put the internal politics of the Republic on a better basis. But nothing was accomplished. The Regents, afraid lest there should be a repetition of the events which had just occurred, turned their faces firmly away from all manifestations of those modern ideas which were then becoming the common possession of all Europe.

All those who had something to lose, of whatever creed or politics, now united to make a last stand against the new doctrines of those who had everything to gain. No longer did the Free Corps march, no longer did the Patriots discuss the salvation of the State in their political clubs. The Free Corps had been disbanded, the clubs had been closed. The newspapers no longer preached to the eager multitude, who had formerly taken in their editorials as the truth of a new gospel. The printshop was locked up and the editor most likely lived in Dunkirk or Brussels waiting for the day of revenge. Without a single man of character around whom the people could rally, without guidance. faced by as unproductive a conservatism as a nation has ever known, the days of the Republic were counted.

On the 21st of January, 1793, Louis XVI was decapitated. On the 1st of February the French Republic declared war upon the Stadholder of Holland. A desperate but futile attempt was made to put the country into a state of defense. The battle

of Neerwinden in March put a momentary stop to the victorious campaign of the French. For the moment the Republic seemed saved once more by foreign intervention. But not for long.

Two years later, in the fall of 1795, it pleased the Almighty Lord to do away with that which is perhaps the most pathetic of all earthly things, an institution which has outlived its usefulness.

EPILOGUE

And this is what happened to the Republic after it called in outsiders to settle its partisan quarrel. The French army walked to the Hague and the Stadholder fled on a miserable fishing-smack. He was sorry to lose his country, but he seemed a great deal more impressed by the inconvenience experienced in crossing the North Sea on board the ill-smelling craft. He reached the English coast in safety, and there we may say good-bye to him. After a few years he went to such of his German possessions as were left him by Mr. Bonaparte, and in 1806 he died an exile in Brunswick.

As for the Republic, it suffered an upheaval, the like of which it had not experienced since the momentous day when it abjured its lawful sovereign and declared itself an independent state. For the next twenty years it was ruled by the Patriotic party in accordance with the wishes and desires of their masters in Paris. There was not a phase in the varied experience of Revolutionary France which was not copied in the history of the Republic between the years 1795 and 1813.

When France had a Jacobin constitution, the Republic had one, too. When in France the reaction against the extreme Revolutionary sentiments brought about a more conservative state of affairs,

the powers that ruled in the Hague felt themselves compelled to revise their own form of government until it should correspond to that of their great southern neighbors.

Indeed, every absurdity of French revolutionary zeal found its counterpart in the Republic. Whatever was old was abolished, irrespective of its value. The country was re-divided, the political system was reorganized, century-old habits were put away, innovations were introduced, until nobody could longer find his way in the labyrinth of progressive improvements. Instead of the old decentralization, a new system of centralization was introduced so complete that all official business came to a standstill. Constitutions came and constitutions went. until most people were so disgusted with the daily political upheavals that they were willing to accept any sort of stable government, provided it did away with the uncertainty and the jobbery of the professional politicians who were then endeavoring to bring about the millennium. And over and above all there was the cry for money, money, and still more money. The French Republic did not bring "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality" for nothing.

The little affair of driving away the Stadholder, of delivering the free Batavian from the slavery of the Orange yoke, was debited against the Republic in the sum of one million guilders. This sum had to be paid in cash, too, preferably in gold. Also the Republic was requested to board and to clothe

twenty-five thousand French soldiers; not twenty-five thousand a year, but twenty-five thousand as often as they came along, which happened the moment the first batch had been provided with the necessities of life and had been moved on to the next country. Incidental expenses on the part of these gentlemen were paid for with assignats, of which the Republic received a number of millions which were wholly inconvertible.

r But that was only the beginning. Before the Republic got through with France she had paid 276,000,000 guilders in regular and 339,000,000 in extraordinary taxes. In plain English, the Republic was robbed of its last cent. During these many years, there was no trade, there was no commerce, there was no industry. On the sea the English held full sway, and Holland as a subordinate nation to France was obliged to consider England as her enemy. The last little remnants of Dutch trade were cleaned up by the British, and some 120,000,000 guilders were lost by Dutch merchants, who still had ships on the ocean or interests abroad. The Dutch colonies all fell into British hands and not a penny of revenue came from Asia or America.

The Hollanders never had been fond of life in the army. Their new masters did not inquire after their likes and dislikes, but put them into French uniforms and sent them over the face of the globe to fight their wars for them as best they could. Before Napoleon got through with his campaigns, whole regiments of Dutch soldiers had been reduced to two or three men. An entire generation of young men were practically annihilated before peace once more came to the country. When it did come, in 1813, the country was bankrupt, the people were hopeless, and in the town of Amsterdam one half of the entire population was kept alive by public charity.

To recite the different constitutions in detail would be useless. The specialist on Dutch history can find them in the handbooks of Dutch political history. It may suffice to mention in a general way the changes which took place in the old Republic of the United Seven Netherlands.

In 1795, that name was given up in favor of that of the Batavian Republic. The Batavian Republic would not have failed to please even the most ardent of the most extreme Jacobins. Unfortunately it did not please Mr. Bonaparte, when that gentleman experienced a change of heart and turned conservative. Hence in 1801 a second constitution put the nation on a more conservative basis, reintroduced much that had joyfully been discarded a few years before, and provided an element of political tolerance which had been absent during the first victorious years of Patriotic rule.

In 1804, Napoleon became Emperor. He now frowned upon republics. The shirt-sleeve politicians disappeared from the meetings of the estates and the members once more enjoyed their old titles

of "Their High-and-Mightinesses." Incidentally the constitution was changed for the third time, and at the head of everything was placed a raadpensionaris. It was the intention in Paris that His Excellency should be a sort of viceroy of His French Majesty. The first raadpensionaris was a most estimable functionary who loved his country dearly, but who lacked a sense of humor. After a year he was sent home and Napoleon's brother, Louis, was made King of the "Kingdom of Holland," and with the help of a fourth constitution was expected to govern the rich Netherlands to the best interests of his brother, the Emperor. Let it be said to the everlasting honor of Louis Napoleon that he did nothing of the sort. Earnestly, and not without success, he endeavored to rule his new kingdom in accordance with its own interests. During four years he conducted a sort of guerrilla warfare against his brother. He could not positively disobey orders from Paris, but he tried as much as possible to mitigate the hardships which the French policies caused his country. In 1810 his game was up. Napoleon dismissed his brother with as little circumstance as if he had been an unsatisfactory office boy, and on the 9th of July of that year the provinces along the mouth of the Rhine and the Maas became part of the great French Empire.

In a foreign school the Hollanders now learned what they had not been able to learn of their own free will. They were hammered into one nation. It is true that for several years they lost their independence and even their language, but all the advantages of a reasonably centralized government were brought home to them in a most forceful way. It was made clear to petty interests that nothing could be accomplished as long as one part refused to act for the benefit of all and held its own special interests more sacred than those of the whole community.

A more severe master than the Emperor Napoleon it would be hard to imagine. When, in the course of human events, he was sent to cultivate the flowers around Longwood House and when most of his work was undone by little potentates who possessed all of his vices and none of his virtues, there still remained the basis of the modern state as it had been laid down by the great French Emperor. When, in 1815, the principal European nations, assembled at Vienna, founded the Kingdom of the Netherlands out of the former Republic and Belgium, the rudimentary work of changing the old anarchic republic into a modern nation had been accomplished.

The cost, however, had been terrific. Neither men nor money were left. Private initiative was dead. Of public spirit there was not a vestige. A few families, a handful of men, brought about the revolution which delivered the Dutch from the French yoke before it was freed by the Cossacks and the Prussians. The people at large were wholly apathetic. Dutch life became entirely contempla-

tive. The Hollander became afraid of living. He preferred to retire into the back rooms of his house and find solace for his misery in meditations on the past life of his ancestors or on the future life of his own soul. Innovations of all sorts were unwelcome. Railroads were looked at with suspicion, since the canal boat provided for all the humble needs. A Chinese wall of conservative prejudice surrounded the country and kept out all foreign influence. It was almost two generations before a noticeable improvement took place. Fully fifty years went by before the deserted streets became once more filled with people who had the courage to take up life as they found it and to regard it with common sense, unmixed with the sentiments of dowdy dignity which during the period of poverty had become the ideal of a self-satisfied bourgeoisie.

The first king of the new Holland, the son of the last stadholder, tried to revive the prosperity of his country by reverting to methods that were wholly out of date. His zeal and his good intentions did not make up for his lack of statesmanship. He failed, and his successors were forced to play the rôle of absolutely constitutional rulers.

The Regents tried to regain their old influence. But their day was over. Except in ornamental positions they played no further part. With a few exceptions they had become impoverished, and were either forced back into business or lived a forgotten existence in some provincial town.

As for the Patriots, the men of 1815 were a very different set from those of twenty years before. They had learned a terrible lesson. They had tried to change human nature overnight, and they had discovered that this is a slow and tardy process which has to be handled with the utmost care and with infinite patience.

All of the three old parties, Stadholder, Regents, and Patriots, with their old provincial and civic animosities, disappeared in the new kingdom. For better or for worse, as fellow citizens of one undivided country, and with equal opportunity for all, they have since tried to work out their common salvation.

THE END

APPENDIX

STADHOLDER

RAADPENSIONARIS

1568, William I — the Silent — Jacob van den Eynde. of Nassau Dillenburg.

Paulus Buys, 1572.

1579, Union of Utrecht.

1584, Maurice, head of Council Johan van Oldenbarneveldt. of State.

1585, Leicester, Lord Lieutenant. Johan van Oldenbarneveldt.

1587, Leicester leaves.

of Holland and Zeeland.

1585-1625, Maurice, Stadholder Johan van Oldenbarneveldt, decapitated 1619.

1590, of Utrecht and Overvsel.

Andries de Witt, 1619.

1591, of Gelderland.

Anthonie Duyck, 22 Jan., 1621.

1620, of Drenthe and Gronin-

1625-1647, Frederic Henry, Stad- Adriaan Pauw, 12 April, 1631. holder of Holland and Zee- Jacob Cats, 3 July, 1636. land.

1625, of Utrecht, Overysel, Gelderland.

1640, of Drenthe and Groningen.

1647-1650. William II, Stadholder.

1647, of Holland, Zeeland. Utrecht, Overysel, Gelderland, Drenthe, and Groningen.

Adriaan Pauw, 27 Sept., 1651. Johan de Witt, 23 July, 1653.

1650-1672, No Stadholder.

1672-1702, William III, Stadholder.

1672, of Holland. land.

Zeeland, Casper Fagel, 4 Aug., 1672. Utrecht, Overysel, Gelder- Anthony Heinsius, 20 June, 1689.

1696, of Drenthe.

STADHOLDER

1689, King of England. The direct line of William I dies

1702-1747, No Stadholder.

RAADPENSIONARIS

Isaak van Hoornbeek, 12 Sept., 1720.

Simon van Slingelandt, 17 July,

Anthony van der Heym, 15 March, 1737.

Jacob Gilles, 23 Sept., 1746.

1747-1751, William IV of Nas- Pieter Steyn, 21 July, 1749. . sau Diez, Hereditary Stadholder of the entire Republic in 1747.

1711, of Friesland.

1718, of Groningen.

1722, of Gelderland and Drenthe.

1747, of Holland, Zeeland. Utrecht, and Overysel.

1751-1759, Princess Anna, Governess.

1759-1766, Duke of Brunswick as guardian of the Prince.

itary Stadholder of the entire Republic.

1766-1795, William V, Hered-Pieter van Bleiswyk, 28 Nov., 1772.

Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel, 6 Dec., 1787.

NOTES

The map was made by the author from original sources. All the available maps were so filled with details about non-essential villages and hamlets that the author, for the convenience of the reader, constructed a general map which shows only such places as are spoken about in the book itself. Should the reader feel inspired to make a closer study of the geographical history of the Dutch Republic, the author refers him to the "Historische Schoolatlas," by H. Hettema, Jr., sixth edition, 1910, printed by W. E. J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle.

- ¹ For the history of the invasion of the Republic by the French Revolutionary armies, see Colenbrander, De Bataafsche Republiek, pp. 42–49 Also Blok's Geschiedens van het Nederlandsche Volk, vol. vi, p. 564; Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaarboeken, for the year 1795; and Vervolg of Wagenaars Vaderlandsche Historie, XXVII
- ² The text of the Union of Utrecht has been given, either in full or abridged, by most historians from Bor to Motley. The first separate edition is of August of the year 1579. The best edition is that of Haarlem, 1778 The full text and an excellent discussion thereon are found in Fruin's Staatsinstellingen, edited by Colenbrander, p. 363
- 3 The abjuration took place in the Hague on the 26th of July, in the Big Hall of the Binnenhof, the hall now used for the joint sessions of the two chambers.
- ⁴ On the appointment of William I, see Fruin's Staatsinstellingen, pp. 402-403.
- ⁵ The history of the Estates, as well as a bibliography on the subject, will be found in Fruin, pp. 42-52. The provincial estates are discussed in detail, pp. 222-251; also pp. 209-213. The Estates General, pp. 177-193.
 - ⁶ For the Stadholder, see Fruin, pp. 204-209; 213-222.
- ⁷ For the courts of justice in the different provinces, see Fruin, pp. 115-144; for the Admiralties, see pp. 199-204.
- ⁸ For the office of the Raadpensionaris, see Fruin, pp. 72-73; 225-235, and 288-289.
- ⁹ There is a large literature on the subject of the Regents: G. W. Vreede, Familieregeering; Alberdink Thym, Het Patriciaat to Amsterdam; de Witte van Citters, Contracten van Correspondentie; Elias, De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795. See a curious map of the relations between the families in the different cities in the third volume of Oud Nederlandsche Steden, by

Brugmans en Peters. See the article in volume 1, chapter 4, of Muller's Onze Gouden Eeuw.

As to the power of William III as Stadholder, see Fruin, pp. 278-293.

The beginning of this chapter (chapter II), the scene in the market-place in Utrecht, has been taken bodily from Jorissen's De Republiek in de eerste Helft der achtrende Eeuw To make up for this theft, the present author wishes to call the attention of the reader to the excellent essays of Jorissen, which, covering a great many subjects of Dutch and foreign history, are almost the only ones in his language which can be read for pleasure as well as for instruction.

- ¹¹ Luzac, Holland's Rykdom. Groen van Prinsterer, Handboek der Geschiedens van het Vaderland, paragraph 601, etc. Diferee, Geschiedens van den Nederlandschen Handel, chap vi. Diferee, De Fondsenhandel tydens de Republiek. Blok, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Volk, vol. vi. p. 105.
 - 12 For statistics on the Sont trade, see Diferee, p. 177.
- ¹³ For statistics on the decline of the trade with Spain, the Levant, and Russia, see Diferee, chap. vii.
- ¹⁴ A detailed discussion on the numbers of men and ships engaged in the fisheries is given by Diferee, pp. 220–226 See also Beaujon, *The History of Dutch Sea Fisheries*, London, 1884. Dutch translation, 1885
- ¹⁵ For the decline of the fisheries, see Diferee, p. 435, where the other sources are given.
- 18 For the history of the Hollanders in the East Indies, see H. C. Rogge, "De eerste Nederlandsche handelsonderneming op Oost-Indie." Tydschrift van het Koninklyk Aardrykskundig Genootschap. 1895, O van Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland, J. K. J de Jonge, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost Indie. 1862; G. C. Klerk de Reus, Geschichlicher Ueberblick der administrativen, rechtlichen und finantiellen Entwickelung der Niederlaendischen Ostindischen Compagnie. 1894; E. Laspeyres, Geschichte der volkswirtschaftliche Anschauungen der Niederlaender und ihrer Litteratur zur Zeit der Republik. 1863; J. A. van der Chys, Geschiedenis van de stichting der Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie. 1857; J. E. Heeres, Hoe Stad en Lande een bewindhebbersplaats in de Ootindische Compagnie machtig werden. Bydr. voor vaderl. gesch. en oudheidkunde. 1893. See also the general article in Muller's Gouden Eeuw; and for the methods of the company and conditions in the East, see the articles by N. P. van den Berg, Uit de dagen der Compagnie.
- ¹⁷ P. M. Netscher, Geschiedenis van de Kolonien, Essequibo, Demerary, en Berbice. 1888; M. G. de Boer, Memorie over den toestand der Westind Compagnie in het jaar 1633. Bydr. en Mededeelingen Amst. Hist. Gen. 1900. See van Rees, Staathuishoudkunde, and Muller's Gouden Eeuw.

- 18 J C de Jonge, Het Nederlandsche Zeewezen. Appendix to vol. IV.
- 19 De Jonge, Zeewezen, vol. IV, pp 231, 281.
- ²⁰ Lieven de Beaufort, Verhandeling van den Vryheid in de Burgerstaat. 1737.
- ²¹ J C. Overvoorde, Geschiedens van het Postwezen in Nederland. Gives all the different postal routes in detail.
 - ²² Muller, Gouden Eeuw, vol. 111, pp. 131, 139.
- ²³ Diferee, p 355. W. C. Mees, Proeve eener Gesch. van het Bankwezen in Nederland.
 - ²⁴ Jorissen, Maryken-Meu.
 - ²⁵ Fruin's Staatsinstellingen, pp 314-320.
- ²⁶ See Nyhoff, *De Hertog van Brunswyk*. More interesting is the criticism on Nyhoff by de Beaufort, *Geschiedkundige Opstellen*. 1893.
- ²⁷ The Diary is in the archives of the Castle of Wolfenbuettel. The professor who wrote the Apology was Schloezer, of Goettingen, and his book appeared in 1786.
 - ²⁸ The document is given in full in Nyhoff's Hertog van Brunswyk, p 216.
- ²⁹ Knuttel, Catalogus van de Pamphkettenverzameling berustende in de Koninklyhe Bibliotheek, vol. v, no. 19143.
 - 30 Knuttel, nos. 19152-19155
 - 31 For the pamphlets of this year, see Knuttel, nos 19114-19168.
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- ³⁴ For the negotiations between the Republic and the American delegates, see Nyhoff's *Bydragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde* Derde deel Derde stukje 1842.
 - ³⁵ For this correspondence, see Brieven van van der Capellen, p. 123, etc.
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